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----PREFA.CE

The purpose of this dissertation is to study San Martin's ideas of tree
foreign trade and his execution of the same by negotiations, policies, laws,
and programs.

The investigation w1l1 emphasize San llartin's dealings with

the Bri tisb and the United Stat.es (governments, officials, private companies,

and individuals) in matters of trade and commerce, particularl,. atter his
liberation of Chile 1818 until his resignation of the Peruvian Protectorship
in 1822.

It is not the purpose of this study to (l) vi te a biography of

San Martin, nor (2) to trace his relations with Argentina or Chile, nor (3)
to write on his military campaigns, nor

(4) on the naval operations, nor (5)

on his dealings with Bolivar, except in regard to the trade rivalry exlstlll£
between them for British and American favor, nor

(6) of the domestic

econo~

of Peru, Chile and Argentina.
Spanish commercial monopol,., long a source ot aggravation to nations
desirous ot sharing in a profitable colonial trade, became more odious

1800.

b,.

The colonials themselves grew vividly aware of the benefits accruing

from an unrestricted trade.
appetite.

The success of contraband trade only whetted the

Spanish monopolists refused to alter or concede what they believed

to be their private domain. When th:3 cry of revolution enveloped the Spanish
colonial empire, one of the tenets espoused by South American. revolutionaries
was free trade.

To what extent this principle was adopted by San llartln forms

the basis ot this research.
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CHAPTER I
Liberation of Chile. Prelude to Peru
The turbulence of the lapoleon1c era disrupted European politics and

ecor1OJlT, disaem1.nating repercuasiol1ll throughout the Spanish empire.

To

iaolate England, lapoleon puraued. a policT in the Iberian Peninsula which
precipitated the separation of the South American colonies trom Spain.

The

removal. ot 'erdinand VII in tavor ot .loaeph Bonaparte in 1808 strained.
colonial allegiance to the inept »Other Count17.

The reatored Ferdinand ot

1815 only aggravated the stress by his determination to establish absolute
authori ty in defiance ot the 1812 Constitution.

The eftects ot the new

political ideas awept through the Spanish colonies giving birth to juntas
imitative ot those in Spain and with them a cognizance of political potency
which further widened the breach.
no relief.

Representation within the Cortes brought

The economic distress grew as the grievances multiplied.

Under

such circumstances it was not surprising that the restless Creoles of the
Americas listened with great interest to the precursors of the revolutions.
Miranda, Bolivar, and Moreno, each with his own particular talent and
philosophy, caught the ears of the di.aatiafied.
de San

On lfarch 9, 1812, Jose

Martin formally joined the charmed circle of liberators.

San Martin, the .future liberator of Chile and Peru, was born on
'eb!"1lal7 2$, 1778, in yapeyU, province of tissiones on Argentina's northern
frontier, the son ot a Spanish officer stationed in the Viceroyalt7 of
1

•
2
La

Plata. t'lihlle still a young boy San Nardn departed with his family for

Spain. Beginning his militar,y life at the age of eleven, he distinguished
himself in the Spanish army, rising to the position of Lieutenant Colonel
at thirty-three. There arises the inevitable question, why did San Hartin
leave a successful career in Spain and cast his fortunes with the daring
revolutionaries? On one occasion he explained that he desired only to
sacrifice everything to promote the liberty of his native land and thus
consecrated himself to the cause of Spanish America. l

The friendship of the

Britisher Lord Fife, through whom he secured passage to South America proved
important later. Because of this assistance, indictments were levied against
the British, who were accused of openly favoring South American emancipation
for commercial reasons.

The validity of these charges will be examined in

this work.
Mart!n1s rank of Lt.
The Buenos Aires government readily confirmed San Martinis
Colonel and he soon began a school for soldiers,

choosin:~

bravery and family background. 2 For political reasons,

his cadets for

san Martin

saw the

necessity for establishing the Lautaro Lodge. 3 The dissension within the
Buenos Aires government perhaps fired his interest in a constitutional
monarchy despite the essentially republican sentiment of the people. In

1.

~

William Spence Robertson, The Rise of the Spanish American Republics as
in ~ Lives .2! their Liberatoi='S'('New
Llberatoi='S'('New YOr'k, 1918), 182.
-

2. The EmanciEation of South America, a condensed translation by William
Pilling of Bartolome Mitre's Ristoria de San Martin
Mart!n l de la emanciEacion
emancipacion
~-americana (London, 1893), 45.
- - -

3.

~.,

47.

pz
pi
)

Jla,reh 1814, San Martin took command of Belgrano' s forces in the northwest,
enforcing discipline and loyalty- to the cause of emancipation.

In August

of the same year, he was appointed Governor of CUTO, there nourishing his
hOpes for the liberation of Peru, the royalist stronghold in South America.
His first step was the liberation of Chile--bT means of the famed Army of

the Andes.
While the Chileans were willing to cooperate in their own liberation,
the main financial support had to be found elsewhere.

San

Martin relied

heavily upon his own province of CU1O. where he had won the affections of
the people.4 He organized the Arrq of the Andes with discipline and
efficiencT. cOmmanding great sacrifice from. the submissive inhabitants of
Cuyo whom he fired with patriotism.

The confidence of British merchants

gave further credit to San Marth.> Assistance from Buenos Aires towarei'the
Chilean campaign apparentlT was very little judging by San Martin's own
statements and thOBe of his contemporaries. 6
The rigorism of San Martin's rule in Cuyo evoked allusions to paternal
despotism.

A strict diSCiplinarian, he tolerated no defiance to his law,

even forbidding the clergy to confess or preach, once their unfriendliness

to "politieal regeneration" became known. The priests were required to

4.

Caesar Rodney and John Qra.bam. The RepYrts of the Present State of the
United Provinees ~ South America (LOndon, 819);-2(SJ."
- -

5.
6.

John Miller (ed.), Memoirs

Et!

General Miller (London, 1828), I, 88-89.

J. P. and W. P. Robertson, Letters on South America (London, 184),
II, 262; III, 344 Appendix.
-

p

4
preach the sYstem of liberty under penalty of arrest. 7 The establishment of
a branch of the Lautaro Lodge in Nendoza was designed to strengthen further
San Martin's position.

There was much opposition to his emancipation of

slaves, whom he planned to employ in the campaign.

It was final4r agreed

to free two-thirds after the Andes were crossed. 8 San Martin's relations
with the government in buenos Aires were not entire4r successful.
Juan Martin de Pueyrredon's sympathies

l~

Though

with San Martin, the latter

would have preferred more concrete approval which v;as slow to ma.terialize.9
The period spent in preparation from 1814 to 1817 finally bore fruit.

The

Army of the Andes became a reality with San Martin its Captain General.

This was not accomplished without the alliance with Chilean
revolutionaries.

There were two factions fighting for power in Chile--one

the wealthy Carrera brothers and the other of Bernardo O'Higgins. San
Mardn favored O'Higgins and was forced to deal severely with the Carrera
party.

One contemporary explained the probable r8asons for the choice.

The

basis of patriotism or strength of party may not have been the criterion.
Of more importance was the O'Higgins ability to remain aloof from local and
narrow interasts.

The

su:,~gestion

that the Carrera party was more favorable

to the United States lihile that of O'Higgins leaned toward the British was
10
branded as mere bait.
The government of the United Provinces sided with

7. Pilling, &Ilancipation

2!

~

America, 115.

8. ~., 127.
9.

~.,

128-29.

10. Henry M. Brackenridge, Voyage !2
)0) passim.

~ ~erica

(London, 1820), I, )01-

pp

O'Higgins.

U

The crossing of the Andes was soon :rewarded with triumph at Chaeabuco.

February, 1817.

San Martin

t.

entrance into Santiago was closel,. followed b,..

his renunciation of a Chilean covernorahip in favor of O'Higgins, and a
declaration of independence, which was formally announced on 'ebrull7 12,

1818.

The battle of liaip{", April

5, 1816, Haled Chilean independence.

Along with revolutionary success came another branch of the Lautaro Lodge,
this time in Santiago.

At this point, Argentine and Chilean 1l1liance wafS

stressed for mutual self-defense and as insurance for the complete
emancipation of South America.
and the

San Martin, O'Higgins, the A~ of the Andes.

Lautaro Lodge were respectively designated by one historian as the

80ul, connecting link, muscle and sinew, and the secret mechani_ of the
a1l1anee. 12 However" the relations between San lIarttn and Buenos Aires
were strained, culminating in his reSignation of the Argentine comrdssion
and

subsequent re-election as general-in-ch1ef of the Chilean anor-

In 1819,

San

Hartin was either characterized as a great liberator with DaU€,ht but

loft,. patriotism or as a demagogue pursuing an arb! trlll7 career for peracnal
glor,r.13
The evant a in Chile were of great importance to two major powers--Great

11. William R. Manning, (ed.), Diplomatic Corre~ndence of the United States
!oncerniM the Independence of the Latin AmerIcan atlons \lew Yori(. 1925).
, j53. ThOiis
U. S:-ConsUl at Buenos lins to James Monroe, Secntar,r
of State. Mar. 3. 1817.

Dal.,..

12 • Pilling, Emancipation.2! South .America" 158.

13. Strictures on a ~e to South America (Baltimore, 1820). 39Brackenridge accUied'

odorIC

Bland of writing the above.

p
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Britain and the United ::itates.

Both were interested in the commercial

advantages to be gained in South America and, therefore, watched the man
who proposed to liberate Chile and Peru, hoping he would throw open the
ports to free trade giving legaUty to an already existent contraband
trade.

Spain branded British and American wide open free trade with her

South American colonies as illegal.

The British and Americans thought

otherwisa.
Sketching briefly tha South American policy toward Britain and the
United states, official and unofficial, through to Chilean independence is
necessary for understanding the major problem of this dissertation.

The

riches and markets of the Spanish Empire in ,'Ullerica were always a tanptation
to canmercially-minded Britain. Unsuccessful attempts to gain access to
this closed trade by means of treaty found hew hope with the imminence of the
Spanish American colonial revolutions. In lB05,William Pitt was informed
of the potential wealth of Sparish possessions to Britain, the resources
of which were alreaqy tapped by British capital and credit. 14 Others
advocated bypassing treaties

~'ith

Spain, favoring assistance to Spanish

colonials. 15 Miranda was cautioned by Sir Alexander Cochrane that nations
not giving aid to revolutionaries should

p~

a duty 10 per cent higher

14. Charles Vane (ed.), Memoirs and corresyondence of Viscount Castlereagh.
Second M~ques or Londonderry (London, 1853 , V, 443=44. Observations on

Bonaparte. s Pacnic Communicat.ions, l".r. Robert Prancis to the Right Honorable
Pitt, Jan. 22, 1805. Henceforth Cited 8.8 Castlerea~h Memoirs"

~illiam

15. Historical Manuscripts COmmission, Report on the Manuscripts of J. B.
Esq. (London, 1927), X, 167 ..59 passim. William \ialton to Lord
urenVille, Apr. 25, 1806.
~ortescue,

p
7

than Britain.

British enemies were to be completely barred from the trade.

16

Castlereagh l s sympathiDs were with the 30uth Americans, especially where the
Napoleonic threat menaced British security.

Economic considerations remained

Perhaps Miranda's 1808 reference to the lucrative trade enja,yed
by the competitive American merchants served to arouse British interest. 17
18
Wellington held another opinion.
Henry Wellesley doubted whether Spain
paramount.

would allow the British to trade freelY with the colonials. However, he
indicated that Spain's financial difficulties might be solved by a British
loan which in turn would predispose Spain to reconsider British commercial
highly in
concessions. 19 Parliamentary discussions found much sentiment highlY
tavor of direct trade with Spanish colonies. The outcome of the revolutions
was watched with considerable interest.
British mediation between Spain and her colonies presented a new
possibility for seeking direct trade as a "tee" tor services rendered. In
1812, the Spanish, officially, were not quite willing to make any commercial

concessions, even for tranquilizing America. Wellesley, however, did not
despair. 20 The impatience of British merchants found expression in

16. Castlereagh Memoirs, VII, 419-21.
17.

~.,

411.

June 9, 1806.

Francisco Miranda to Castlereagh, Jan. 10" 1808.

18. Philip Henry Stanhope, Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington
(London, 1888), 69.
-19. The Duke of WelUngton (ed.), Supplementary; Despatches, Correspondence,
14emoranda 2! Field Marellall Arthur Duke of WellIngton (London, 18bO) ,
VI, >79. Wellesle,y to Marquess Wellesle,y.

~

20. Castlereagh Memoirs, VIII, 269-70. Wellesle,y to Castlereagh, July 28,
1812.

p,
8
parliament with sympathetic men proposing direct trade with the Spanish
colonies.21 The "most favoured nation" clause figured prominently in all
debates and correspondence concerning this direct trade.

Some individuals,

among them Wellington, were even willing, at one time or another, to do all
in their power to discourage rebellion if .:3pain granted certain commercial
22
advantages to the British.
Aloofness from any British entanglement
either with the Mother Countr,y or the colonials also seemed to be the policy
advocated by Wellington.
From 1815 onward, the mediation negotiations occupied more attention of
both Spanish and British officials. Numerous correspondence exists between
wellington and Spanish officials Cevallos, Feman Nufiez and Pizarro. Vaughan
cited a report of the Council of the Indies, which stressed the loss of the
colonies if Spain did not relinquish her trade monopoly. Apparently, the
opening of trade was no longer so repugnant to the Spaniards. Mediation not
force was the answer to colonial preservation. 23 Although .:3pain refused to
grant commercial concessions, the fact remains that the British did carry on
this trade with the Spanish colonies. The successful revolts in South
America opened markets to the British who no longer felt any real legal
necessity for seeking Spanish approval. As mediation became more futile,

21. Great Britain, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, XXVII (1823), 268.
Dec. 9, 1813.
22. Castlereagh Memoirs, X, 44.
23. Charles K. Webster (ed.), Britain and the Independence of Latin America,
llig-1830 (London, 1938), II, 344. Char18sR. Vaughan to Castlereagh,
November 16, 1815, based on Con~rsations with Cevallos and discussion of
Council of Indies Re ort of Jul 1 1815.

.' -

9

Britai-,1 asserted the right of the colon13,ls to remain independent, especially
since Spain could no longer force submission to her laws.

British recognition

of newly-established revolutionary governments was rapidly becoming the policy
boped for by Latin Americans. British officials, e.g., Earl of Liverpool,
emphasized the absurdity of Spanish claims in 1818 that British trade be
24
carried on only through Sparush ports and under close scrutiny.
A requiem
signalling the end of Spanish colonial domination in the New World had begun.
Chile was liberated and Peru became the next candidate for emancipation.
Further discussions of British policy will be covered more fully in other
chapters.
The United States was also vitally interested in South American
commercial prospeots.

For man, years, North American ships defied the

Spanish closed port system claiming Spanish impotenc.y to control the regions
as nullification of monopoly.

Despatching agents to unrecognized states

indicated clearly official American thought and interest in potential
markets. Joel R. Poinsett was sent in 1810-1811 but did not observe strict

diploma~ic decor~~.25 In 1816, Joseph Devereaux was appointed for the
purpose of gathering information "interesting in a political point of view."
Devereaux exceeded his powers and on January 23, 1817 J William y,Jorthington
succeeded him as Special Agent to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru. Thomas

24. v.iellington, Supelementa;!2 Despatches, XII, 823. Earl of Liverpool to
Castlereagh, Nov. 9, t818.
25. Henry M. vlriston, Executive Agents
(Baltimore, 1929), 414.
26. Ibid.

!!! funerican Foreign Relations

26

10
Ha.lsey in Buenos Aires and Matthew Havel in 3antiago were appointed specifically for commercial missions and Worthington ",as calltioned not to interfere

in the domestic aff.airs.

The object of Worthington's mission WaS to explain

the mutual advantages of commerce and to transmit pertinent informatIon back
to Wasrdngton.

27

Worthington assumed too much power and soon was recalled.

co-existent with such incidents were protestations from the United States of
28
strict neutrality.
To offset the activities of some Special Agents and, at the same time,
to 7,ather more information regarding the stability of revolutionary governments
and commerctal prospects, the Rodney-Graham-B1and commission was appointed
with Brackenridge serving as Secretary. On July 18, 1817, the commission
received its first instructions. 29 At approximate~ the same time, John
Prevost was selected to reside alternately in Chile and Peru, cooperating
wi th the Rodney-Graham mission. 30 The reports of the commissioners varied
in their sympathies to the South American cause. Along with a detailed
account of the Chilean economic position, Bland's report contains much
information on the political stability of revolutionar,y governments, colonial
intrigues, conferences with O'Higgins, and some comments upon the liberator
of Chile.

27.

~.,

Under~ing

all other material is the impression that the

415.

28. Worthington C. Ford (ed.), writin~s of John Quincy Adams (New York,
1915) , V, 5S1. To James Monroe, Mar. 0, 18~
29. Manning, Dielomatic Correspondence, I,
JO.

~.,

49.

43-44.

u
commissioners tried to convey to revolutionary leaders. the United St.tes
sought commercial arrangements with the new governments. 31
The active interest taken b,.. the United States in the revolutions

precipitated voluminous correspondence with Luis de On1s, Spanish mini.ter
to the United States.

One major source of irritation concerned privateering,

especially from New Orleans and Balttmore. 32

However, the United States

could ba.rdlT hope to convince Spain of her sincere intentions to control
the privateering when private mercantile interests loudl:y acclailaed. quite
another polk,...

The presence of revolutionar;y agents, sueh as Jlanuel

Aguirre, further attested to the direction ot private and even official
sympathies.

Recognition waa still not fe.aible.

of a war with Spain.

There remained the danger

)Ioreover, while the British were promoting the cause

of independ.ence, the,.. were reticent to acknowledge tonaall,.. the existence
of the new states. 3)

The two nations in 1818 were, officially at least,

highly interested spectators, while unofficially there was little that

transpired without their influence.

The natural eonsequence of s1lCh a dwal

policy was their vigilant observation of San MartIn t s actinties in Chile
and, at the same time, an active participation in eapecially the economic

31. U. S. Congress, American State Papers, DocUllJllllnts, Legislative and
Executive of the Congress of the United State., From the First Session of
tr.o Fou..-teenth to First Session of the Seventeenth Congress, Class I,
Foreign Relations (Washington, 18)4), V, 291-312 passim.

32. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, III, 19lo-19U.

33. Samuel

nagg

Bemis, (J:clz
(J:c!l D~o_tic .Ili.sions from Bueno. Aire. to the

t!~rr!::-ip;rri;~2t939 to·:tob:roi8:~9~~i68-6~tiquarian SOCi~;-

paz
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life of t.his count17.

The following study of British and American commercial

activity in Chile during San 1W-t!.n's preparations will illustrate the
1')osition talren by cit.izens .and officials of both powers.

~

How olosel1' did

BrUJ.sh and Arnericfm policy coincide with San Marttn's economic ideast
Above all, what were San Martinis views on tree trade up to l818t

How did

he carry out hl.s ideas in the preparations for the campaign, during the
campaign, and especially wilen he liberated Chile?
ad."'lere to San Martin' 8 economic philoaoplV'

of the Chilean trade?

What

Bow closel1' did O'Higgins

What was the extent and nature

are the facts?

As early as 1813 the British were oognisant of San Martinis favorable
disposition toward them. 34

that San

In 1816, William Sowl.s informed J. W. Croker

Martin had persevered in

integrit1" honor, and disinterest, which

he thought very rare among the liberator's compatriots.';'>

On 'ebru&l'7 22,

1817, San lLart1n wrote to Bowles that an interview between them would

contribute very much to the mutual welfare of Chile and England.

II'oreover,

he stressed, the presence of British war ships would be very desirable for

th~ protection of British commerce. 36
dated February

25,

Pua,Tredon'.

letter to San Martin,

1817, clearly expressed the oifer made to England and

France in return for negotiation, iree trade.

However, the reply of both

goverments ind1.oated it was already too late to mediate for Spain would.

.34. Ricardo Piccirilli, San liart1n 1 La Pollt1ca de los Pueblo. (Buenos
Airea, 1957), 402. Bowle'8'to eroiC8r, Tan. 26, 1813.35. Ibid., 409. Sept. 22, 1816J

1.1.0 see Webster. Britain and Independence,
I, lO3-ii54, Henry Chamberlain to C.atlereagh, A.pr. 5, 1817. -

36. Webster, Britain!l!! Independence, II, 102-103.
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never be able to maintain her colonies • .37

That the British took advantage of

commercial opportunities in Chile is a fact.

Furthermore, theY' kept a clo..

watch on competitors, especiallY' the United States.

The increased commerce

also increased the dangers from Spanish ships and enterprising privateers.
More British ships of war were needed to protect merchantmen. 38

The risks

involved did not deter British merchants from P17ing their wares along the
Chilean coast • .39
Bowles was apparently not the only Dritisher in whom San Martin confided
his plans for Chile and Peru.

Staples wrote to Hamilton on Kay

25,

1817,

that San Marta requested an intervi_ with him, Meldng Dritish approbation
for his schemes.

San Martin hoped that some authorized person might be

assigned to con8Ul t with him private17 upon Chilean affairs, indicating his
British preferences.

The neces.itY' of

Chilean waters was re-emphasised.

a British naval force stationed in

If direct assistance would not be possible,

San liarta at least hoped for British neutrality.

attributed to San

lIartin that

However, the statement

he did not require money, arms or soldiers is

suspect. What did be expect from the British?

The partial an....r to this

question is indicated in another section of the letter which solicited British
assistance

III

insurance against the factional rivalry which might develop in

the event of Peruvian independence. What further te.timon)" is needed to show

37. Museo Mitre, Documentos del Archive de San Mart!.n (Buenos Aires, 19101911) , IV, 564. Cited henceforth as ~ -

-

38.

Piccirilll,!!n Martin :: Politica, 416.

39.

.!2.!2.,

429.

Bowl•• to Croker, Mar. 1, 1817.

Bowles to Croker, !iay 24. 1817.
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San MartIn's disposition towards EnEland than the statement that Bwhatever
advantares this country Chile has to offer, its prosperity cChile's2 depends
on conceding them to England. w40

On June 18, 1817. San Martin wrote to

Bowles informing him of the letter he had sent to Staples regarding British
protection for their commerce. 41 The high degree of confidence enjoyed by
Bowles was further attested to by the statement that without this official
nothing might have been finished. 42 While the above observation probably
referred to a specific incident, it could well be true of many others.
The friendship begun in Europe between San Martin and the Earl of Fife
continued in letters anddBveloped into a

b~

correspondence file.

In

addition to reports of military successes and pronouncements against a
democratic form of government, San Martin's December 9, 1817. letter lauded
the virtues of the English king.

He was certain that if the monarch cast one

of his "compassionate looks" the Americans would respond with much gratitude
to his subjects. 43 Could one expression of this gratitude be commercial
advantages?
More concrete evidence that the offer of trade was not a myth can be
found in the instructions given to Irizarri, the Chilean agent in London.
If Britain wished to favor the cause of independence, Irizarri was

authorized to make the followil)f coneessions: (1) the cession of the Isle of

40. Webster, Britain and Independence, I, Appendix I, 553-54. Robert
Staples to William Himiiton.

41. Piccirilli, ~ Martin Z Politic a, 439.
DASK, V, 416. O'Higgins to San Martin, Nov. 8, 1817.
42. DlSK,
43. Webster, Britain!!!!!
Britain ~ Independenee,
Inde ndenee, I, Appendix, 556-57.
556-57_
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Ghiloe and the port of Valdivia (2) the reduction of 10 to l~; per cent tao"\(

u::.on importations a.nd of 4 per cent upon exportations for all i:>ritish ships
during

Ii

thirty-year period. 44

The san Martin-Gastlereagh correspondence further amplifies his trade
policy with respect to the British. Although not the author of an enclcsure
to his letter of January 12, 1818, to Castlereagh, its sentiments could well
mirror

S<~n

Martin's ideas. The enclosure was a letter written by O'Higgins

to the British king, dated November 20, 1817.

In return for British mediation

and intervention in behalf of the revolutionary cause, Chile would shower her
appreciation in several formst tree admittance of British ships to her ports)
exchange gold from her mountains for British goods; and the political and
commercial treaties which would contain "advantageous conditions as gratitude
would owe" to Chile l s benefactor. 45 The subject of mediation appeared again
in San Martin's letter to Castlareagh, April 11, 1818.

46

It

portr~ed San

MartIn's admiration of British influence in European politics and the hope
that it would be exerted in behalf of the South American, cause.

San Martin

sought British aid in political and economic spheres and was willing to grant
the much sought sweet plum--free trade.
Did San Hartin treat the other tlinterested party" with a similar policy?
A letter to Preeident James Monroe, indicated that the United States was
al~o

solicited to lend aid and affluence.

44.
45.
46.

Piccirilli, ~ Martfn l Politica,
Webster, Britain ~ Independence,

-Ibid., 558-59, Appendix.

containing the oft-repeated ideals

443. Bowles
I, 556.

to Croker, Feb.

14,

1818.
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wbich prompte() hir'l t.) free the oppressed from Spanish tyranny, dan Mart!n 1 s
leVLier requested the extension of protection nne assistance to Agui.rre,

adcing that. the areas under his orders "will not fail to give consistency and
respect to the p)~omises of both Goyernments. 1t47 The O'Higgins letter to
Monroe, April 1, 1817, expressed a more positive approach to the question of
Chilt;cID trade.

As Supreme Direct.or of ::hile, O'Higgins announced to the

world the potential resources of this "new asylum" to further mutual
prosperity and the 6Rtablishment of liberal commercial and political
relations.
fine. him

The promotion of commercial activities, O'Hig:Sins proIllised, would

lnOt1t

cooperative. 48 Smphasis, however, was upon "all nations"

rather than favoritism to a particular one.

Exclusive commercial advantages

as the prerogative of Great Britain or the United States was not officially
favored by either

p~~ar.

Bagotts letter to Castlereagh, February 8, 1818,

referred to the "coincidence of sentiment" in this respect. 49
The commercial activities in South America, despite official prono~ncements

by words.

to the contrary, bespoke a trade rivalry not so easily settled

The presence of an American officer seemed vital tor the well-

SO Voluminous reports from Special Agents
bein~ of mercantile interests.
interests.'O
47.

Great ~ritain, Foreign Office, British and Forei~ ~ate Papers (London,
t3 30-18 36), Vo lurne 1817...1818, 808. No date given but ~anning stated it was
pro~ably \pr.·l, 1817.

48.

Manning, Dielomatic Correspondence, II, 899.

49. Castlereagh !'1emoix:s, XI, hOS-406.
50.~ Manning, Diplomatic C2rrespondenc2' I, 370. W. G. D. Worthington to
J. ~. ~damsJ JRn. to, !81~.
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1f. G. D. Worthington and John B. Prevost more than confirm the threat of

British commercial monopoly. Worthington's letter to Adams, January 15, 1818,
evaluated the Chilean situation and San MartIn, and cautioned that a ·certain
great Commercial Power of Europe will get a footing here too firm to be displaced,·51 which he feared would injure American commercial interests.
Prevost's report, February 13, 1818. indicated that the Supreme Director was
most anxious to obtain the confidence of the United States as insurance
against European intervention. 52 The Chileans desired the friendship of both
Britain and the United States and would probably hesitate before committing
themselves officially to the most favored nation policy until political
stability was assured.

Antagonizing either power deliberately was suicidal

with the Peruvian campaign already taking shape.

San Martin needed consider-

able support he could secure in attacking the Royalist stronghold, and this
meant the culmination of friendly relations with the merchants of Britain
and the United States, who would supply his military necessities.
In the event of any dispute involving commercial interests of its
subjects, British and American naval forces stood ready and most willing to
intervene, although their ability to protect their interests vacillated with
circumstances.
Working closely with the American naval forces were the Special !fents.
who managed to be present whenever yreat events transpired or American
interests needed representation.

51. ~., I, 372.
52. ~., II, 913-14.

The official Chilean recognition of the

18
"Special Arent" status enhanced the American position in matters of commerce. 53
For example,Worthinpton made certain of his presence when vessels of the
Uni ted States confiscated by the Royalists were in danger of being claimed by
the revolutionaries as royalist property. 54 The further benefit of Special
!pents was their constant observation of the commerce of their own nation and
the British. ,San MartIn's relations with the American agents were ~ood and
Worthj nvton repeatedly spoke hig-hly of him in his reports to Washillf,ton. 55
The pleasant result of amicable relations was the rising ascendancy of
Un:ited States commerce in areas emancipated by the Army of the Andes.
Prevost's report of April 9, 1818, clearly indicates the advanced status of
the United States in South America.

That there existed deep feeling for the

United States, a feeling which should be nurtured to defeat the influence
of British, waa Prevost's conviction. 56 British-American rivalry was ever
present but San Mart!n personally and throug-h his officials and friends
efficiently utilized the resources that each commercially minded country had
to offer him.

It would appear, however, that his strongest personal allegiance

was to the British.

Whether this remained true of the remainder of his

career in South America, specifically in Peru, remains to be investigated in
succeeding chapters.

53.

~.,

916.

:>'~4 •

~.,

II, 916. Worthinpton to Adams, Mar.

Miguel Zaf1artu to Worthington, Mar. 1, 1818.

5, 1818.

55. Ibid., 919. Worthington to Adams, April 8, 1818.
56.

-Ibid.,

920-21.

Prevost to Adams.
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The patriot victories in Chile were c,3.l'efully noticed and scrutinized in
?eru.

The liberation of Chile was a harbinger of doom for the Great royalist
The Viceroy, Joaquin de 12. rezuela y Hinojosa, :3panish officials,

bdwark.

merchants, and populace surveyed the Chilean revolation with mixed feelings.
In addition to military reports, fortifications, and naval encounters,
royalist attention also centered on British and American commercial activities
anc; evaluations of the caudlllo San Nart!n.

'!'he opening of Chilean ports to

flri tain and the TJn! ted 3tates, and the extension of unrestricted trade policy,

salted the wouncl of an already e:-dstent Peruvian uneasiness. 57

Pezuela re-

g'lrded Bowles with as much suspicion as he did the commander of the

.

,

Ontario, Captain J ames Biddle.
not

on~

!!..

~. ~

•

He reaUzp,d fully that the naval commanders

protected the commerce of their respective countries, but also aided

the shipment of arms and munitions to the insurgents. 58

The Rodney-Graham

mi'ssion and AGuirre's solicitations brOUGht further distrust of the United
3tates. 59
the

Pezuela's instructions to General Osorio included an emphasis upon

ne~es0ity

of recapturing Chile for economic securit,y.

The loss of Chile

brought a loss of customs duties amounting to half-million [pesos] annually.
This loss made it difficult t,o maintain the war, and moreover, impoverished
innumerable merchants engaged in the trade.
e~tab1ished trP.8

On the other hand. the insurgents

commerce enabling them to acquire financial

~ssets

for their

57. Vicente Rodr!guez CasadO and Guillermo Lohmann Vi llena (eds.), Memoria
~ Gobierno ~ Virrey Pezuela 18l6-~ (Seville, 1.947), 88. Aug. t7, t8U>.
58.

~.,

183. Nov. 12, 1817.

59.

~.,

203-204.

Joe. 20, 1817.
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ca.l':1p".igns tha.t helped but ships to blockade port::smd disrupt Jpanish

commerce. 60 Thus, lihile the Chileans shO't·n~red praise upon J.an Hartin, 'l.he
roya.lis::'s heltI him greatly responsible for t.hair plight.
The extensiveness of the Chilean trade, and individuals and compardes
engaged in this trade from 1814 through the time of Chilean independence
must be considered.

The presence of En tish ships in Chilean waters is noted

in much of the correspondence for the 1814-1818 period.

The ships were not

all part of the British naval squadron, since many were merchant ships
carrying arms and munitions with ordinary commodities.

At times, the British

flag flew atop a ship definitely not of British origin, notably the Pezuela. 61
Since the British government officiallY frowned upon open aid to the rebels,
there is little information for this period concerning the comapnies involved
in transporting such cargoes.

One of the companies mentioned

Neita and Company, Bucklesbury.62

~

Bowles is

There is more information about Edward

Ellice, London merchant who through Jose Antoniollvarez, Chilean a.~ent,
bought and equipped the Cumberland for the patriot cause.

Instructions for

the ~tvarez miss:ton came directly from Jan Mart!n. The Alvarez mission was
apparentlY not without tribulations, mostly financial. 63 However, the final
contract was signed on

60. ~., 195-96.

l~ovember

25, 1817. Among the various stipulations

Dec. 9, 1817.

61. ~, V, 384. O'Higgins to San Mart!n, July 27, 1817.
62.

Piccirilli, ~ Mart!n l Politiea, 436.

Bowles to Croker, June 30, 1817.

6J. ~, VIII, 231-33. J. A. Alvarez [Coudareo] to San Hartin, Nov. 22, 1817.
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concerning the payments for the Cumberland is a most interesting clause.
According to this clause, the supercargo or person authorized by Ellice was
free to bring in the ship goods amounting to 6,000 pounds sterling with permission to sell them in any part of Chile or Peru upon the authority of the
Chilean government completely free of duty. Moreover, the supercargo was to
export, on returning either the specie or fruits of the country also free of
any custom charges. 64 Since the contract was negotiated under instructions
from San Martin, or at least the agent Alvarez was informed of his wishes
in this matter, the contract is one example of 3an Martin's commercial policy.
American commercial involvements furnish considerably more data about
the companies and ships which dealt with San Martin or the Chilean government.
It would be erroneous, however, to judge the extent of the trade solely upon
the amount of documentation.

The contraband trade flourished65 over the

protests of the United States government.

American and British merchant

ships made a mockery of the Spanish blockade.

Despite the watchful eye of

the naval forces and the Chilean squadron, occasionally the Royalists seized
ships and rich cargoes destined for patriot use.

Information on companies

and individuals in the United States dealing with San Martin or his
representatives is fuller than their British counterparts.
Any stuqy dealing with the sympathizers, b.Y conviction or convenience,
of the South !Unerican cause will find a roster of impressive names.

64.

~.,

191.

65. ~., V, 413. O'Higgins to

San

Martin, Oct. 25, 1817.

Although
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there were many challengers, Baltimore was most often the habitat of the prorebel entrepreneurs. Thus, it became the natural magnet of revolutionaries
seeking ships, supplies, munitions, and also the center for commercial
activity with newly independent states. The bond between the Buenos Aires
government and Baltimore merchants developed early in the revolutionary
period.

Fit-t,ing out privateers was good business and men like Thomas Taylor,

acting in the capacity of a commissioner, "brought six blank patents for
disposal among interested merchants."66
Of greater interest were the activities of Henry Hill who arrived in
Chile in May of 1817 as supercargo aboard the Salvaje disposing of war
67
supplies to San Martin.
Towards the close of 1817, Hill and Lynch started
a mercantile house in Chile, the counterpart of
of Buenos Aires.

~ch,

Zimmerman and CompaQY

Valparaiso was Hill's commercial territory.

In March of

" Hill was appointed United States consu 1 for Santiago and Va1paraiso. 68
18ld,

Hill's business partner was Estanislao Lynch, younger brother of Patricio
Lynch of Iqnch, Zimmerman and Company. Many of the business transactions
69
were aided by DeForest.
Estanislao ~ch was particularly useful to San
Martin in the dispute centering in Buenos Aires and involving payment for
supplies.

San Martin published in the Gaceta [in Buenos Aires] on January 3,

1818, a statement signed by

~ch,

to the effect that he had received money

66. Benjamin Keen, David Curtis DeForest and the Revolution of Buenos Aires
(New Haven, 1947), 164. He arrived earlY in1815.
-

67. Bemis, Early Diplomatic Missions, 40.
68. Henry Hill,
........~-=.-.;;....;_
~-=.-;....._ (Boston, 1884), 86-81.
~.;;..;.:;;.;;..;..;;..;;.;;;.;..;;.;;.;;.
~;..;.,;;;.;;;.;;...;;...;.;;;.;.;;.;;.;;.
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and copper bars valued at 62,493 pesos for the cargo of the 3alvaje. In
the merchants received various advantages, amon6 them exemption
of duty for export gOOds. 70
~atitude,

The firm of Darcy and Didier was well known for its dealing with Chilean
insurgents.

Due to their efforts, Jose

in December, 1316, guaranteeing

government.

71

p~ent

Ca~rera

sailed

aw~

with three ships,

b.1 a still non-existent Chilean

Carrera's other contacts were John Jacob Astor of New York,

Walter and Nixon of Philadelphia, 8.nd Robert Oliver and Thomas Tenant of
Baltimore. 72 How much these men contributed, if anything, is difficult to
say.

The Salvaje, discussed in connection with Henry Hill in earlier

paragraphs, was furnished and loaded by Darcy and Didier.

The Expedition,

the ship which brought Carrera to the United States, was owned by Henri
Didier. 73 The Aguirre maston, appointed by San Martin in A.pril 17, 1817,
also involved the compaqy of Darcy and Didier. 74
Working closely with the Darcy and Didier company as the Buenos Aires
representative was David Curtis DeForest.

It was not unusual for the real

owners to pass nominal ownership to men like DeForest thus protecting themselves from the charge of illegaUty.

The customary commission for rendering

such service was a ten per cent commission of net proceeds on the prizes

70.

Diego Barros Arana, Historia General

71. Keen, DeForest
72. Ibid., 103.
73.

~

~

Chile (Sant..iago, 1890), XI, 194.

Revolution, 105.

Bemis, Early Diplomatic Missions, 39.

74. Manning, Diplomatic Gorrespondence, III, 1973.
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captured by the privateers.

DeForest was aided in the equipment of the

pri vateers by Thomas 'l'enant and George Crownj nshield. 7> lot all of DeForest's
activities were above reproach, even to parties anxious to secure ships and
supplies. 76 Joining DeForest in many of his privateering adventures was
General William Winder of Baltimore, appointed by Pueyrredon on February 2$,
1518, as special deputy of the United Provinces of La Plata. 77 All of these
individuals and companies were in various degrees responsible for securing
ships, supplies, and other necessities requested by the Army of the Andes and
the Chilean naval squadron.

Nhile claiming great personal devotion to the

cause of independence, more often it was the glitter of gold that prompted
and sustained the American entrepreneurs in their South American ventures.

Victory at Kaipu, April 1816, decisively announced Chilean independence.
During the campaign, the tantalising prospect of free trade dangled continuall
before the eyes of the two most interested nations, Britain and the United
States.

Chilean independence a reality, what was the commercial and economic

status of this country?
comnercial scheme?
~hat

degree?

How did the British and Americans fit into the new

Did they secure any of the promised advantages and to

How far did O'Higgins and the Chilean officials follow the

trade policy of San Martin now completely absorbed in planning the Peruvian
campaign?

Contemporary documents and accounts furnish much tnformation in

75. Keen, DeF'orest
76.

~, VIII,

77.

B~~is,

~ Revolution, 106-107; Ill.

184-85. Matias Irigoyen to San Martin, April 30, 1817.

Early Diplomatic Missions, 77-78.

t"1i s respect.

Hall IS VoYages contain considerable det,aHs regardinc Chilean commercial

life, forcipn and domestic.

Ch~lean

11beration, and its "consequent establish-

ment of English and Mr.-rtl: American mercantile houses, have wro'Uf'!1t a rreat

~hnr.re in the whole systEm, It Hell observed. 78 This contemporary paid much
heed tn the' min1ng nctivities, stressing the British investments in the
copper trade. wh1ch nc·t only proved financially ac1vE.ntagecu5 uut eliminated
the services of the Chilean mini ll€ c&.pitalist actillf as the middle rr-.an.
Moreover, the British goods consig'ned to Santiago merct;.;.nts, Britieh or
American, were paid for either in specie or copper.

Due to this unrestricted

comr.:erce, the owner of t.he original foods made a rrofit, the Chileans lierE"
smmlied with commodities previously not
a lIIaluable return for their e:ervices.
numerous.

However, all t.his

-)"189

tvana~)le,

and the nerche..nts acquired

The advanta.fes to t.r..e mine owners 'Were

novel to South America and the consequences

of recent changes. 79
Stevenson's Narrative contains the statement that after the revolution
"e.lmo8t any t.h:i.!¥; !

1!

I!lf'lesa meets with approbation_ n80 From 1817 onward,

the-;re was a noticea.'!:>le increase :in tl-tc number of wholesale merchants, retail
dea1ers, Chileans S-"ld foreign :merchant vessels.
business.

The ports were ttrivi!'!g with

Whereas in 1809 the Chilean custom-house had receipts amounting

to 26,738 1/2 dollars, by 1821, the total had increased to h64,387 3/4 dollars.

'(8.

Captain Basil Hall, Voyages (Edinburgh,

(9.

~.,

1826), II, 54.

60-63.

80. William Stevenson, A Historical and Descriptive Narrative of Twenty Years'
Residence 1.n South America .... {LOndon71S25), fiI, 161.
-
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In 1809, 13 ships, all Spanish, entered and left Valparaiso but, in 1821,
the number was 142, 21 were war ships and 121 commercial vessels. al The
monopoly enjoyed by Spanish merchants and its strangling effect upon Chilean
economic life had disappeared.
Anglo-American commercial competition in an independent Chile remained.
The presence of American agents and consuls continually disturbed Bowles, who
wrote on June 7, 1818, that British merchants needed better, accredited
representation in Chile. 82 The United States, however, encountered maQY
obstacles in Chile, especially due to Cochrane who seemed to favor and promote
British commerce, though there were instances where this did not hold true.
Cochrane's role in the commercial activities during and after the Peruvian
campaign will be discussed at greater length in other chapters of this
dissertation.

Actually, the greatest percentage of Chilean trade was

British. B3
Contemporary American accounts evaluate the commercial status of a
liberated Chile. One such account referred to the ports, formerly restricted
by Spanish monopoly, now thrown open to the world. 84 Theodore Bland's
report, part of the Rodney-Graham mission, offers extensive coverage of
Chilean economic conditions after independence, since Bland arrived in

-Piccirilli,

31. Ibid., 163-64.
82.

~

Martin I Politica, 449-50.

83. Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin
America !§.gQ-1830 (Baltimore, 194t), t~5. - -

84.

Brackenridge, Voyage

~

South America, I, 301.
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Santiago on Nay 5, 1818. In oonversation with O'Higgins, Bland remarked that
the United States did not wish to bargain with Chile via treaty for commercial
advantages but for the ability "to trade freely, upon terms of equality and
mutual benefit. 1I85 Since foreign recognition was of paramount importance to
Chile, O'Higgins indicated that the nation which shall first reoognize its
independence would be extended many commercial advantages. He hoped that
the United States would be that favored nation.

Bland replied that he had

no instructions to speak on this matter but believed the United States wanted
no commeroial inducements for acknowledging Chile. However, Bland did say
that the people of the United States would appreciate any municipal regulations
favoring their oommerce but not as part of any direot treaty.86
Bland's discussion of Chilean oustoms and taxation indioated the
fluotuation of import-export duties.
per oent.

In 1818, these duties amounted to 22

The excise paid on all artioles sold, the aloabala, was quoted as

10 per oent, with all foreign merchandize subjeot to this excise.

Liquors,

claret, Windsor chairs, silk and morocco shoes of French fabrio all paid
double duties.

The government itself sold tobacco, snuff, arms and

munitions, granting speoial permissions to individuals when necessary.
Bribery and special fees, although illegal, still expedited goods through
the customhouse. 87
Sinoe the opening of some Chilean ports in February 1817, twenty-four

85. Amerioan State Papers,
86. ~., 294.
87.

~., .301.

For~ign

Relations, IV, 293.

Bland Report.
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American ships carrying a cargo worth $1,385,000 [a supposed estimate] and
twenty British ships with a valued cargo

of'~1,835,ooo

entered the country.

However, the cost of the goods was not collected immediately.8S During 1817,
the total estimate of imports into Chile,

~

land and sea, was calculated at

a little less than $4,000,000 of which $2,000,000 came from England,

~l,OOO,ooo

from the United dtates, and $1,000,000 from Buenos Aires. The balance of
trade was definitely not favorable because the exports for the same period
amounted to about

~2,OOO,000.

Two reasons advanced for this deplorable

state of affairs were (1) the over importation of goods (2) the necessity
for a middleman in many transactions. 89
At the commencement of the Chilean campaign, San Martin personally or
through friends or officials, promised commercial advantages both to Britain
and the United States. The closed port 8,Ystem of the Spaniards was replaced
by

considerable trade activity which grew as Chilean prospects for inde-

pendence became more feasible. With the completion of independence in 1818,
and

de~pite

duties, taxes, rivalries, blockades, and political uncertmnties,

Chile offered free trade.

The future commercial growth of Chile, however,

depended to a large exteLlt upon the outcome of the Peruvian cnmpaign.

Braced

with this thought, the Chileans prepared to give substance to San Martini s
promise: the liberation of Peru and subsequent extension of free trade.

88. ~.,
89. ~.

305.

-CHAPTER II
Outfitting of the Peruvian Expedition
There could be no tranquil nor certain Chilean independence with the
ever-menacing Royalist controlled Peru directly to the north.

Nor did the

royalists intend either to allow one loss to deter them from reconquering
Chile or lead to the complete extinction of the:f.r domination in Peru.
is precisely what San Jlartin envisaged.

This

To him, the Chilean campaign was

a means to subvert royalist power and revolutionize Peru with one of the
watchwords of the period, free trade.

While this was hardly the sole tenet

of the revolutionaries it was, nevertheless, of prime significance in
motivating the Peruvian expedition.

Spanish commercial monopoly opposed

colonial interests which considered free trade the basis of agricultural
and industrial wealth. l

How extensively San Jlartin imbibed of this

revolutionary principle and how closely he followed its dictates during the
earliest stages of the Peruvian campaign will be studied through his
promises to the Peruvians and his subsequent dealings with officials, private
companies, and individuals who furnished both the capital and supplies for
the expedition.
San Martin had made no secret of his Peruvian plans prior to Chilean

I1ber~tion.2 Be had publicly expressed his opinions more consistently as
EmHio Romero, ItApuntes sobre las ideas de orden economico durante la
revolueion por la independencia del Peru," Me~urio Pemano, III, (Lima, 1939),
36-37. Author cites Riva Aguero's "Las 28 Causas de 1a Lvolueion de ~ ••
2. Robertson, Letters .2!! ~.!., II, 210.

1.
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victories :i.n Chile grew, culminating in Maipu. With Chilean successes came
problems.

The Army of the Andes dwindling by desertion and weakened by

indifference needed employment.

San MartIn's difficulties with the Buenos

Aires povernment over the Army's return to the Argentine resulted in his
refusal to move back, thereby offending a potential supporter of the
Peruvian campaign. 3 ChHean confidence brought San Martin a new commission

as head of the liberatiOf
liberatiDf army.

Contemporaries appreciated the ripeness of

4 Peruvian insurrection arainst Royalist
Peru for the San Martin project. 4
control, fomented by the Chilean revolutiona.ries amoIlf' an uneasy and dispopulace. became part of the strate£y.)"" The Chileans prepared to
affected populace,
give substance to a dream.

Designated by a British observer as a great and bold measure originating
Martin,6 the Peruvian expedition was highly propagandized among the
with San Martln,6
Chileans. 17 The inhabitants of Cuyo found

many

d1 recti ves and pleas addressed

to their attention. 8 Even Peruvians sympathetio
sympathetic to the revolutionary cause
oause

asked the Chileans to advance the sacred cause of liberty and remedy the

3.

Killer. Memoirs,
Kemoirs~ I, 259-60.

4.

DASIl, VI, 290-91, Guido to San MartIn, June 2, 1818.

5.

~., IV,
~.~

6.

Hall,
Hall. Voyages. I, (1826 ed.), 54.

402, Jan. 29,
29. 1819, probably wr:ltten by San Mart!n.

1.
7. C. Galvan Moreno, Bandos Z Proe1a:mas
Proelamas del General San MartIn (Buenos Aires,
1941), 168-69, San Mart!n's proclamation to-the Chilean;-c18l8-!819_.
1947),
Chi1ean;-c18l8-18l9_.

8.

~.,

179, San Mart!.n, AU[!. 16, 1819.
179.

31
widespread commercial distress. 9 Peruvian s.ympathizers were encouraged qy
emissaries and pamphlets. 10 To these must be added the numerous proclamations
from [;oth O'Higgins and San Martin.

In one such address, O'HigGins enumerated

the Peruvian grievances, among them Royalist monopoly, and praised the virtues
of independence. ll On November 13, 1818, San Martin explained to the
Peruvians the viceroy's response to his letter of April 11, 1818, in which
he suggested reforms.

The proposal for a free type of government met with

insults and San Martin promised that only under freedom could the natural
riches of the country flourish and commerce expand to its fullest measure. 12
That the Peruvians needed prodding was noted by several contemporaries.
Hall mentioned that the people had to be prepared for independence,13 this
despite the many pro-revolutionary s,ympathizers.

On September 8, 1820, San

Martin discussed the activities of the Cortes and the new constitution which,
he argued could never be successfully applied to the colonies, since distance
made representation impossible. Although a liberal party in Spain concerned
itself with American independence, the Cortes was not of the same mind. 14

9.

DASH, XI, 269-71 [1820J.

10. Pilling, Emancipation

£! South America,

235.

11. Galvan Moreno, Bandos 1 Proclamas, 15B-59.
12. Jose de la. Riva Aguero, Memorias l Documentos para la Historia de la
Independenci,a .2!1: Peru, l Causas del: !:!!! ESdto (.~aris, l'B>BJ, II, 13:t>'
13. Hall, Vgrages, I, 183.
14. Hanuel de Odriozola, Docu.mentos Historicos del Peru (Lima, 1863), IV,
--- ---33-34, San Martin to the PeruVians.
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October 12, 1820, San Martin explained more fully the object of the Peru
expedition.

He did not seek military glory to gratify his personal views but

to give independence to his country fulfilling the duties imposed upon him by
"fate and nature." When Peru will have decided by which form of government
she would be ruled, he said. then his employment would cease. 15 This document,
like many others, did not specify tree trade as one of the principles for
which San Martin fourht the Peruvian campaign.

The promises made to the

Chileans and Peruvians were couched in general terms stressinr political
freedom and material advancement.

The general propoganda was calculated to

stir the patriotic imagination of the masses while specific promises of
commercial benefits were directed to quarters most likely to profit by them,
whether they be Chileans, Peruvians, or interested foreign powers.
One of the interested powers was Oreat Britain.

Ho sooner had the first

pronouncements concernine the campaign been voiced when British officials
and

private citizens injected themselves into the proceedings jn varyinr

degrees of involvement.

British ships stationed jn ChUe or cruising along

the Chilean-Peruvian coastline noted all activities coneemine military and
naval preparations.

laval lists were compiled16

and

numerous commentaries

revolving around the personality, ability, and motives of San Martin can be
found in Hall's description of his personal encounter with the liberator.

15. British State PaEers, 1819-1820, 990, Manifesto of the General in Chief
of the Liberating Army of Chile on the' failure of the negotiations for
Peru with the Spanish Viceroy of Peru.

16. Pedro Torres Lanzas, Independencia de America, Catalogo de Documentos
Conservados en el Archivo General de fndias de Sevilla (Madrid, 1912), V, 38.
July, 1820.
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Hall praised San Martin's political maxims but noted that these were not
always consistent with his conduct. 17 San Martin's sincerity was unquestioned
and t.he

Peruvian campaipn described not as a war of conqvest and glory but

war of new and liberal principles against prejudice, btgotry,

Other estimates of Ian Martin were less kind.

t:i

anl~ tyranny.l8

He was accused of carrying

out the counsels of a British general who wished the emancipation of South
America for commercial reasons. 19 Moreover, the post 1818 rapport between
San Martin and Cochrane wavered as the admiral continued questioning the

military strategy of the general. 20 The weakened relations between the two
elicited much comment both at home and abroad. A correct estimate of San
Martin's position in the period after Chilean independence is important, for
upon it depended the amount of support he was to receive for his next project.
Was he still considered reliable and motivated by highest principles or was
he succumbing to the intrigues that characterized the independence era? Was
he in any position to fulfil his commercial promises and had his influence in
this sphere waned or risen?

Opinion in this matter was divided.

Reports from U.S. agents indicated that San Martin was more than
capable of carrying out the Peruvian expedition successfully. Worthl.npton
wrote to Adams, April 8, 1818, that Peru would secure independence, and

17. Hall, Voyages, I, (1826 ed.), 178.
18.

Ibid., 180-81.

19. Ricardo Levene, El Genio Politico de ~~ Martin (Buenos Aires, 1950), 26.
Levene cites Juan B. Irberdi, "El Crimendel'a guerra," Escritos Postumos
(Buenos Aires, 1895), II, 213.
.
20.

DA.SJi, IV, 512, O'Higgins to San Martin, Aug.

7, 1819.

33a
expressed admiration for San Martin. 21

In November of the same year Worthing-

ton told Adams that he might probably eat his Christmas dinner in a liberated
capital of the incas. 22

Prevost considered the "Perus" as "irrevocably

separated" from Spain and able to "maintain themselves as independent
powers.· 23 Worthington was moat vocal in his admiration of San Martin. on
one occasion calling him "brave and politic,ft 24 and on another "the greatest
man I have seen in South America.· 25 An equally ardent admirer, Hill,
referred to San Martin as a man of great influence,26 possessing devotion to
duties, integrity. prudence, and moral rectitude.

As a commercially

interested observer, Hill's comments on San Martin's "enlarged and liberal
views,·27 so characterized by foreigners, are highly pertinent.

All reports

dealing with San Martin's character and conduct were not so favorable, some
attribu~ing

to him burning ambition for military despotism in his designs

for Peru. 28
The Peruvian Viceroy Pezuela remained constantly informed about the
projected expedition.

Some of the reports came via the American ships

21.

Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 919.

22.

~.,

1024, Nov. 18, 1818.

23.

~.,

1041, Prevost to Adams, Sept. 13, 1819.

'24. ~., I, 372, Worthington to Adams, Jan. 15, 181 •

25.

~., II, 533, ~lorthinF'ton to Adams, March 7, 181

26.

Hill, Recollecti.ons, 126.

27.

~.,

131.

28. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 308, Bland Report, May
1818; Strictures, 99-100, Letter of American Citizen, Oct. 12, 1819.

5,
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cruising the Chilean-Peruvian coastline, for example the Ontar1o. 29 The
Viceroy was also well aware of the varied activities of the British ships
which continuously involved themselves with the royalists and the insurgents.
In view of the various threats to Royalist control of Peru, the officials in
Lima sought military aid trom Spain where an expedition was already prepared
to depart for an attack on the rebels ot Chile. 30
From the very beginning it was apparent that San MartIn's Peruvian expedition could not be financed and equipped b.1 an insolvent Chile.

Chile's

critical situation was recorded in many contemporary accounts and
correspondence. 31 Despite Chile's economic plight, constant effort was made
to acquaint the people with the necessity of freeing Peru as a means of providing an excellent market for Chilean eoods. 32 Earlier, the Chileans had
given their silver for the sake of independence 33 but in 1819, there was no
money and the economic and financial situation grew worse. O'Higgins wrote
to

3an

Mart!n in January, 1819, pointing to the need for troops, munitions,

transports, and to the necessity of seeking 600,000 pesos outside Chil0,34
and in a second letter, January 20, 1819, he again stressed the need for
29. Casado and Villena, Memoria Pezuela, 247, 255, April 21, 1818; DASM, V,
82, Pezuela to La3erna, A.ug. 9, 18t~.
30. DASM, IV, 350, lrigoyen to San Martin, Feb. 20, 1819; 360, Irigoyen to
San Martin, June 15, 1819.
.
31. Manning, Diplomat:tc Correspondence, I, 372, Ivorthington to Adams, ,Jan. 15
1818.
32. DASM, XI, 65, "Manifiesto del Gobierno a los pueblas que forman e1 estado
de Chile," Bernardo O'Higgins, May 5, 1813.
33. Rodney and Graham, Reports, 211.
34. DASM IV, 392-95, Jan. [16, 17, 18J 1819.

money.

An exhausted public treasury and undependable customhouse dictated
that financial assistance be sought elsewhere. 35
The helsewher.- proved to be Buenos Ajres which found itself in much the
same economic distress as Chile. 36 Cooperation between the two countries had

been established earlier in commercial and political affairs 37 and mutual
interests now demanded further cooperation on the Peruvian project.

Viceroy

Pezue1a's proposal to open Callao to British ships had elicited much common
concern in 1818 over Chilean and Argentine commercial interests centering in
Peru. 38 Mutual interests had demanded mutual strategy.
Of immediate concern was the procurement of supplies desperately needed
by the Army of the Andes and Cochrane's naval SQuadron.

Letters from Zai1artu.

Chilean lfinister to Buenos Aires, reflected the difficulties encountered in
securing the needed supp1ies. 39 The Argentine Supreme Director, Juan Martin
de Peuyrredon, also spoke of the troubles associated with providing ships
and naval artillery. 40 On December 2, 1818, Pueyrredon reported to San Martin
regarding the preparation of frigates and request for 33,500 pesos made by

35. ~., 167-68.
36.

Hall, Voyages, I, 60.

37. Diego Luis Molinari, "La Expedicion Libertadora al Peru y los Principios
de Derecho PUblico Coetaneo,· Boletin ~ Instituto 2! Investigaciones
Historicas, II, (Ano II, 1923-1924), 8. Footnote no. 1.
38. DASK, VI, 314-18 passim, Guido to Supreme Director of the United Province
Santiago, Sept. 29, 1818.
39.

Ibid., V, 701, Zai1artu to San Martin, Buenos Aires, Nov. 12, 1818.

40.

Ibid., IV, 601-602, Pueyrredon to San Hartin, Buenos Aires, Hov. 1818.

zanartu. 4l lone of San MartIn's pleas for assistance bore fruit, for on
January 28, 1819. he wrote to Pueyrredon and complained bitterly that not only
did the United Provinces fail to provide 6,000 men but even the 3.000 requested
recently.

There was alsc the questinn of supplies requested in July, 1818,

which never materialized, among them hardtack

and

salted meat.

The Army of

the Andes had needed men, ships, food and manit-ions but the United Provinces
were silent to the afflictions besetting the expeditionary force. 42 The
same day San .Martin had written to Jose Rondeau

and

expressed similar dis-

satisfaction with the progress of the Peruvian expedition. 43
Although noble sentiments ard pronouncements of assistance outweighted
either financial or other material aid, the Buenos Aires government did
attf'mpt to aid San KartIn.

On February

5, 1819, a spec::!.a.l treaty

was

sirned between Buenos Aires and Chile which had as its purpose the. liberation
of Peru a.s a joint measure.

Both governments pledged themselves to procure

armed force for the project; to avoid dispute over expenses and eliminate
allus10n to questicnable motives behind the expedition both agreed not to
discuss the Te1..mbursement fer the expenses unUl they were able to settle them
wi th

the j-l'lCiependent r.overnment of Lima.

At this time, the agents of both

governments wodd settle amicably the amount, time and ways of repayment. 44

41.

42.
43.

44.

-Ibid., 608.
-Ibid., 377-98.
Ibid., 383. San MartIn to Rondeau. Jan. 28, 1819.
-Riva
Jlem.orias Z DocumentoD, Articles III and IV,
AgUel"O.

6, 7.
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l~ere

were no specific agrcem6nts with respect to the amount either party

would contribute to securing the armed force, maintaining it, or hovJ" these
objectives would be carried into effect.

There were further demonstrations

of mutual assistance. 4S
On JulY 28, 1819, San Martin wrote to O'Higgins first calling him "the
arbiter of Latin 4merican destiny," then extolling the superiority of the
Royalist naval forces, a factor which necessitated the cooperation of Buenos
Aires in building up the Chilean squadron.

San Martin su:!,;:;ested
Bu:!,;:;ested the

following terms for the desired cooperation: (1) the United Provinces would
give the Chilean Government SO,OOO pesos to equip the squadron; (2) from the
day the squadron would sail, the United Provinces were to pq and clothe
the division led by Col. Las Heras; (3) 2,500 troops were to remain in
Mendoza and be emplo.yed for Chilean defense; (4) the United Provinces were
to contribute 6,000 horses to Chile by next February at the latest; (5) the
United Provinces were to indicate the amount of provisions and various
replacements needed by the squadron. 46
Not satisfied with contacting important officials

in~3uenos

Aires, San

Martin sought assistance from the governors of the various United Provinces,
among them the governor intendente of Cuyo.47 His plea was always the same,
the Peruvian expedition could not materialize much less succeed without arms.

45. DASM, IV, 285. Letter d~ted March 19, 1819, to Supreme Director of
Chilean ,State from Francisco Borja ~'ontecilla and Jose Maria Villareal.
46.

~.,

47.

~., 470, Aug. 16, 1819.

Sal, ;;>an Martin
Mart1'.n to O'Higgins, July 28, 1819.
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supplies and money.

'The Cuyo inhabitants had Great confidence i.n .:>an 11ar·t.!n

and, accordine to contemporary reports, had freely yielded up their sla.ves,
),000 horses, 10,000 mules, plus personR.l services when he readied for t,lle

Chilean campaign. 48 Now, when hev,ras preparing to strike a similar blovl at
Peru, the people of

Ct~o

once again evidenced a noble response especially

arnoni~ t,he different officers of the municipality and corporations. 49 Not
only did they offer their wrought silver but vowed to do more for the success
of the expecti tion.

The secnlar and regulA.!" clergy, magistrat.es 2nd corporate

1)odies stripoed themselves of their plate and silver utensils. 50
v,Thile the condition of the army continued to be distressing, that of the
naval squadron seemed to prosper under the "unremitting assiduity" of Lord

Securir~ and provisioninG Ships, always somewhat of a problem,

Cochrane. 51

was solved by various means, legal and otherwise.

There was much speculation

about where Cochrane found the ships and the supplies when the scarcity of
mon~J

made both more difficult to obtain.

3till another denied the fact that either Cocr~ane or tte

merchants. 52

48.

One source credited the British

Department of State, General Records, Washington, Special Agents File on

C. A. Rodney, John ClTaham, Theodore Bland and J. B. Prevost, Rodney Report,

A, 1818, 29r.

Microfilm.

49.

~.,

50.

~., 37r, Mar.

Sl.

Hall, Voyages, I, (1824 ed.), 67.

36v.

5, 1818.

52. National Archives, ~1iushington, Despatches from 3pecial Agents, Jeremy
Robinson, A.ugust 4, 1817-September 21, 1823, Robinson to Adams, June 1, 1818.
l'1:e88 desnatches are on microfiL'n but orit~lnals were checked. Henceforth
cited. as Special Agents, Robinson.
-
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British Government equipped the patriot navy.53 But the guns, munitions and
other l'rticles of war necessary to a naval fleet were found as can be seen
from an account dated January 18, 1319, and signed by Jose Manuel Borgoffo,
commander of the artillery, who noted that

on~

a part of the supplies were

destined for the naval squadron and the greater portion to the ar~.54
On

Hay 25, 1819, San tl.artin wrote to the Minister of State, Don J.

Echevarria, enclosing a list of necessities for a maritime expedition of
four thousand men, which should be able to sail at the latest the middle of
November. The letter indicated a great need for four gunbonts,55 while the
list itself detailed all the specific items that would be necessary including
the necessary trans[jI}rts for the troops.56 An American observer and agent,
Robinson, reported to Adams, June 30, 1819, that Cochrane would come to
Santiago to refit his vessels which would then be well supplied with Congreve
Rockets and with arms and military forces adequate to take the royalist

p~ssessions.57 Just how did San Martin and Cochrane expect to supply their
ever increasing need for ships, munitions and war goods? Robinson's letter
expressed confidence that the rockets and munitions would be there when
needed by the Peruvian expedition, naval and military. Robinson mentioned
53. National Archives, Washington, Despatches from U.S. Ministers in
Argentina, October 22, 1818--April 8, 1820, Worthington to Adams, March 7,
1819. Microfilm. Cited in future as U.S. Ministers Argentina.

5h. DASM, IV, 396.
55. Ibid., 465.

-

56. ~., 461-63 passim.
57. Special Agents, Robinson, June JO, 1819.
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that Buenos Aires and Chile were cooperating happily by sending the military
and maritime expeditions but no particulars were given about the actual
source of supply_ With regards to the ships themselves, he said, many were
purchased either from

for~ign

merchants, e.g. the British Cumberland renamed

the General San Martin, or the Columbus, now the Araucano.

Chile also

purchased the Chacabuco for 35,000 pesos. 58 It is easy to understand Chilean
need for money when the cost of the various ships is taken into account, for
exa;ple the Araucano bought at a cost of 33,000 pesos.

Although confiscations

provided some of the ships, many of them had to be bought, and moreover,
provisioned.

Adocument

with Prevost's name attached stated that San Martin

had 6,000 men and would receive provisions for four months by those who
furnished the transports. 59 This could well refer to the contract sipned in
September, 1819 between individual merchants and the Chilean government for
the purpose of outfitting the expedition, and which will be discussed further
in the chapter.
With respect to the provisioning of the

~,

land transportation also

had to be considered. Arrangements were made to purchase mules and horses of
Which there was a constant shortage.
upon these items existed.

Despite this shortage, import duties

In August of 1819, however, the case of

58. DASM, V. 439, O'Higgins to San Xart!n, Aug. 17, 1819.

59.

-

National Archives, Washinp,ton, Despatches from Special Agents, July 10,
18l7--Oetober 1, 1825, John B. Prevost, James Biddle, Stanhope Prevost, and
John Dorr, Extracts of a letter from a gentleman, March 9, 1820. Document
has the name of Prevost at the top. Xicrofilm. Cited in future as Special
Ap,ents, Prevost, Biddle, Dorr.
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Matias Morales challenged the payment of duties upon mules.
the Chilean

gove~~ent

At this time,

decided to enforce the duties on mules but revoked

import duties on horses for a period of two years. 6O
Increased demand for various supplies was not matched by a prosperous
treasury that could accede to the soupht for necessities. Many reasons were
given for insuff1.cient funds but one especially deserves attention.

O'Higgins

had complained to San llartin in his January 20, 1819, letter of reduced
profits, citing limited trade as one cause.

Free trade had placed much of

Chilean specie in the hands of foreign merchants but it was not they who had
to create and maintain armies and a naval sqUadron. 61 Disruption of the
Peruvian trade further depleted the Chilean treasury and added a point to
the patriotic reasons for extending the revolution jn that dlrection. 62
The lucrativeness of the Peruvian market, expecially without any kind
of royalist restrictions, weighed so heavily upon commercia1ly-m1nded
entrepreneurs that they resorted to espionage and propaganda.

The benefits

of free trade were flaunted before Peruvian eyes, using Buenos Aires and
Chile as exmap1es.

O'Higgins issued a proclamation to the Peruvians in

which he spoke of the foreign nations vying w.1 th each other commercially

60. National Archives, Washinrton, Communications of Department of State
from Foreign Leeationa in the United states. Chile, February 20, 1811-July 16, 185), document sirned by O'Higgins and Secretary of Senate
Chamber, Jose Karia Villareal and dated August 6, 1819. 1I1crofilm. Cited
henceforth as Foreign Legations, Chile.
61. BartOlome Mitre, Historia de San Martin
Americana (Buenos Aires, 18901, ~18.
62.

Barros Arana, Historia Chile, III, 366.
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ane bringin~ to the Chileans not. only their personal aie: but also arns. 63
A.mon:s the sncret aE::n!l'ts operating in Peru was Raf:J.elhrfias, 64 DO!TIingo

'l'orres,65 Jose Fernandez paredes,66 all of whom received definite
instructions concerning their mission.
were a prime

t~get

for observation.

The economic conditions in Peru
Re,orts from

LL~a

signed by Aristipo

Emero61 and Senor el 301dado68 gave further evi.dence of Peruvian conditions
and sentiments.

'!he name of ~ochrane, his activities, British interests and

mercantile speculations formed the basis of many reports.

Of con8iderab1e

importance WaS the auestion whether or not the viceroy wOllld accede to free
trade in the fa.co of the impending Chilean expedition and the f'lnl'lncial
disasters already shaking Royalist economy.69

Since the reward of the

ULerl'l:tion was the prize of free trade, how J!'IJlch support would the British
or ,':Tl1eric;ms provide to the expedition if the Royalists handed the prize to
them vlithout demanding loans, supplies or negotiating cont.racts stipulating
trade concessions in return for assistancp.?

The possibility of free trade

63. u.s. Ministers Argentina, O'Higgins to the Peruvians, n.d., but
probably 11a;.v 1019.

6L. .Jarros Arana, Historia
65.

~,

-

Chile, XII, 162; DASH, VII, 161.

VII, 1.4.

-

06. Ibici., 161.

6",.

~.,

116, Mar. 16, 1519.

6,).

~.,

152, Oct. 28 [1819].

6,). Ibid., 114-15, Juntt. de Corporaciones sobre arbitrios, Guido,
'" b-ruery--March,
()
1'8
1019.
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with Peru was not exactly untenable even in 1818. 10
rear of royalist policies, economic pressures within Chile itself to
trade in Peru, preparations for the expedition, lack of money and supplies,
promises of liberation to the Peruvians, promises of foreign aid meant only
one thing--80mehow Chile would have to equip and maintain the expedition.

In

June of 1819, Joaquin de Echeverria wrote to San Martin concerning contractors
who had submitted to the Chilean government diverse proposals for outfitting
the expedition. 11 On August 7, 1819, Tomas Guido also wrote to San MartIn
regarding the contractors mentioning Pena and Sarratea who were to lodge and
transport 4,000 men to Peru.

The

proposal of these two men was approved by

the Chilean senate but as yet nothing had been done although the merchants
showed great confidence in San Martin as the leader of the movement. 72

The

same day Guido wrote another letter to San MartIn ..ntioning Cochrane's
foreign crew which entered the service with the hope of a short and lucrative
campaign.

He closed the letter acknowledging receipt of 50,000 pesos to

carry out his mission. 73
The names of licol&s Rodrigues Pefta and Juan Jose Barratea were
mentioned again in connection with Paulino Campbell.

Pefta was a friend of

70. Ibid., VI, 314, Guido to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces,
Sept.2'lr.' 1818.
71.

~.,

IV, )01, June 3, 1819.

72.

~.,

507, Aug. 7, 1819.

73.

~.,

IV, 510-11, Aug. 7, 1819.

and Sa.rl. l<art:!'n IJ.ad sold Pena pl'operty in 1/}20 v9.1ued at ,30,000

pr,yment in 1:·22, it 'liaS made clear that the remainir:g amount vJas usee! to l?ClY
a note signed by 3an Hartin in favor of Campbell to cover the chorter of a

ship carrying f>orses to the liboruting army of Peru.

CaJI'll.)cell

V73.S

c~

J.3ritish

merchant who became associated with Perla and. .3arratea in Chile in connection
with the transport of 3an l'lart1n's troops to Peru.
ahove debts continued even in 1842. 74
;';8ver"tl reasons.
the e:;<p:3dition.

Litig::l.tion involving the

Th:i.s document is interesting for

One, it definitely imVlic:ltes several merch2.uts who supplied
Two, it involY8s one. British merchant in the transaction.

Three" it estaLlishes a tie of friendship between San Hartin and the
"contractors" for the expedition.

Four" it notes an <:unount of money paid

for the tra.nsport of horses, if the t3'tatement is correct.
Fhen the r5-nal contract was si;ned on September 2, 1'319, the following
d.:.natures appeared officiall;yt Bernardo O'Higgins" NicoUs Rodriguez Pen.a,
JU3.D

Jose Sarratea, Felipe Santiago del Solar, and Joaquin de Echeverr·ia.

The

c0ntr?ct l'lW.rie the followin;:: stipUlations: 75 (1) the company was to provide in
tho month of December, with a difference of fifteen days either way, all
the preparations

m~cessa.ry

for the expedi Mon, the nllmber of troops to be

determined by San Mart{n, these prer:'lrations tJere to be ready and waiting
i~

the port of Valparaiso.

tr~nsport

of the

a~

(2) ThA oompany was to pay for the necessary

its maintenance and horses during the departure as well

711.

Barros Arana" !.!!storia Chile, XIII, 690, footnote

75.

~, IV,

304-308

gassim.

58.
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as for the return of the expedition, in the event of poor success, for five
months from the day of leaving Valparaiso.

Provisions were made to ship

camping equipment for the general-in-chief and his aid-de-camp; the others
would have to paT for the same equipment.

() For the desirnated period of

time, the company was to provide four thousand ready-made uniforms composed
of a cloak, cap, trousers, two snirts of linen, a pair of shoes and a pair
of sandals.

C4)

The company was to be responsible for the administration of

its accounts accordinp to the ouantity and quality by order of the generalin-chief.

(5) It was not only the sole responsibility of the company to

provide for the departure and return of the expedition but in addition to
maintain the army where it might be 'on land only.

The company was to be

reimbursed for the additional expenses and collect in Chile.

(6) Tne

empresarios were to continue their contract for the stipulated five months,
although the sailing date might be postponed.

In ease of partial fulfilment

of the contract due to the failure of the squadron to sail again, the
government was obliged to pay the empresarios the stipulated freight, receiving the supplies at its cost, according to the account which the company
would present, takillf care to charge the government adequate compensation to
reimburse the work andgrievanee involved.

(1) If the company was not

ready by the stipulated time to provide the supplies etc., it was obliged
to pay 1,500 pesos for each day of delay resulting to the expedition.

If,

however, the delay was caused by the government, compensation was to be made
to the empresarios for their troubles and expenses, 1ncludinp the charges
paid to the captains of the ships.
comp~

(8) The government guaranteed to the

for each soldier, sergeant, corporal drummer, musician, etc., who
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embarked trom Valparaiso, sixty pesos, and for each horse seventy pesos.
(9) The government was obligated to deliver to the company all the ships

which it had acquired by seizure or qy any other means or title, immediately
after the signing of the contract, excepting those which would be necessary
to serve Cochrane in his immediate expedition.' The frigate Dolores was to
be

delivered to the company as soon as it returned from Concepcion, and the

government was to

p~

no more than the costs entailed if she were used by
,

the empresarios so long as she remained in the service of the government up
to one month prior to the sailing of the expedition.

~lhile

in the service of

the government, any damages suffered by the Dolores was to be remedied by
the government. Spoils taken in the future would have to be delivered to
the company.

The company was to

p~

the government 10 per cent of the value

of the ships at the termination of the expedition and costs determined by
the government regarding their improvement.

Any

discount suffered in their

value was to be borne by the empresarios upon the valuation of appraisers.
(10) The 'empresarios were to make every effort to acquire sufficient ships
for the expedition.

(11) With respect to mUnitions, artillery, equipment,

etc., shipped on board the ships belonging to the company, the government
was to pay their freight at "sanelt prices with the exception of the gun and
knapsack of each soldier, corporal and sergeant who embarked.

(12) The

government was to pay the company only 2/3 of the total value of the debt
in the following terms: from the 10th to the 15th of the present September,
30,000 pesos, and the rest in October, in reaqy money, in the value of the
ships that may be sold to it, and in the

,~oods

that some indiViduals may be

able to deliver for the present contribution. There were stipulations as to
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how these goods were to be delivered to the company.
be

The 2/3 that would

paid to the empresarios would amount precisely to the 300,000 pesos

imposed for the expedition.

(13) The last 1/3 was to be guaranteed in the

first enemy country that the army occupied with the first arrivals of
contributions that they imposed.

(14) If the government needed more than

the 20 horses stipulated in article 1, the company would be reimbursed for
the same, including their mal,ntenance, transportation, and a 6 per cent of
their total value as compensation.

(15) The company also was to provide

maintenance for all officials embarking who were not soldiers at the same
stipulated rate of

sl~y

pesos.

providing 4,000 pairs of shoes.

(16) Arrangements were to be made for
(17) On the request of the company, with

the sandion of the Chilean government, the general in chief waa entrusted
with intervening with the newly established government in liberated areaa
on behalf of the empresarios to remove duties upon

590

tons of foods as

compensation for servicea rendered and hardships endured.
While all the articles of the contract are illuminating, of special
significance are 13 and 17.

The speculative nature of the expedition,

commercially speaking, could prove most advantageous to the empresarios both
in

re8"~ect

to the repayment of a third of their expenditures and in importing

goods duty free into the liberated area.

On September 4, 1819, EcheverrIa

wrote to San Martin and enclosed a copy of the signed contract discussed
above.

He mentioned that the naval squadron had set out upon another

vigil perfectly equipped and provided with all the necessities for destroying
the enelBT.

It remained only for San MartIn to ready himself for the

expedition, assured that the Chilean and United Provinces governments are
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behind his project.

76

There is much controversy

OVI3t'

who contributed nost to i'ittir.c out the

PeruV'ian expedition-. Hany of the sources, among +,hem l\rr:.eric:ln obsnrvers.
creclit the Chilean

gov~rnment;

for having undertaken such a grand enterpriF>e

in a singularlY short space of time and in a manner so complete as to
indicate probable success. 11 Robinson reported to Adams, October 9, 1820,
t,hat there were whispers concerning the

rr.rant~ng

of a monopoly for a

speoific period of time to those individuals who had furnished the Chilean
government with assistance either by

w~

of money, ships or supplies. More-

over, further rumors indicated that foreigners would be excluded from the
ooasting trade. 78 One ca~ speculate whether this monopoly alluded to above
was granted to the contractors for the expedition or whether it involved a
completely different group of individuals--if it had been granted at all.
Nows cf the impending expedition reached the viceroy by the various
ships which touched Peruvian ports.

From the captain of the

!!.. ,2.

Warrior,

Pezuela learned that by July 11, 1820, the outfitting of the expedition was
still delayed by lack of money and tran sport. 79 By August of the same year,
American sources indicated that the expedition was at least prepared to
liberate Peru after having been equipped at great expense by the Chilean

76.

~~iq.,

77.

Spe<'ial Ap;ents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Oct. 9, 1820.

IV, 303, 304.

"lB. Thin., Robinson to

~_dams,

Oct. 9, 1820.

79. Casado and Villena, Memoria Pezuela, 730.
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government.

BO

Still another contemporary, Oharles Gauntt of the Macedonian.

wrote on August 21, 1820, of the drain that the expedition was upon the
Chilean treasury and that Chilean credit was very low.

He added an interesting

note when he said that "San Martin has promised to pay to Chili [sic] the
amount it has cost them to fit out the expedition, the first place he
conquers.,,8l How did San Martin expect to repay an obViously huge debt to the
investors of the expedition? What part did spoils and concessions play in
this repayment?
Whatever assistance the Chileans gave to the liberating expedition was
carefully accompanied by explicit instructions to be observed during the
campaign.

One such document is dated June 23, 1820, and contains twenty.five

articles of which only the last specifically deals with commerce, and then
on~

to a deputy who would concern himself with the diplomatiC and commercial

negotiations of mutual interest to both states. 82
Although the Chileans contributed heavily to the San Martin expedition,
one could hardly overlook the aid given by the British to the project.

Partial

and impartial sources credit the British with considerable sustenance to the
Cause of Peruvian liberation. As ear~ as 1813, the British were aware of San
Martin's favorable disposition. 8) In 1816, certain British officials still
80. Hall, Vgyages, I, (1824 ed.), 60, Aug. 1), 1820.
81. National Archives, T;lashington, Navy Department, Private Remarks of
Lieutenant Charles Gauntt of the U. S. Ship Macedonian ••• , f. 92.
82. Riva ~guero, Memoria 1 Documentos, II, 11.
Piccirilli, San Martin 1 Pol!tioa, Documentos, 402, William Bowles to
J. ~". Croker, Secretary of Adnliralty, Jan. 26, 1813.

83.

,
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considered San Martin a man of integrity, honor and disinterest. 84 In 1817,
San
san Mart!n was urging William Bowles that his presence in Chilean waters would
be very necessary and contribute much to their mutual interests. 85 The opinio
of the British government by 1817 was definitely in favor of the insurgents,
considering mediation with the mother country too late. 86 In the meantime,
British merchants interested in the Chilean and Peruvian markets clamored for
additional protection against both the royalists and privateers alike. 81 On
April 9, 1817, Bowles mentioned receipt of San Mart!n's letter of February 22,

1817, in which he urged closer ties and pledged mutual benefits. He added
that he considered San Martin's proposals totally devoid of personal

ambitioH~

Open and official sanction of San Mart!n was quite impossible and the
British government issued a series of proclamations prohibiting its subjects
from taking part in the contest between Spain and her colonies, either by
personal service or arms and other exports. 89 The official attitude of the
Bri tish government was not shared by many of its mercantile minded individuals
or officials. Henry Chamberlain wrote to Castlereagh, April 5, 1817, praising

Independence, I, 102, Feb. 22, 1817.
DASM, IV, 564, Juan Mart!n Pueyrred6l'l to San Mart:!n, Feb. 25, 1817.
-Piccirilli,
San Mart!n 1 Pol:!tica, Documentos, 416, Bowles to Croker,

84. Ibid., 409, Bowles to Croker, Sept. 22, 1816.
85. Webster, Britain
86.
87.

March 1,

88.

1817.

~.,

~

-

Documentos, 424.

89. British State Papers, 1816, 1811, 488; 1818.1819, 510; 1818-1819, 519;
1819-1820, 931.

p

San Martin and his friendly relations with Bowles. 90 Of more interest i8 the
letter written by Robert Staples to William Hamilton, )(ay 25, 1617.

In it

he speaks of San Kartin t s request for an interview wherein he discussed

prospects for Peru and, what is more important, his chief desire which was for
the British government to inform him what course he might pursue to gain its
approbation.

Apparently, San Martin considered Chile capable of bearing the

financial burden but unable to provide ships of war and naval officers.

San

Martin reiterated his desire for a British naval force, acknowledging the
likely impossibility for any direct aid.

In return for British favors, San

Jlartin was prepared to offer advantages to Britain.91 On June 18, 1617, San
MartIn wrote to Bowles, again requesting the presence of a British naval
force in Chilean waters to protect British commerce. 92 Bowles reported to
J. ... Croker on June 38, 1617, that ChUean agents were sent both to the

United States and Britain to secure ships and equipment and mentioned the
name of leite y Company, Bucklesbury, acting as Chilean agents in London. 93

That British citizens, especially merchants, contributed to San MartIn's
campaign was also confirmed by Killer who in his Memoirs wrote that the
confidence of the British merchants at Buenos Aires was conspicuous, that they
gave credit to the government for supplies intended for his use. 94 Moreover,

90. ..ebster, Britain.!:!!!! Independence, I, 103.

-Ibid.,

I, Appendix I, 55)-54.

92.

Piccirilli, San MartIn I politica, Documentos. 439.

93.

~.,

436.

94.

liller, Memoirs, I, 89.

91.
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the Spanish government was totally aware of the fact that British citizens did
aid t.he insurgents in

many

ways and protested stro~17.95 O'Higgins credited

Bowles for his cooperation in a letter to San MartIn, November 8, 1817. 96
In his Memoirs, Pezuela constantly referred to the assistance eiven the
rebels by British officials and merchants, citing the hand of Bowles in the
expedition. 97 San Martin directly thanked the Earl of Fife for "proofs" of
his friendship though he does not succinctly mention what form this aid had
taken. 98 British assistance to Chile was not without its rewards.

On

November 20, 1817, O'Higgins wrote to the king George III that Chilean ports
would welcome British goods. 9'

Further concessions came from San MartIn who

in return for British help would proaise a reduction of 10 to 20 per cent
on L'llports and 4 per cent on exports to all British ships for 30 ,.earl. The
above concession was treated in a letter written by Bowles to the Foreign
Office, February 14, 1818, and mentioned further San Mart!n r s liberal
political idealogy, particularly in respect to commerce. 1OO

95. Wellington, ~lamen~ Despatches, III, 115. Wellington to Sir Henr,y
We11esle7. Oct. 26,
17.

416.

96.

l?.A.SM, V,

97.

Casado and V1l1ena, Memoria Pezuela, 18), Nov. 12, 1817.; 189, Dec. 1,

9S.

Webster, Britain and Indep!ndence, I, 556, San Martin to Earl of Fife,

1817; 200-201, Dec. 19. 1817.
James Duff, Dec. 9.

lSir.-

99.
Ibid., 5>6. enclosed in formal letter from. San Martin to Ca8tlereagh,
Jan. 1'2;1818.
100. Luis O;yarzUn and Juan fernamez
rernamell V.iJ.dez, "Lo8 Planes Politicos de San
Beletin de 1& Academia Chilena de la Historia, Ailo XVII,
Martin en 1818," Boletin
no. 43 (Santiago, 1950), 7>.76.
7>,76.
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A report from the Duque de San Carlos to Pesuela, February 7, 1818,
refers to the arms and munitions leaving Britain and designated for use of
the insurgents, and the efforts of various merchants to despatch three ships
full of merchandise and war goods, ships to be sold later to the rebels. 10l
The London activities of Jose Antonio llvarez Condarco to procure ships, arms
and munitions proved that Spanish accusations were not entirely incorrect.

Cochrane, since hi s arrival in Chile, was greatly interested in organising a
laboratory which could fabricate the effective Congreve rockets, and therefore
negotiated through the London agent llvarez. 102 Pezuela received constant
information regarding the various arms and munitions that were being delivered
to the Chileans by the British and Americans and so noted it in his Memoirs
on April

4, 1818. 103 Furthermore, he was fully aware that the destination

of the new expedition was Peru. 104
The name of the British Ellice, Inglis and Company was involved in
connection with the Catalina Griffier which sailed from the Thames in Februar,r
of 1818 carrying war goods contracted for by llvares.

1Iisfortune visited the

Ihe ship which had to leave for the second time on its clandestine voyage.
The first time she suffered damage and the second time she was shipwrecked. 105

101. ~,V, 173, 174.
102. Gonsalo Mnes, Historia de 1a Espedicion Libertadors del Peru (Santiago,
1887), I, 267, 288, 289.
-- ---- ---10). Casado and Villana, Memoria Pesuela, 244, 245.

104.

12!S.,

255, April 21, 1818.

105. Bulnes, E!p!dicion Libertadora, I, 5S, 56.
56 •
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The service of 11varez were further required in the purchnse of the
Cumberland, with the name of Ellice making another appearance.

A Mr. M. Neile

is also mentioned in regards to the Cumberland. A letter to San Martin trom
London, November 22, 1817, speaks of the financial difficulties entailed in
the sale and equipment of this ship.l06 On November 25, 1817, a contract was
signed between the accredited agent Jose Antonio Alvarez and Eduardo Ellice,
merchant ot London tor the equipment of the Cumberland. Under the contract,
Ellice waS to buy and equip the ship and then sell it to the Chilean government, with no small profit and a qualified dispensation trom export duties.
The cargo master ot the ship was empowered to sell goods amounting to 6,000
pounds sterling in any part of Chile or Peru tree ot duty, also exporting duty
free speCie and fruits ot the country brought by the sale of his goods. 107
Further munitions were acquired through the British ship
John Templeton, master.

~

_Li_n_d_oc_h,
_Li
....n
....d_oc---.h,

The munitions came via Buenos Aires and according to

a September 10, 1818, document, the value of a specified cargo amounted to
177,464 libraa (pounds) ,108 which is confirmed by another document dated
September 15, 1818, signed in Buenos Aires. l09
British interest in Chilean and Peruvian markets continued to grow, and
accredited rebel agents to London were encouraged to stimulate that interest.
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Irisarri was given instr'lctions in Dec8rlher o.f 11318 to this effoct, and to
stress concessions for recosnition coupled with commercial adv~tntages in the
form of reduced export and import duties. 110 ~lthough there was considerable
ar::ttation on the pttrt of British individuals to recognize antl a.id the
insurgents, among them the Earl of Liverpool,lll Mr. Ellice,112 and Mr.
Robert Wilson,113 the official position did not favor open assistance and
recognition for fear of openly defying Spain and provoking

~ar.

Unofficially it was business as usual for the British who sought to sell
mum tions and war goods to the Chilean government.

Some of the ships were

seized even before they reached their destination and taken by the royalists

to Callao. One such ship waS reported to San Mart!n by Guido on July 8 t
1819. 114 The Gazeta Ministerial ~ Chile, September 4, 1819, reported ships
laden with men, suppUes, arms and munitions in the 'l'hames ready to aid the
insurgents.

~~ether

those ships arrived is another matter not easily proven.

Quoting "French Papers" the same article stated that in the rear of English
bayonets l'!I.8rched bales of merchandise. 115 On November 13, 1819, O'Higgins
told San Mart!n about the reason for purchasing the English frigate

no.
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111. Wel~ngton, Sugplementa;r
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113.
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was well equipped and had eome from England for sale. 116
As the expedition to Peru progressed, British aid was visible.

On

May 16, 1821, for example, O'Bigrins informed San MartIn that the English
Frigate Laura carr,ying supplies for the squadron. would also convey medicines
bOth for t,he army and navy.

llention was also made of a Diego O'Brien in

eonneetion with the supply of clothing needed by the army.ll? The Laura
carried a physician in addition to salted meat, medieines, topmasts and other
provisions. lIB
In his )(emoirs, Miller has some interesting comments eoncerning the
actual assistanee given, fer example, to the Peruvian eampaign by British
merchants.

He believed that they were given far too mcuh credit for acting

as "eonsignees of a few old ships, and of second-hand sloops and stores ••119
The claim of these businessmen to ardent patriotism is hardly valid.

While

they did display a liberality often found in the commercial world, their
sympathies and interests were closely allied.
the royalists dictated a sale in that quarter.

Ioreover, a better priee trom
Miller did mention individual

merchJ.n'!is -mo gave proofs of their zeals John Begg, Samuel Haigh. Riehard Price
James Barnard and William. Hodgson. 120 One statement made by Killer, however,

116.

~,V,

117.

-!bid., V,

11B.

~.,

482.
491.

496, O'Higgins to San Mardn. July 19, 1821.

119. Killer, Memoirs, II, 221.
120.
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shall be pursued with greater detail in another section of this study-the
strict observance of neutrality laws by the British naval commanders. 12l
Courting of AJr.erican entrepreneurs by the Chilean rovernment through
diplomacy and agents suggests that the amount of ships, munitions and
supplies coming from Britain was insufficient for the demand.

O'Higgins

wrote to president James MOnroe, April 1, 1817, announcinr the solidity and
durability of his gcv6rnment and the
those investing in Chile's future.

cor~eroial

benefits to be derived from

The resources of neighboriIlf Peru were

not overlooked. 122 Brackenridge confirmed the liberality of the Chilean
government in throwing open ber portIS to foreign trade.

He did, however,

mention the rumor that while the Carrera party was more friendly to the
United States, that of O'HigginS favored the British.

Brackenridge denied

the validity of such a statement. 123
American merchants were interested in extendine their t·rade to the newly
independent state I and in supplying the proposed Peruvian expedition.

It is

not within the province ot this chapter to dilSCuss mercantile speculations
and

trade in Chile and Peru but merely to investigate those companies and

individuals who contributed directly to the expedition.

The name of Henry

Hill. of Hill and Lynch. a Chilean mercantile house and counterpart of the
Buenos Aires firm of Lynch, Zimmerman and

121.

Comp~,

is often mentioned in

-Ibid.

Hanninf, Diplomatic Corre!POndence, II, 699.
122. Hanninf.
123.

Brackenridge, Voyage to South America, I,
I. 301, 302, 303.
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connection with the expedition. Throueh David C. DeForest, Hill became
personall.v acquainted with San Martin after his victorious Chilean

cam.paign~24

In March of 1818, Hill was appointed U.S. consul for 3antiago and Valparaiso
and thus was even more interested in Chilean affairs. 125 Hill was the cargo
master on the 3alvaje which in

May

of 1817 reached Chile, where Hill disposed

of war naterials to San Mart!n. 126
'!'he activities of Chilean agents in the United citates were observed both
by the British127 and the ra.yal1sts. 128 A document dated March 8, 1811, empowered Manuel Aguirre to

b~

ships and munitions in behalf of the Chilean

government. 129 During his American sojourn, Aguirre contacted General Mason

ot Washington, a cannon-founder, who sold to Aguirre as well as to the
royalists. Mason, inCidentally, supported the appOintment ot Bland as
District Judge in Maryland. l3Q The firms of Darcy and Didier ot Philadelphia
and Huget and Tom ot New York were also involved in supplying the Chilean
insurgents with arms and munitions. 131 Regarding the privateering ventures

-----124. Keen, EeForest

~

Revolution, 123.

125. Hill, Recollections, 87.
126.

Bemis,~;r

Diplomatio Missions, 40.

127. Piccirilli, San l1art!n 1. Politica, DocUJlli,;ntos, Bowles to
May 24, 1817.
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~roker,

128. Casado and Villena, Memoria Pezuela, 204, Dec. 20, 1817.
129. Foreign Legations, Chile, Mar. 8, 1817.
130. Charlos .franCis Adams, ed., J.'Iemoirs ol John *iooy Adams (. .lIdladelphia,
1875), IV, 426, Oct. 29, 1819.
-131. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, XI, 93, 94.
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of Baltimore merchants, the "Americcn Concern" with th.e names of Joseph
Karrick, Mathew Murray, John G. Johnston, J. Gooding, Samuel Brown, John
Snyder, Joseph Patterson and John S. Skinner is prominent. 132 Skinner and
Bland were connected with the Carreras.

During Bland's visit to Chile as

U.S. commiesioner he busied himself with collecting money which he then lent
to the Carreras.

The money came from the very governments which prosecuted

the Carreras ae traitors. 133
Aguirre's negotiations with Darcy and Didier were not without difficulty.
The company received money from Aguirre and offered to transact all business
regarding the Tessels and to bond them for 5 per cent. Aguirre was unwilling
to allow them more than 2.5 per cent even thoufh

Darc~

pay interest on the money while in their hands.

No agreement was reached

and Didier offered to

owinp to the small commission that Aguirre was williJ1f to pay and it was
observed that in the end Aguirre could have saved himself at least

15

if he had employed a merchant rather than do the contracting himself.
cannon for the
Comp~

ve~sels

was made by )(ason.

per cent
The

The firm of ten Eyck. Wynans and

made the blocks for the ships and a Mr. Blackwell the sails for one

of -t.he ships. 134
San Martin's letter to President Monroe, written April 1, 1817, referred

Charles C. Griffin, "Privateering from Baltimore during the Spanish
American Wars of Independence,· !a.ryland Historical Ja,gazine, xnv {March,
1940>, S. 6.
.

132.

133. Adama, Memoirs, V, 56.

134. Manning, Diplomatic Corre!J?<?ndence. III, 1973, State of New York, City
of New York, DepoSition of George

w.

Lynch of City of New York, July 25, 1818.
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to Aguirre's misston. US An agreement was also reached with an American
merchant, George Green, by' which the government of Chile v:1 tb the oooperation

ot the United Prarinces committed 1 tselt to acquire

the ships whicb Green

brought into Buenos Aires.1.36 Aguirre related details ot his mssion to the
director ot the lIni ted Provinces, dtsoassing American poUcy toward the sale

ot ships and munitions to the insurgents under exiating laws.1.J7 Bowles
notified Croker on lovember 19, 1818, tha.t Chilean rebel agents bou.ght ships
in Now York oosting around 8300,000 but tbat tbese would not be delivered
until $70,000 bad 'beenpatd.1.38 John !bwaites' letter to San HartIn,
March 3, 1819, also -re.terred to the Aguirre a1ss10n, pqments tor the- ships
bought, oommissions entailed, and tbe role pla;yed by Skinner, Davies, D1okaoD.
and Coapan;r, Pord and Miller and Iqncb and Z1JRm8rman in the transact1ons. 139

Bland.' s report upon his visit to Chile oontains muob information about
the eoonOJld.c and politioal cond1t10n ot tbe country_ His interviews nth
O'Higgins in K&7 ot 1818, communicated tbe friendly and neutral disposition
of the United States to 1;be Cb11ean oau•• and the lack ot any desire to
secure taTOre<l trade prlvlleps.l.40 O'Higgins, however, stated that Ohilean
13S. Brlt1ah State P!p,!!8, 1817-1818, 808.
of this
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recogn1t:ton by a friendly power w01ild mean extension of many commercial
advantages. 141 The possibility of a rich and free trade alOl'l8 the Chilean

and Peruvian coast was not denied. l42

Bland's sympathies were definitely

wi th the Chilean cause.

The brig Savase, .the Salvajea named in connection with Henry Hill in
previous paragraphs, is mentioned again with reference to Chilean payment of
debts.

Rumors circulated that Chile was not punctual in paying for the arms

recei ved and that fore4':n merchants complained.

San Martin. in the Gaceta

of Buenos Aires of January 3, 1818. published a statement signed by Estanislao
Lynch wherein Lynch as ProXT for the traders acknowledged the receipt of money
due the merchants in money and copper bars amountillll. to 62,493 pesos for the
cargo of the Savage.

In return for their good will, the Chilean government

insured the traders various advant&l?:es such as the exemption from duties for
goods taken out of the C01.1ntry.

The American brig Adeline, is also mentioned

in connection with the supplyinp; of arms and IlUIrl.tions.143
Pezuela reported on January 1:>, 1818, that the American brig Chilena
entered Valparaiso carrying arms for the insurgents.144 Furthermore, on
April 27, 1818, Pezuela complained tb the .American Command., of the OntariO,
Biddle, concerning the previously mentioned activities of the Savage and the

141.

~.,

294.

142. ~ •• 311.
143. Barros Arana. Histor!. Chile, XI, 194.

144. Casado and Villena, MeDloria Pezuela, 214.
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-ships in the face of such obvious lack of neutralityt145
Adeline.

How could Biddle expect the Spanish cruisers not to detain American

The reports of special agentB Prevost and Worthinpton are rich in
contemporary accounts of the Chilean situation.

In one of his conversations

with otHigrins, February 12, 1818, Prevost outlined the necessity for U. S.
neutrality but that in the event that Lima falls to the independents, and
acquires some degree of stability, then the United States would aeknowledge
its independence. 146 On March 9. 1818, Worthington wrote to Adams mentioning
the purchase by the patriots of the British Windham and the "respectable"
amount of
ot commerce carried on by United States subjects in the area. 147
Prevost reported to Adams, A.pril 9, 1818, that San Martin was now able to
focus his attention on Peru and her "disaffected population." Economic
advqages resulting from such a move would be hirh1y beneficial to the
United states. 148 Another agent, Jer~ Robinson, however. indicated that
San Martin was devoted to England. 149

It was feared by many Americans that

San MartIn would show the British greater favoritism :in the event of his

complete liberation of
ot Peru.

The rlories of a tree Peru market were

145. Wational Archives. Washjnfton, Waval Records Collection, Area 9 Flle,
1801-1830 Folder, Box 1. Typed copy of letter sent from Lima.

146. Special Agents, Prevost, Biddle and Dorr, Prevost to Admns, Feb. 13. 1818

147.
~7. u.S. Jlinisters Argentina,
Argentina. April 26, l8l7-July 9, 1818, Uarch 9, IB18.

1148.
148.
1149.
1.49.

SpeCial Agents, Prevost, Biddle

and Dorr.

Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Kay 16, 1818.
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oxtolled in Prevost's letter to

Ad~~s,

June 10. 1815, affirming the possibilit

that. unless American commercial advantages were SOUfht the British would
reap the benefits of the new markets. 150 Worthington also warned Adams that
a certain great commercial European power would get too firm a hold unless
prevented by AFerican policy and action. 1Sl
concerni~

Worthington's remarks dated July 1, 1818,

the importation of

arms into Chile, mention some of the ships which engaged in this practice.
The

~ibertl

of Philadelphia, under the command of Captain Oliver. first began

importing arms into Buenos Aires in 1812 and in 1817 San Martin crossed the
Andes wi th about 3500 of its arms.

The Savge, mentioned earlier, coming

from Baltimore was the first vessel which imported arms directly into Chile.
In June 1817, she arrived with about .3000 stand of arms, .orda and powder.

The Adeline from Philadelphia came to Valparaiso with about 4000 stand and a
few swords.

The Lion from Providence. R.

I.,

carried 6000 stand; Bengal of

Philadelphia, 1500; Ariel of Baltimore, 2000 stand; Enterprise from New
York, 1000 stand; E!£la of Boston 1000 stand.

Worthington claimed that the

Uni ted States was the biggest supplier of arms, and that had i t

I~ot

been for

its timely importation into Chile, the battle of Kaipu would have been lost.1S 2
On tkvember

4, 1818, Worthinp-ton wrote to Adams or the friendly attitude San

Martin had toward the United States, disprovl.ng a statement that was made by

150. Special Agents, Prevost, Biddle and Derr.
151.

u.s.

Ministers Argentina, April 26, l8l7-July 9. 1818, Worthington to

AdalUs, Jan. 15, 1818.

152. .!2!£., Worthington to Adams regarding letter of July 4, 1818, but remarks dated July IJ Remarks on Chile No.2.
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Hol.:inson shOVlin; him a devotee of :Brl
Er1 tain. 1S3

rei:,orted
in

Ii

~lorthinGton

A week later,

conversA.tion with San Hart!n wherein he complained of the delay'

receivin~;

ships frOITi the Unitsd States

although~200,OOO

The delay meant loss of prestige for the United States. 1S4

hali been sent.

1";orthin~ton dis-

ch:imed the theoI"'lJ tha.t the Ohilean navy was furnished by Cochr".ne adding

ttat the ~ritish sold only old vessels for
tor high prices. 15S
The Peruvian expedition was complicated by the state of San Mart!n t

B

health which sometime in the earlier part of 1819 involved a successful
surgery.

In

ad(~i tion

to informing

~.dams

of this above fact,
tact, Prevost further

amldtted that San Mart!nls reputation inspired confidence even in Peru. l56
Numerous obstacles were overcome and on September 28, 1820, Prevost reported
finally sailed for Peru.lS7
that the eYpedition .finally

of

~ch and

Incidentally, Prevost's use

Zimmerman of Buenos Aires or Lynch, Hill and Company of Santiago

official mail during absence from Valparaiso
for the purpose of forwarding his otficial
15S
is of interest. 158

In 1820, the supply of arms reaching San Mart1n halted but was renewed
in 1821.

The )araval! of Providence, the

~

of Boston, and the

!ea-Plan~

153. U.3. Hinisters Argentina, October 22, 181S-April
l81S-April 8, 1820, Worthington
to

~,dams.

15h.
15L.

~.,

\Iorthir.£'ton to Ada.ms, Nov. 11, 1818.

155. Manning, Q!Plomatic
Q!Plomattc

Correspond~,

I, 525.

1~6.

SpeCial Agents, Prevost, Biddle and Dorr, July 3, 1819.

157.

Prevost to Adams.
-Ibid.,
-Ibid., Prevost to Adams, Sept. 25, 1819.

158.

".--

tnz
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of New York, carried arms directly to Cochrane and3an Martin in peru. 159
prevost's letter to Adams" June 30, 1821, mentions a Mr. Thomas Eldridge of
Connecticut who fitted out the ~aipo and caused Prevost much trouble. l60
Rivadavia informed Forbes on September 20, 1021" that a contract was signed
on September

7 of the same year for

from John Mason through Aguirre.

~20,,500

worth of munitions purchased

The Buenos Aires treasury was to pay for

the goods. 161 Whether these goods were to be delivered to San Mart!n could
not be determined.
Argentina, Chile, Britain and the United States, each either as a nation
or through individuals contributed to the Peruvian expedition.

There is much

disagreement as to which of these gave the greatest assistance.

Before any

definite judgement Can be made it is first vital to study the second phase
of assistance given to San Martin, namely the financial.

Money and credit

were essential to the purchase of arms, munitions and other needed supplies.
The Chilean government consistently claimed a bankrupt treasury and so San
Martin had to seek other avenues. Where did he look for the key to open the
door to Peril?

159. Eugenio Pereira Salas, "Henry Hill, comerciante" vioe-consul y
rrdssionero," Rensta Chilena .2! Historia 1. Geogx:afia, LXXXVII, No. 95
(Santiago, 1939), 12.
160. National Archives, WaShington, Despatches from Special Agents" John B.
Prevost, February 9, 1818-Januar,y 10" 1825. Microfilm. Cited in future as
Speoial Agents, Prevost.
161. National Archives, 1t>;ashington, Despatches from U. S. Consuls at Buenos
A.ires, July 3t lB2l-August 6, 1826" Bernardino Rivadavia to Forbes, Document
No.2. Microrilm. Cited later as Consuls B. A.

CHAPTER III
Financing the Peruvian Expedition
w'hile money may be considered a source of all evil by some, it loomed in
San Hartin's eyes as the prime source of success for the operation of his war
machine. San Martin was tormented by the need of money.

He had to reckon on

numerous costs, war materials, ships, supplies, wages of officers, soldiers
and sailors. His estimated expenditures mounted when details were considered.
San Martin had no tangible collateral and possible investors hard~ favored

chancing all their capital on what many considered a poor credit risk.
Several possibilities tor securing funds presented themselves to San
Martin who exploited these during his campaign and Protectorate. The govern..
ments of the United Provinces and of Chile were called upon to open their
pockets, foreign and domestic merchants and mercantile houses were solicited
and when these funds seemed inadequate, forced loans were instituted. The
latter means were unpalatable and not alw~s successful. l Circulating rumors
questioning San Martin's ability to pay debts previously incurred2 only
tightened the purse strings of the money lenders.
Historical dispute still exists as to which country, the United Provinces
or Chile contributed most toward the successful culmination of the Peruvian
expedition. Both countries pleaded a state of bankruptcy and yet both vied

1.
2.

-

Levene, El Genio Pol!tico, 90.
Barros Arana, Historia Chile, XI, 194.
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for recognition as the greater benefactor of Peruvian independence. Reports
of foreign agents testified that the financial state of Chile was not as
precarious as might seem. In addition to the regular sources of income there
was also the classitication of revenue received from "extraordinary contributions. 1t On April 20, 1818, Miguel Zafiartu wrote to \vorthington that Chile
had no national debt, she had sufficient naval strength to govern the Pacific
and that the United Provinces had joined Chile in a "strict union" to triumph
over the royalists.) Bland's report of a conveTsation with O'Higgins on
Hay 21, l818, further attested to the "bonds of union" existing between Chile
and the United provinces. 4 Commenting upon the state of the Chilean treasury,
Bland observed that the official accounts of Chilean income were not altogethe
correct and that the financial resources had been strained. Moreover, there
was the question of $2,000,000 that had been gathered up "in some

way

or

other, (in what manner I could not learn)" and which was difficult to trace. 5
That 3s.n )'1art!n or his backers did have money to pay for ships can be seen in
another section of the Bland report which indicated that he delivered sums
of money through Buenos A.ires to Aguirre

and

GOmez who had been sent to

New

York to contract for the building of war ships. Moreover, Aguirre and Gomez
had received further financial assistance while staying in the United States,6

3.

4.

U. S. Ministers Argentina, April 26, l8l7-July 9, 18l8, April 20, 1818.
American State Paeers, Foreign Relations, IV, 293.

5. Ibid., 303.
6.

-Ibid., 304.
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but from what source is not known.
The state of the Chilean treasury was the favorite topic of foreign
agents

~1hose

duty

i~

was to keep resp8ctive

~overnments

informed on the

stability of the newlY-independent Jovarnmant and, consequently, resources
to meet aQy indebtedness incurred in the present or future.

In addition to

a recital of annual receipts, duties and other sources of income, Prevost's
letter to Adams, February 13, 1818, indicated one means by which the Chilean
treasury profited.

This took the form of "donations f1 whereby individuals of

weal th were called upon by the Oabildo to give any sum of money desi -;nated
by

it.7 The Gazeta Ministerial

2! Chile,

June 6, 1818, noted an income of

6401 pesos 2 reales tor the month ot Mq, 1818, from "Donativos voluntarios y
empresti tos. 11
~

8

The Estado

Tesoro Publico

~

~

!!! Entrad~ l

Gastos que

E!!!

tenido

!!! Coxas

Estado listed a total income for this month of 81,546

pesos and 5 1/2 reales. The expenditures for the same month, which included

17,818 pesos and 4 raales paid to the Comisario del Exercito de Chile for
the payment ot troops amounted to 85,312 pesos and 1/4 real.
cannot judge the entire Chilean

econo~

Although one

on the basis of this one report, it

does indicate a none too abundant money supply. Chilean insufficiencies in
contributions had to be compen3ated for somehow and in June of 1818 San MartIn

7.

Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr.

8. Speoial Agents Robinson, Gazeta Ministerial
Tom. 1.

-

9. Ibid.

...

Itt

~

Chile, Santiago, no. 43,

>
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had gone to Buenos Aires with the intention of obtaining one million dollars
for his project.10
Even while the Chilean resources seemed incapable of sustaining further
depletion, the povernment was negotiating for the purchase of the Lautaro.
Some inkling as to how this new burden was met could be deduced trom
Prevost t s report to Adams, June 20, 1818, who wrote that "the English and
American merchants who had property embarked in the harbor contributed in
proportion to their respective interests as the only means ot securing a
protection upon the departure of the Ontario."

Prevost did add, however,

that the government repayed the individuals for the advancement. ll Miller
agreed that foreign merchants "did ocoasionally make advances to the new
governments; but it was always upon terms of profit proportionate to the
risk.· 12 Connected with the process of loans were
Brothers and Thomas Kinder.

SUCh

names as Hullett

Kinder was a merchant in partnership with Robert

Ponsoby Staples whose bankers were Everett, Walker, Maltby and Ellis. l )
beginning of July 1818 saw the
to attack Lima.

The

revolutionaries still without sufficient funds

Worthington observed that unless the venture be undertaken

between July 1818 and January of the next year the golden opportunity would
be lost.

The value of Peruvian commerce to Buenos Aires was immense, he

10.

Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, June 10, 1818.

11.

~.,

12.

Miller, Memoirs, II, 222.

Prevost to Adams, June 10, 1818.

13. Robin A. Humphrey8, Liberation in South America 1806-1827, (London,
- 1952), 122.
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continued, and while the rebels had the ships they needed the money.14 The
Viceroy Pezuela was fully aware of the reason for San Hartin's trip to
Buenos Aires, namely the gathering of money. sailors and troops for the
proposed expedition. l5
In the meantime, Pueyrredon continued to apologize for the empty coffers

and the reluctance of British merchants to cooperate both with respect to
loans and comn~rcial aotivitiea. 16 Pueyrredon'a letter of August 25, 1818,
further evidenced the inabUi ty to secure SOO,Ooo pesos even if they filled
the jails with capitalists.

The British merchants resisted forcible detachant

from their word1y goods although Staples attempted to persuade them to give
voluntarily.

However, as Pueyrredon made clear, otten the refusal meant they

did not have the ability to contribute to the cause and proved it.17 Greater
exasperation with the financial condition is evident in Pueyrredon's
September 2, 1818, letter to San Martin.

The British had resisted the

forced loan openly and of the 141,000 pesos they could
given more than 6,700.

P~.

they had not

Furthermore, packi1'l€ the jails and barracks would not

raise the half million in cash, nor .:>uld it alleviate the precarious currency
problem that threatened the national

econo~.

Customhouse duties .ere paid

in instable commercial paper rather than in actual currency.18

14.

u.s.

Ministers Argentina, April 26, 1817-July 9, 1818, July

15. p!!!. V, 82, 'esuela to 1a Serna, Aug. 9, 1818.
16. ~., 676, Pueyrredon to San Kartin, Aug. 21, 1818.
17. ~., IV, 596, Pueyrredon to San Hartin, Aug. 25, 1818.
18.

Difficulties

Ibid., 597, 598, Pueyrredon to San 14art!n, Sept. 2, 1818.

4,

1818.

,
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in raisin/; the loan were voiced from other aources. 19 On 3eptember 16, 1818,
pueyrredon aeain wrote to San Martin but this time suggested a more positive
approach for

collect.in~

the loan. He would make an example of the British

merchants who paid no attention to his demands and l-lho by their refusal to
cooperata led other merchants into error.

Since the money was desperatelY

needed for the continuation of San Martin's military oampaigns, PueyrredOn
said that on the following claJ, September 17, he would "sugeest" to the
British merchants that if in the remaining

14 days of

Septe~ber

they failed

to contribute the amount assigned to them, their goods would be auctioned,
their houses closed and they themselves expelled from the country.

Pu~red6n

was confident that the British would not give occasion for such a drastic

measure and the mone,r would amass even though there would be the devil to
pay.

20

This confidence must have been overwhelming and contagious for the ve'r".f

same day, September 16, 1818, Matias de Irigoyen sent an official notioe from
the M.inistry of War to San Martin authorizing him to draw against the
treasury up to the amount of 500,000 pesos.

Irigoyen expressed the

difficulties encountered in raising the necessar,y funds but added that a new
means had been found to till the coffers. 2l Correspondence between Esteban
Agustin Gascon, Minister of Hacienda in Buenos Aires, and San Martin indicated
that San Martin did receive money from the United Provinces within a weeK: of

19.

~.,

V, 679, Esteban Gascon to San Mart!n, 3ept. 2, 1818.

20.

.!!?!2.,

IV, 600, Pueyrredon to>an Mart!n.

21. 11itre,

~

l-lart!n, IV, h94, Sept. 16, 1818.
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Irigoyen's promise. 22 What remains somewhat of a ~stery is how Pueyrredon
secured the necessary loans when he consistently bemoaned mercantile
hostlli.ty and reluctance. Was the threat of confiscation and deportation
actually used or did its mere possibility secure cooperation?

The money

came none too soon for ships had to be bought and provisioned and the

~

could not fight without supplies and munitions. 23
There is much to indicate that while money passed from Buenos Aires to
Chile, the sum still represented only a trickle and confidence in the procurement of much needed financing was premature. Extracting JIlOney from
unwilling subjects even at exhorbitant rates was hardly an easy task. 24
Letters between San Martin and the Chilean minister in Buenos Aires, Miguel
Zafiartu, attested to the above difficulty.

Zaaartu's December 1, 1818, letter

did contain interesting news in that it specified the names of merchants who
were cooperating in some capacity with thB Buenos Aires government in
liquidating debts, e.g., those of Zimmerman, Lynch and Rfglos.25 A December 4,
1818, letter, Zaaartu to San Martin, made further reference to the payment of
debts, crews of ships and loans from the Buenos Aires government. 26

22.

DA~

V, 682, Sept. 24, 1818.

23. Ibid., VIII, 231-233, J. hvarez Condareo to San Martin, Iov. 22, 1817;
Ibid.;-m9-192J Ibid., 234-236; Ibid., V, 430; Ibid., 682, 683.

-

~

-

---

24. ~., V, 698, 699, Sept. 24, 1818; ~., 700, 701, Iov. 6, 1818.
25. ~., V, 703, 704.
26.

-Ibid.,

702.

12
The financial state

ot Chile was no

better than that of the United

PrOvinces. Between the diminished foreign

vade,

the clandestine British-

royalist trade and the pa.yaent tor naval ships and supplies, the Chilean
funds suftered depletion. 27, Ships contracted tor in the Un! ted 'States were
withheld until the debts were paid. According to reports of British observers,
the Chilean government bought ships in New York costing around $300,000 but

the agent in charge ot them was torbidden to make delive1"1 until a debt of
$70,000 was settled. 28 Wbere did OMle find the resources to cover her
financial obligations, those al.rea.dy contracted and those which prondsed to
be even greater in the tuturePeruvian campaign?
The solution

to the prohl., or at leut a partial one vas met in a

similar lIWlner to that ot the Un1 ted Pro'fince...loans and donations.

Gazeta lti.n1ster1al

!!! qhil.e,

The

loVEtllber 7, 181.8, cOntained a list of voluntary

donations given b7 the citizens ot Valparaiso for the naval expedition.
While some of the donations were in the torm of supplies, a total ot 885.2
ODZas

was presented in 81lver and gold. Listed also were donations ot

September 25, 1618, which brought the total amount to 1085.2 onzas. 29
Worthington·. report ot November 11, 1818, mentioned $200,000 which vas
sent to the United Statu tor the purchase ot ships,30 but other documents

27.

~.,

VI, .315, Guido to Director ot United Provinces, Sept, 29, 1818.

28. PiccirilU,

au Hartin :. PoUt1ca. 456,

Bowle. to Cl"Oker, Hov. 19, 1818.

29. Special Agents Robinson, 0".81;& M1rd..terial eta Oblle. 3aD1;1ap, no,
TOlU, 1, Report of Ooii. 2, 1818.
.30. tJ. S. M1n:.Lsters Argentina, Octobv 22, 1818-Apr11 8, 1820.

6S.

iL,
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late in 1818 emphasized the urgent demand for more and more money.)l
money.3l San
Martin complained to O'HigPcins on December

4, 1818. that the Buenos Aires

treasury was incapable of meeting his demands and individuals were reluctant
to contribute money even though his army found itself in extreme want. 32
On December 15. 1818, San Martin wrote directly to Pueyrredon painting a
gloomy picture of army demoralisation for lack of salaries and citing need of

129,690
129.690 3,h pesos.

Because the state of Chile was bankrupt and that without

hope, he pleaded for financial assistance to keep the army from progressive
ruin.

the Chilean government had already pledged itself and had consumed its

income for several years and the paralysed state of commerce precluded any
assistance from that source.))
source. 33 San Martin voiced a similar plea on December 31

1818,

lamentin~

the impossibility of any future success without concerted

financial and material aid. 34 Attending to San Martin's financial requests
in Buenos AiresWls one Jose CaperrO., who in several letters to the liberator
described the difficulties encountered in raising the necessary loans but
also the

~llingness

emancipation.

of his government to cooperate in the project of

The loans raised still seemed far short of the actual needs. 3'

Hill,36
It was, however,
bowever, the opinion of many contemporaries, for example,Henr;y Hill,J6

31. Levene, ~ Genio Politico,
PolitiCO, 91.
32.
33.

~,V.

2,1.
Ibid., 2,2.

to Supreme Director of United Provinces.
-Ibid., 691, Dec.Martin
16, 1818; Ibid., 692, Dec. 25, 1818; Ibid., 692-93,

.34. Ibid., 2",
3,.
Jan. 3, 1819.

San

-

-

36. Jlanning, Diplomatic Correa,pondence, II, 705, Hill to Adams, Dec. 21, 1818.
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that the final San Martin success in Peru would have to be a joint venture
between Chile and the United Provinces.

The way to Lima could net be paved

without money and neither country seemed capable independently to carry the
project through to its completion.

There was still another source of plenty--

the British and Americans whose vested interests in Chile and Peru dictated
profi table cooperation.

However, reports circulated not only concerning the

jealou.., existing between Britain and the United States but also the Chilean
jealousy of foreign interference in the re8uscitation of the exhausted exchequer.

Robinson mentioned to Adams in a letter January 19, 1819, trom

Valparaiso that the British had more trade in this area and could more
extensively accomodate the government with loans. 37
The channel through which the foreigners loans passed was often either
one of the cooperatinR governments, Chile or the United Provinces.

This re-

mained especially true of "forced loans." Early in 1819 neither of these
governments seemed highly successful in this respect; only scattered documents
testit,y to the extent of success or failure of their endeavors.

O'Higgins

continued to insist that Chile had already done more than her share toward
the expedition and no remedy remained other than seeking a much needed 600,000
pesos for the Peru expedition from other quarters. 38 The government of the
United Provinces was equally certain that it had done its share toward the
Peruvian campaign but continued to

37. Special Arents Robinson.

-

38. DASH, IV, 168, Jan. 20, 1819.

p~

bills that accrued even when there

h

15
seemed no money with which to pay them.

?:anart~

reported to San

r~art{n

on

January 10, 1819, the extent to which i'orei.;n merchants and interested parties
cooperated to assist the cause of liberation.

The names of

!"ord,:~iller,

'rhwaites, liYnch and Zimmerman were aGain prond.nent in the project. 39 On
January 13, 1819, Gascon sent news of .f>Jrther financial assist,mce. ttO Other
correspondence and documentation indicated that Buenos Aires continued to
support the San Martin cause through various means. 41
Zanartu correspondence indicated a decided reluctance on the part of
foreign mercantile interests or money lenders to cooperate and laborious
inefficiency among Buenos Aires Officials and administrators to aid. 42

To

expedite the voluntary loans, ZafIartu proposed several inducell'ents to the
merchants. 43

For one, the capital invested wOllld be ;':ilaranteed by both

partiCipating governments, Chile and th.e united Provinces.
the loan, the merchants would be given up to
duties.

In return for

50 per cent discount on Chile.tm

Secondly, in compensation for the risk involved, those

loan would receive an interest of 100 per cent

~pon

,~iving

the

their investment, this

interest payable in the form of a discount in duties collectable in Lima or
any other ports taken by Chilean arms.

Thirdly, the benefactors would enjoy

39.

~.,

V, 712, 713.

40.

~.,

693, 694, Gascon to San Martin.

41. Mitre,

42.

~ Mart:!.!!, II, 26'1.

~,V,

114, 715, To

San Martin, Feb. 3, 1319.

43. Bulnes, !sEediciones Libertadora, I, 94, 95.
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the considerations of the Chilean

t~o\·ernm.ent

and would be as::3isted by it in

their mercantile specul1'!.tions. The merchants rofused.

They had their

Otffi

proposals, more realistic ar.d more certain. In cxch!)11 :r,e for the risk involved
ir..

making a loan of 120,000 pesos, they demanded the oxclusive privilege of

introducing yerba. mate in Chile for an indl3finite period of time and .3,t, dOt'!,ble
the current price.

These terms were not accapted and the proposed loan

failed to materialize.

Za.nartu·s letter to San Mart!n, February 29, 1819,

pinpointed the exclusive and "gratuitous" herb introduction to a term of one
year.

The danger, he added, arose from the f,';let that these -privileged groups

would aspire continually to retain their monopoly for many years. Under such
circumstances Chile would lose income. 44
At the same time that

Za~tu

was negotiating for a loan in Buenos Aires

the Chilean government sent agents into Peru with the hope of raising a
300,000 peso loan among discontented royalists.

One such agent vlas Rafael

Garf!as, a Chilean with commercial connections in Poru.
mission, O'HigGins placed tho Golondrlna at his disposal.

To facilitate the
The loan ooliel ted

from the merchants and landowners would bear an interest of 10 per cent a year
and be backed by the Chilean state rents and properties. On February 28, 1819,
the Chilean Senate approved the above plan. 45 Its experiences with suppliers
and financiers who demanded a high rate of interest in return for their

44.
45.

DASM, V, 711.
-Barros
Arana, Historia

~,

XII, 162, 163 footnote 60.
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5erv~ces, such as those associated with the ~guirre46 mission in the United
states, cautioned them to offer a more conservative margin of profit for
the investors.
No account of San !1art!n's
!1art!n' s a."Cpeditions either to Chile or Peru is complete
without some mention of the "Logia. 1t

U"ter Chilean successes, San lI,art:!n
lI,artin

established the Lautaro Lodge in Santiago to w11ich is attributed, just.ifiably

.

r·aUer in his Memoirs wrote
or not, some of the liberator's Peruvian success. t·aUer
th!:tt the Lodge lent its
i t8 aid to bring disrepute to San Mart!n.
Martin. 47 ':'hatever tn.a3
have been its secret machinations, openly and at the beginning of the Peruvian
O'Higbins ineampai;;n, the I·odge supported San t1art:f.n. On April 3, 1819, OfHigbins
formed San Mart:!n
Martin

or

the Log1a's great interest in his Peru project and of

its raising of a 300,000 peso loan to further this plan.

O'Higgins' infor-

mation came from Jos~ }!anuel Borgono, who suggested that 2JO,000 pesos of
that loan should be solicited from
£rom Buenos Aires, and a commission named to
facilitate the collection of money, supplies and other necessities. 48 Borgono
wrote directly to San Mart!n on April 5, 1819, and not only mentioned the
commission, the efforts of British firms supplying preparations which required
quick expenditure, and the possibility of even further demands on the British,
but also remarked that the resources for the expedition consisted of 300,000
pesos plus the contribution from the towns and the 200,000 which would be

-

46. DASM, VIII, 244-247, Juan Tbwaites
Thwaites to San Mart:!n,
Martin, March 3, 1819.
47. Miller, Memoirs,
MemOirs, I, 259.
48. DASM, IV, 491, 492, O'Higgins
I

l

to

San Mart!n,
Martin, April 3, 1819.

p
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available at his discretion. 49 Guido's letter to San Martin, April 3, 1819,
however, was more explicit about the Logia'. interest and constructive advice.
Besides mentioning a commission in charge of collecting the 300,000 peso loan,
Guido stated that this money should be deposited in the Casa Moneda upon the
raponsibility of the commission.

Furthermore, to facilitate the work of

supplyinf the expedition, a loan should be demanded or exacted from foreigners
who repayment whould be pledged on a short term basis. 50 However, there is
no way to determine accurately how much if any financial assistance the
affluent members of the Lodge or the Lodge itself contributed directly or
indirectly.
When Chilean stability had become more certain by Kay, 1819,51 and
foreigners more hopeful of governmental permanency, the prospect. for toreign
loans rose in proportion.

Oi tizens of the United States, officially or un-

officially, declared themselVes in favor ot loans to finance the Peruvian
expedition, loans to be subscribed for in the United States. Worthington was
accused of such imprudent aetioJ2 but defended himself by saying that a loan
was possible if it came from an individual and did not concern the United
States rovernment. 53 Money begets money and perhaps Prevost's assurance to
49. ~., 493, 494.
50. Mitre, ~ Martin, II, 362, 363.
51.

Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, May 16, 1819.

52. Francisco A. Encina, Historia
Uistoria

2! Chile

(Santiago, 1948), I, 378.

53. U. S. Ministers Argentina, October 22, l8l8-April 8, 1820, Worthington
to Adams, Jan. 26, 1819.
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Robinson that San Martin had obtained a loan of 500,000 dollars for his Peru
campaign minimized the risk for totential lenders. 54
In July of 1819. money was coming into the San Martin Peru fund but its
quantity remained insufficient. 55 Operating out of Mendoza and through the
Oabildo. San Martin on July 28, 1819. issued a proclamation also sipnad by
the Gobernador Intendente, Toribio Lusuriaga, which proposed a partial
solution to the financial problem.

The proclamation provided for the election

of a commission of assessors Whose principal and primary function was to
prepare a tax list of resources calculated from 1,000 pesos upward.

All

military, town and ecclesiastical lands and properties were included in this
tax list, and were to be assessed in proper proportion atter governmental
approval.

Provision was made tor a book containing a perpetual aocount of

assessments and payments. 56
Despite the countless efforts to obtain financial support through various
channels, the debts only became greater and the Peruvian expedition remained
confined to the realm ot planning.

Even the efforts of Ratael Oartias, sent

by the Chilean government to secure loans from discontented royalists, were
not attended by success. 57 Foreign commercial interests would not or could

54. Library of Congress, Wuh1ngton, Manuscripts Division, Jermy Robinson
Papers, Notebook on South America, Minute of a Conversation, fragmentary.

55. DASM. V, 698, JOR Caparras to San Martin. July 3, 1819. Caparroz
broug~ 21,700 pesos in drafts.
56. Galvan Moreno, Bandas 1. Proclamas, 173, 177 8sica should be 174.

57. Bulnes, E!pedicion Libertadora, I, 93.
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not provide loans. Onq the Cb1lean squadron seeaecl to be resourceful eDOU(Ill

sa

to keep .ell supplied with rockets .. ams and military .forces.

Many reuou

wer'o advanced tor Cb1lean inab111 t1 to And the IlOne:r it needed. !be Qerioaa.
Robinson, reported to Adams on June .30, 1819, that Cb:ll.e possessed abundant,
resources and that her need tor monq arose "trOM the novelty ot tho Government. nS9 Robinson adrdtted that the 0b11ean governMl1t contemp1.ated remodellDl
the financial systa b1 several measures I laying internal and direct taxes

ill

some t01'1l, adopting a regular tued import and export tariff.. aDd proposing a

national bank. He agreed that sucb .easures would tend to instill contidenoe
not on'Qr

w1~hin Ch11~

but also abroad and make the soUcltd:ag of loans on the

bases ot pu.bl.1c reftnWl and state property that much eas1er.60 Ov.aranteed
redemption

bt

sora. degree of econoJd.c stab1Ut)', capitalists would be

JIIDr8

willing to open their purses tor the sacred cause ot Ub$r1iv. The etent to
which tbe proposed retoru were carried out 1s .not w1 thin the scope of this

dissertation.

What is vitalia that

in 'ebru.at"1 ot 1820 the Peruvian c.

ped:1tion probleBl vas resolved as tar as the oollection ot troops, prov1s1ona
and munitions but there was no v.lsible .sans to pq naval. and 'land toro.s.61
Oontemporary observers,luch as Ball, noted the difficulty in proVidinc
tor the expedition. Ball blamed "indolent habits" tor lack ot real progress
•

58. Speoial Agents Robinson, Elobinson ·to Adams,

59.

-

Ibid.

60. Ibid.

JUM

.30, 1.819.

,
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which he belined did not come until March of 1820, two ;,ears attar the battle

ot laipo.62 !be moat difficult commodity to

r1rxl was moneY' and the bard-

pressed Chilean treuU1"7 continued to resort to forced loana to supplY' the
delici t.

Late in 1819 the Chilean goverlllDent aeccrdillf t.o degNe

lecting • recentlY' levied contributicn63 which was augmented by

b~&n

6\.."lOth£ll'

col-

cegfte

ot April 1, 1620, imposing even gre.ter tinancial demands upon foreigners
Chileans of means.

The li5t eor~ta1ned

lION

and

than 2)0 names and their quotas in

pesos. While thF! majority of loans was under 1,('.00 pesos, there were

ttlOH

who, "were assesaed" a. tho\l.sand to e1£:ht thousand. 64

62. Hall, 'omee,
VOl!£~e, I, 60, 61.
63. Foreign Legations, Chile, handwritten cOPY' of 1tem in Ga..tao
de C:yilo, Sat~lrdq~ C'8pt. 18. 1619.

-

64. Luis de Amesti, ed., tlDocU'IIlentos sohR la

tini.ttrl~

Exped1c1on Libertadora del Peru.
Boletin
Bol.tin de 1& .Academia Chilena de 1& IUstoria.. Aao lVII, no. 43 (Santiago, 19~>'
81=M: lione those who contribUted-were, Sa Ana Josera Azua. 4,OOOJ Don
Joaquin Aguirre, 4,000, Don lligue1 Eohenique, l,SOC,; Don Carmen I.ecaro8,l.OOOJ
Dof'1a Agust1na Montt, 4. SOC; Don ToUl CalIe.burn, 4,OOOJ Don JOM Antonio
Jlodria'uea. 2,5OOJ Deb liatilde Salamanca, 4,600; Do11& Carmen l.anda, 3,000, Don
'licente Huldobro, 8,000; Dofta Carmen Moralea, 2,000; Dofla I,~nao1a 'aIdes, 2, ~OOJ
Dona Antorda De11os. 1,000, J)ofta Ana Jo_fa. Sot.&, 2,000; lld\a J4ariana Saldivar,
J,OOO; Don Juan Antonio Fresno. 4,000; Don Jeronimo Medina. 1,000; Don Jos&
Santiago Solo de Saldivar. 2,500. Don Juan l4anuel Crul, 7,000; Don Vicente Cruz
6,000; r ••ta:lrteDtarl. de don Ce1edonio 'illata, 1,500; Den Pedro Ramirea per
don Dlae Osorio, 1,000, Doi1a Antonia s&nchfla '1 aua hijaa, 1,000; Don Vicente
IZquierdo, 1,000. Don JOM Montee, 1,500; Dof1a Jo..f. Excandon, 1,000; Don
Jose Antonio Valdea, 2,500, Don Franciaco Amor, 1,800; Don Diego Valenauela,
1,000; Don JON 'Ior1b10 tarraln. 6,000; Don Francisco Borja Valdes, 2,OOOJ Don
Juan ManuelEehaUl'l'8n, 1,000; Don JOM Valentin Valdivieso, 1,700; Don Iam1Aoo
Valdivieao Y' VU'lU, 2,,)00; Don Joee Santiago Sra". de Baravoa, #2,000; Don
Antonio 1uenaaUda, 1,800} Don Ignacio Aranguiz, 6,900; Don Jose hria ~
1.000; Don Anacleto Cantos, 4,ooo} Don Rosario Portales, 1,000, Don Franciaoo
Ruiz Tarle, 6,000. Don Pedro Prado Jaraquemada. 2,800; Don Juan J;ugst!r. Aleade,
2,000; Don Jo8.qu!n TrIleio., 1,000, Don Vioente Ovalle, 2,000; Don Martin Calvo
Enc&lada., 6,OOO} Don Joae 11colU de 1& Corda. ),500; Don Diego !..arra!n, 1,500;
DofIa Agustina lo.1as, 2,000, Don Juan Jose Aldunate, 1,0001 Don Felipe Santiago
del Solar. 2,000; Don Gregorio Arcomedo, 1.600; Don licoli.B Rodr:!e-tlez, 1,500;
Don Estanislao L1lich, ),000; Don Jose Rlglos, 1,100; Don Antonio Arcos, 1,000;
Don F'orturutto • •ias, 1,000, Don ~.~~.l,$OOJ
~.~QoOiI:;..l,$OOJ Don Juan Orr, 3,000; lloIl
Santiago Larraa. 2.000. DoxaJoaqu1n de la tdoranduis. 1,000; Don Francisco
Vicurla, 1,OOOS Don .10.. Antonio 1ludre., 1,000.

l
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There were only a few names easily recognizable as associated with commerce.
Some of the others do, however, appear in ,-arious other documents of the

period dealing both with the supplies for the expedition and for Chilean and
Peruvian trade.

To trace these here would be tedious and ineffective; with

proper perspective they will be introduced later in this work.

One fact does

stand. outj there were people who could be assessed such sums of money and a
goodly percentage of them women.
The Peruvian expedition "drained the country to the last cent" and San
Martin promised to pay the Chileans the amount expended from "the first place
he conquers. tl

1820. 65

On

So wrote Charles Gauntt of the

!!.!.

Macedonian on August 21,

October 9, 1820, Robinson sent word to Adams that great credit

was due Chile for fitti ng out the expedition in such a short time and so
completely.

But the novel part of Robinson'. private report concerned the

monopolT that was to be granted or had been granted for a specific period of
time to individuals who contributed either money, ships or other supplies for
the Peruvian expedition.
coasting trade.

lIoreover, foreigners were to be excluded froll!. th..,

The Chilean debts ioorea.ad to an amount between one and a

half and two 1Ij111on dollars; funds for the expedition were raised by paper
money. forced lans, exactions, voluntary contributions, and specific duties
and taxes.

Ro!:>1nson commented that the paper DlOney was 30 per cent below par

value and duties were paid one half by specie and one half by government

65. Cauntt, Private Remarks, f.

92, Aug. 21. 1820.

66. Special Agents iobinson, Rob1mJon to Adams. Oct. 9, 1820.

~

-
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An October 2, 1820, letter midst the Jeremy Robinson papers with a postscript
dated October 1, 1820, also referred to a Peru trad.e monopoly granted for a
S9ecific period to several individuals

lIDO

had furnished money and proviSions.

Robinson remarked upon the continned exorbitant duties. 6?
Although the United Provinces and Chile both at times claimed that the
efforts of foreign merchants

weT'e

negligible in preparing and sending the

PeruVian expedition, contemporaries took another view. Haigh, in his Sketches..
wrote that the expedi tioa suffered troll. lack

ot money and "it was tinal1:y

accomplished through the aid of foreign merchants, Who afforded tthe needful',
by a handsome loaato the Ohile goyernment.,,68

In his l!emoirs, Miller praised

the libttral1.ty ot the lI1erchants for their "tiMly" assistance in equipping
the expedition, trJf:' if it tdled, "the terms ot their contl"acts, which they

entered into vi th the goYeroment, would most probab'l:y neyer haTe been hlfilled.,,69 JIill reconated an utual cOnT8rsation with San Mart{n in which the
latter expressed billse1t !"egU'ding the nltle of mercantilo support.

San

Hartin soUeited three merchants connected with the Chilean and foreign
cOImIerce tor a t?S,OOO lOath In retul"n, the merchants wen to raeeiTe pramssory notes with a 1G8. ot 25

pM'

cent. It Peru gaine<lindependanee, thea.

merchant. were promised that to!" each thousand pesos that they" lent thejl"
would be allowed to export tree of tiutT tme toll ot goods. The above
1ndlleeunta obYionsl1 proftd tempting for the $1,,000 needed. 'by the

-

a.ft{V'

was

67. JerEIJIY Rob1naoa Papers, Vol. " 1820-1824.
68.3amuel Haigh, aketches of Buenos .~~~ Chite and Peru (London, 1831),
)08, Dec. 23, 1820. Tbe latecoutd Se""""i'"1:fttt. tater. -

69. Hiller. Memo1rs. I. 263.
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loaned.

70

1Ihether the merchants gave voluntarily, lured by commercial concessions,
!. of no great consequence.

Spealdng in general of the Latin American revolts,

Lon, a London merchant, wrote to Canning about the readiness with which loans

were riven and the bountiful returns in terms of trade. 7l Haigh, however,
praised the naval efforts of British officers who on many occasions prevented
improper exactions from being levied on British merchants. 72
Individuals or companies that contributed loans, forced or otherwise, did

eo with the expectations of remunerative return, in kind and in concessions.
On Aurust 11, 1821, Robinson informed Monroe that Chileans who loaned money

for the Peruvian expedition on the promised condition of exclusive privileges
and monopolies looked for "indemnification and reward."

If the expedition

failed, a revolt in Chile was "inevitab1e_,,73 !he fall of Lima brought econcai
changes wi thin Chile.

A temporary embargo was laid on vessels destined for

Peru not only to rai.. funds, but "likp.wiae to give to those persons who had
loaned money to the Government to assist in fitting out the expedition to
Peru, on condition of enjoyinp- certain cOJlDllercial privileges, a fair opportmi.'tv
of profi t1ng in the highest possible degree by their contracts." 74

'0.

Henry Hi,ll, "Incidencias en Chile, Sud-America," Revista Chilena de
Ristor!a Z c,eograf'fa, LXXXVII, no. 95 (Santiago, 1939), hOe
-

71. John Lowe, "A Letter to the Ri~ht Hon. ~orge Canning, M.P •••• on the
Pelicy of Recognising the Independence of the South American States," The
P!MPhlateer, III (London, 182.3), 409.
-

72.

Haigh, Sketches, .31.3.

73.

Special A£f:Tjts Robinson.

71~.

Ibid., RoMnson to Adams, Aug.

24. 1821.
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controversy still exists as to who pave most towards the finaneinF of
San Martin's expedition.

Miers wrote that Chile, "by means of her own re-

,curees alone •••• eontributed
peru ••••• 75

80

efficiently toward the liberation of tower

He did admit that the Chilean ~overnment ·was greatly relieved

from the pressure of its finaneial difficulties by the British merchants, who
came

forward 'With 10a11s of money •••• " 76

The

diff1cult,. came later. for the

loans were secured by debentures and were acceptable in payment of duties upon
British imports.

furthermore, individuals holding debentures found it dif-

ficult to exchange them foraoney and at a considerable discount sold them to

the British merehants "who alone were able to obtain the value they represented by payinr" them into the custom-house in discharge of duties." 77
Historians, espeeially

ennean

historians, agreed that the greatest

financial burden for the Peruvian expedition was borne by the Chilean government.

Barros Arana elaimed that in 1819 Chile and Argentina agreed to a

joint effort on the projeet. but internal disturbances with1n Argentina foreed
Chile to depend on 1ts own resources.

Th.!s opinion 1s shared by Ernesto de

1a Cruz and Benjamin Vieuaa. 78 Bland. a U.S. agent, believed the Chileans
capahle of susta.tn1nr:

th~

eXPedition al thouph 0' Hi~~ins and other Chilean

officials disagreed with this view.

---

In addition to payiJlf for ships and

7,. John Miers, .....;;..;.;......;
Travels
La Plata ••• (Lcndon, 1826), II, 166.
166 •
.......
. -and ......................
-in Chile
.......

------.-

76.

Ibid.

--

77 . ~1:.<\.. 166, 167.

78. Fritz L. Hoffman, "'!'he Fjnancinp of San Ma.rtin's Expeditions, tI Hispanic
!!nerican Historical Review, XXII (November, 1952), 634-3~.

L
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ppli es , Cr.ile raised 600,000 pesos for tht:' final Peruvian preparations. 79

JU.

On the Argentine side, Emilio Hansen claimed that a large part of a

h,5 0o,000

pesos dsbt was due to the Argentine by Chile and Peru.

Earlier,

the Chileans had received from the Arf!entine four to five million pesos for

their

O~~

liberation which indebtedness the Chilean povernment refused to

recognize.

Both Hansen and Lopez are Argentine historians. 80

A present day

American historian claims that Argentina contributed 501,931 pesos and 1 real
for the Peruvian expedition but th i s did not represent many other expenses
involved.

An attempt to collect this debt, plus one of 1,062,313 pesos owed

for Chi1~~n liberation, proved fruitless in 1822. 81

Hoffman believes that

neHher country, ChHe or Arrentina, was individually responsible for
finandng an expedition t.o Peru but that. each probably contributed between
1,500,000 and 2,000,000 pesos. 82

Taki~7 into account the internal conditions

of Chile ano Argentina, their relaticn~~ip with San Martin, their ability to
obtain money from commercial sources, and considering other available documents
dealinq with this phase of the Peruvian campaign, evidence points to a joint

Tenture on the part of both Chile and
tributed b::t t.he fO'MRE'r.

Adequate or not the Pf;ruvian expedition was financed

and Lima. fell tc the revolutionaries.
Ml'lny !,rf'l'r1 ~'"

Anr! afl:rer>mfl!nts.

extent to which these promises

79.

~.,

637. 638.

Be.

~.,

634.

81. ;!bid., 6.36.
82. ~., 638.

Arrentina 'With the greater share con-

San Martin, or those backinf' him. made

Later chapters w1.l1 discuss the manner and
we~

fulfilled.
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CHAPTER IV

Cochrane and the Blockade
The man of the hour

Ilq

have been San Jlartln, but looming as the more

cOJllDanding figure was Thomas J.. Cochrane, who, backed by his naval equadron,
tended to become a law unto himself.

Destruction of Royalist naval power in

the Peruvian campaign was but one of his accomplishments.

In his position

a. admiral of the Chilean naval squadron he not only came into open conflict
with British and American commercial interests, but also with San Martin
whose policies he often chose to disregard.

This chapter will investigate

the extent to which Cochrane carried out San Martin's ideas, policies and
practices, his self-interest substituted in their place, and the effect his
individualistic naval tactics had upon the interested foreign powers and the
liberation of Peru.
From the moment of his appearance on the Latin American scene, every
phase of Cochrane's activities was subjeoted to speculation.

Contemporaries

attributed to him great wealth,l considerable naval skill,2 and the organizatia
of the Chilean fleet.)

Cochrane's "allegiance" to British interests provoked

critioism from the Americans and denials from the British, who during the 1$18

1. National Archives, Washington, lavy Department, C. J. Deblois, The
Private Journal kept on board the .!!.!.!. Kacedonian, 1818, 1819, I4ay 24, 1819.

2.

Hall, VOl!,es, I, 67.

3.

lanning, Diplomatic Correapondence, I,
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525.
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to 1822 Peruvian campaign found sufficient reason to question that allegianoe.
3till, this view was not shared by' all, tel' Stevenson wrote ot the indb'eot
help given to tbe British.

Had it not been for Cochrane's valor, military

skills, and "assiduit:y,· Spain wOll1d still baTe oommand over tbe western baU
of South America and ftBritish Commeree· would have been excluded from the
extensive market which it enj018.u4

to serve American interests better and miniMize a1J7 possibl.e British
favoritism, ships Uke the !.

1!-

~.

Ontario were stationed along tbe ooast 'Ot

Chile and Peru. Captain J_ee Biddle, of the above 9ntltM:,g was instructed t'O
protect United states oitizens at onoe from the Spaniards and trOll the
Uarbitrat7 measures of the Patriots,'" and in this ease he ran &toul ot

Cochrane. 1'he embargo ot Valparais06 and confiscation et American propert,y7
ocoupied the attentions ot United States agents and naval ccmrma.nders.

On

April 9, 1818, Prevest notified Adams that the presence ot the 2,ntar1;C! aleng
the Chilean ooast beth enhanced the Amerioan poaition in the area and deore

British int1.uenoe.8 Captain Jebn Downes ot the

!!.. ~. 1!.

Maoedonian was

likewise directed to sateguard the person and the property ot Aurioan

4.
5.

staYenaon, B.1storical. Narrativ." III, 219.

National Arcbiyea, Waahingtont Despatches trOll U.S. Consuls at Buenos
Aires, January 10, 181tJ...June 16, l621, Hal.aq report to A.dams, Jan. 10, l818.
Microt1la.

6.

NatioaalANh1ves, Washington, Navy Depart.mGnt, Log and Journal ot the
book dated October 4, 1.817-Apnl. 12, 1818,t. 'OJ u.s. Ministers-Argent , April 26, 1817-Ju'q 9, 1818, Worthington to Adams, Mar. 9, 181.8
1. u.s. M1n1sten. Argentina, April 26, 1817-Jul;y 9, 1818, Worthington to
Adula, Mar. S, 161.8.
U.S.!.

B.

oaR'

Speo1al Agenta Pl"evost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, Apr. 9, 1818.

,~~---- - - - - - - - - ,
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Citizens "wherever and whenever such protection may be needed.,,9

The efficacy

of the Macedonian' 5 tour of duty was attested to by Hill who wrote that this
10
ship protected American commerce along the coasts of Chile and Peru.
The Ontario achieved much notoriety among the Royalists for defending
American ships confiscated by them for illegal trade and among the Chilean
tor interfering with Cochrane's blockade.
naval squadron for

Biddle was thanked

profuselY for saving American propert,yll but incurred Cochrane's displeasure.
This displeasure
displ.oasure increased when Biddle notified different ships anchored in
tha.t he would give them safe
sate conduct if they wished to sail with
ValparaiSO that
12
him when he lett
left for Lima.
Nor were feelings mollified over the question
of a proper salute which Cochrane demanded and Biddle ignored.

Although

Cochrane believed that Biddle carried Spaniards and enemy goods out of Lima,
he claimed that he WOuld
would not forCibly board the American ship, arguing in the
face of the American guns, that it was against the polley of the Chilean
government.

However, Biddle departed from port abruptly and without saluting

the Chilean flag.l.)

This Cochrane protested in a heated correspondence which

9. National Archives Washington, Navy Department, Private Letters, February
1, 181)-January
1813-January 20, 1840, f. 253, B. Crowninshield to Downes, Sept. 2, 1818.
10. Hill, Recollections, 123.
11. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, XI, 547.
12. Robinson Papers, Diary, June 6, 1818.
1).
13. U.5. Ministers Argentina, October 22, 1818-April 8, 1820, Joaquin de
)1, 1818.
Echeverria, Jan. 8, 1819, no. 2; also Cochrane to &:heverria,
&':heverria., Dec. 31,
From seamen who deserted the Ontario Cochrane learned about Spaniards who
had boarded the Ship, and of i920,OOO aboard belonging to RoYalists.

I.!
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ensued regarding the salute. 14 Biddle replied on December 28 indicating that
it was a matter of a mutWll gun salute that was under controversy, presumably
,ine his country had not recognized Chile. 15 Cochrane asked whY it had to
e

be an equal gun salute? 16

Biddle insisted the salute was optional and only a

courte s.y.17 On the 30th of December, Cochrane forbade Biddle to sail from
Valparaiso for a specified period of time. 18 Biddle answered he would deIa;y
tor only one day.19
While Cochrane and Biddle clashed, the latter courted the favor of San
lartln whom he fthandsomelyG entertained along with other important officials.
lorthinpton referred to the Ontario as a safety measure not only for the
Americans and British but also for the patriots. 20 Be shared Biddle'. distrust
of Cochrane's intentions calling Ban Martin the more republican of the two.
furthermore, Worthington doubted if Cochrane was amicably disposed toward the
United States. 21

14.

~.,

Cochrane to Biddle, Dec. 27, 1818, no. 3.

15.

~.,

Biddle tc Cochrane, Dec. 28, 1818, no. 5.

16. Ibid., Cochrane to Biddle, Dec. 28. 1818, no. 6.
17.

I1?,i~.,

Biddle to Cochrane, Dec. 28, 1818, no. 7.

-

18. Ibid., Cochrane to Biddle, Dee. 20, 1818, no. 11.
19. Ibid., Biddle to Cochrane, Dec. 30, 1818.
20. ~., Worthington Diary, 4th part, From Santiago to Valparaiso, liar. 4.
,1819 ••
21.

~.,

Worthington to Adams, Jan. 6, 1819.

L
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British ships had their own difficulties with Cochrane.

The fact that

the British were trading :in Peru and even looked forward to an extension of
that trade, quite naturally conflicted with Cochrane' 5 blockade.

The British

COJlllllanders openly entered the Peruvian ports and even offered Worthington passage to Lima if he so desired. 22

A.t times. British ships boldly protected

American vessels threatened by the Royalist squadron.

For example, on

)larCh 19, 1818. three American captains wrote to Captain Sheriff thanldDg him
for his intervention. 23 More often British interests prevailed and Americana
looked on with envy.

Commodore William Bowles noted Prevost t s mission in

Chile and urged the British governaent to send adequate representation to
.afeguard their commercial activit1es. 24 Earlier, San Martin had written to
Bowles requesting his presence and stated that British ships of war would
afford "much for the protection of your commerce.· 25

It was these very

lhips of 'War that now grieved Cochrane.
The viceroy of Peru, Pesue1a. wal not oblivious to either the need or
wisdom for opening Peruvian ports t.o British trade.

Keenly aware of the

need for caution and prudence in soing so. on September 29. 1818, Guido wrote

22.

~••

Worthington to Adams, Oct. 22, 1818.

23. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr. Letters of
Sheriff, Callao, March 19, 1818. Fred. Arthur of the
the John Adams.. and Peter Paddock of the ThOll..S,
a, told
cO~Ander8 would do the same for ~ British ships in

24.

U.S. Naval Captains to
Russell, John Brown of
Sherif'f' that American
need of' protection.

Jose Pacifico Otero, Ristoria
Riatoria del Libertadora Don Jose de San Martin
432. 433.-ao.le8 to Admiralty, June-7;-iS18.

(Buenos A.ires, 1932), II,

25. Webater, Brittin.!!!l Independeno"
IOOependeno"
22, 1817.
Feb. 22..

If 102, 103. San Kartin to Bowles,

i
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to the Supr<'1l1e Direcor of the Uni.ted Provinces about the dangers resul tlng

from such a proposal.
Sheriff and

~.!.!.

He specificall, mentioned the activities of Captain

Andromaca in connection with the Lima trade, and the

dilficulty in enforcing a blockade. 26

Other sources al80 mentioned the

-

jnciromaca and the Ryperion as manauvering between Chilean and Peruvian ports

while declaring their neutrality.27.The Royalists often distrusted the British
and accused them of aiding and abetting the insurgent cause.

Cochrane like-

wise indicted the British commanders and their ships for endangering the
expedition and hampering his naval operations.

The fact that a blockade was

decreed was one thing, its enforcement was something else.

Both the British

and the Americans had little regard for a blockade where absence of blockading
ships or bigger guns made it ineffective.
Cochrane answered the defiance by arming himself with a decree issued
Jlarch 1, 1819. which blockaded Peruvian ports.

This decree was published in

various periodicals in the United States and Britaln,28 and, therefore, known

to any ships proceeding into the blockaded area.

Authorized by the Chilean

government, Cochrane decreed' (1) The port of Callao and all other ports, as
well as the coastline from Guayaquil to Atacama in a state of formal blockade.
(2) All sh:i.ps were prohibited from carrying on any trade or communication with

26.

~, VI, 316, 317, Guido to Supreme Director, Sept. 19, 1818.

27. Otero, Historia del Libertador, II. 770, Intorme del contra-Almirante
Jurien sobre Chile y ~campaaa Libertadora de San Martin, Archivo de la
Marina, No. BB4 407. Doeumento D, December 182,.
28.

Barros Arana, Historia Chile, III, 23). footnote 38.
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the stipulated area.

(3) After eieht days, from the promulg~tion of this

deoree no ships belonging to neutral powers presently anchored in Callao or
the other ports blockaded would be permitted to sail.

(4) The flaG of neutral

powers was not to be used to mask the transport of Royalists or royalist
property.

(5) Any ships carrying false or double papers and unable to prove

the ownership of property carried was to be considered in the same category
and suffer the same penalties as en~ property.

(6) Neutral ships which

carried on board either officers, masters, supercargoes or merchants of
countries subject to Spain would be sent to Valparaiso for judgement to the
law of nations. 29

The above decree raised many doubts and Cochrane took it upon himself to
amplify the meaning and extent of the blockade.

For one, the blockade was

effective purely by being declared. Without such a concept, it would have
been absurd to blockade the coast of Peru with only four ships of war.
Second,

ene~

property was not neutralized under the protection of a friendly

or neutral flag.

Third, if the owner of the ship also owned the oontraband

goods both the ship and goods were subject to confiscation.
~~er

However, if the

of the ship and the owner of the contraband were tvo different persons,

then only the contraband goods were subject to confiscation. A belligerent hac
the rii1,"ht to confiscate contraband sold to an enemy.

Fourth, it was alreactr

understood in Europe that an item such as grain was subject to contraband
restrictions.

29.

Cochrane explained that i f the matter were left to his judgem.en1,
judgem.eni ,

Odr:l.ozola, Dooumentos, Ill, 359-60.
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all kinds of provisions would constitute contraband of war as far as the
present situation of Peru was concerned.

These were the principles which

guided the conduct of the Chilean squadron along the Peruvian coast during
the 1818 to 1822 campaign. 30 In fairness, it m.ust be added that these were
not the sole bases for Cochrane's attitude toward neutral powez's that chose
to disregard his dictates.
On April 20, 1819, O'Higgins issued a further decree relative to the
blockade. Referring back to the March 1 decree, O'Higgins confined the
blockade to all ports and anchorages situated between Iquique and Guayaquil,
inclusive, Itin pursuance of the Orders of Lord Cochrane. 1t According to the
second stipulation, all neutral ships entering the ports com.prehended by this
decree and proceeding from Europe, the United States or IIIslands of American
were to be notified of the blockade by Cochrane; after such formal notificatior
notificatior.
these ships would not be permitted to enter the blockaded ports nor carry on
commerce with them.. The third point covered the time element involved in
carrying out the preceding article. The fourth point waS practically identical
to Article 6 of the March 1 decree concerning the adjudication of confiscated
property and ships. The fifth point made it clear that any neutral vessel,
havin,~

been given time by articles 2 and 3 and having been duly informed of

the blockade, found in the ports so blockaded would be sent to Valparaiso for
judgement. The sixth was similar to Article 5 of the earUer decree. 31 'rhe

30.

Bulnes, Espedici6n Libertadora, I, 259-261.

31. British state Papers, 1818-1819, 1110-1111; also U.S. Consuls B.A.,
January 10, lBt8:June 16, 1821, for original decree.
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Chilean governmont was not too anxious to promulgate Cochrano's decree for
fear of Con3cqucnces.

32

cochrane swiftl¥ meted out justice to transgressors.

On f1arch 26, 1819,

he wrote to "'anteno about an American schooner which carried munitions, naval

provisions and other articles of war for the royalists and noted that t:19
owner of the schooner also owned the goods.

Cochrane insisted that his

capture of this ship was perfectly in accord with maritime law and produced
pa.pers to substantiate his assertions. 33 On April 8, 1819, he again wrote to
Zeoteno and among other things mentioned the troubles with the Macedonian.
captain E. 3nrl.th, and its contraband cargo and money.

He charged this ship

with carrying royaUst property and the captain with being in the viceroy's

service. 34 The very same

d~, he sent another letter to Zenteno in which he

pointed to the actiVities of the l·1acedonian and the British ship Columbia.

He

furthor discussed the insidious behavior of neutral ships that continued to
serve royalist interests by carrying gold and other money to safety.

same ships were also accused of bringing spies into Chile.

These

For example, where

the French brig Gazelle was suspected of concealing money belonging to the
Philippine Company, Cochrane sent the Galvarino in her pursuit. 35

The effect of Cochrane's decree and poUcies was rapid and British

32. 13ulnes, Espedici6n Libertadora, I, 259.

33. Odriozola, Documentos, III, 336-37.

-

34. Ibid., 343-45.

35.

~.,

341, Apr. 8, 1819.
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commanders became most vocal on the subject. SOurces indica.ted tha.t "Bowles
did not appear to . like lord Cochrane" and that be notified bis captaina not
W salute hila. 36

Bowles had previoU/51T complained to the Admiralty;about

Cochrane' a dispute with Capt.a1l'l Sheritf over the question ot saluting and of
his own problems in this matter. 31 There was 1IJlcb to be said for Cochrane's

behavior wben he found British and American na:'al coman_s obviouil,conspiring witb tbe royalists and condoning il11cit trade. Juan T'bwutea

advised SanMartin in bis letters of Marcb 1.6, 1819.. and April 10, 1819, ot
some specific infractions of tbe blockade and Cocbraae t s right

to enforce the

law more '¥igorottsl,-. He mentioned the Androaaoha ad the Resource, both

British ships,alld referred to others as carry1.ng arms etc., but did not name
them in the lettlJrs. 38 Capt. Sher1tf of the Androuc~, ftinclined to favor
tbe patriots,' protested the extension of the blockade to ships ot war
belonging to neutral nations. Cochrane, of course, aware of the u.ny in.
tactions iMurred by these ships of war, be they' British or American, quite
strictlT refused to modtt,y his decree,» consequent'b', the Peru ports remained
under strict blockade. laO Gu.1do's letter to SaD Mart{n, April

27.t 1819,

did mention that Britilh mercbant. "were screaming" against the blockade

.36. U.5. Mini8ters Argentina, October 22, 181.8.April 8, 1820, Worthington to
Adams, March 7, 1819.
37. Piccirilli, San Kal"tfn Z Po1!t1ca, 4S8-S9. Bowles to Crok81", Feb. 27,

1819.

-

nn,

)8.

DA.Sl,

39.

BalTOI

AA

2la9-S0, Hareh 16, 1819. 2)2-S3, April 10, 1819.

A1"an&,

H18to1"ia

Chile, III. 267 and footnote 9

40. DASM. II, ,46, Zenteno to San Mu-t!n, April 21, 1819.

8. .

page.
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because of their personal interests in Lima but that Sheriff and Downes had
acknOWledged it.4l An American contemporar,y pictured Cochrane as displaying
a good deal of national feeling and added that he "probably keeps a return
home and a restitution of his lost honor in view.,,42

This same souree,

Robinson. admitted that British ships of war had been engaged in contraband
trade and were in the habit "of receiving for tar servioes a commission of

troa 2 1/2 to $ pr.ot.--upon the amount.· 43
American reaction to the blockade was equally distressing to Cochrane
who not only found his orders challenged by the Americans but supported their

position by ships of war.

The llacedonian continued to plague the admiral by

protectinr American, English and french merchant vessels.

The journal of

the )lacedonian recorded on )larch .31, 1819, that prior to this ship's arrival,
patriot cruisers committed great depredations upon whalers and other ship.
but now no longer dared to perpetrate such insult and plunder. 44 At times,
Capt. Downes of the Macedonian with a request not to enter Callao lest it
prejudice the revolutionary cause,4$ but in other instances he dropped anchor
and "let Lord Cochrane know that the Jiacedoman must enter Callao, blockade,

41. ~., VI, .384, Guido to San MartIn, April 27. 1819.
42.

Special Agents, Robinson. Robinson to Adams, JulY' 29, 1819.

4,3. Ibid.

-

44.

Deblois Private Journal, Wednesday. )(arch .31, 1819. Valparaiso.

4$. lationa! Archives, Washington, laT,f Department, Captains Letters. Vol. 4,
1819, Joaqu!n de Echeverna to Downes, April 17, 1819, also Downes to
Echeverr!a, April 20, 1819.

98
no ':::';;.,;;.o--blockade.·
9!- -__
9L
.:::._:;.;:;.;;.;;;;;
.......

46 The Mac.donian's defiance increased the friction between

DoWnea and Cochrane but brought applause from American and British ships in

Callao which either carried large sums of money or traded in this area.

Over

Cochrane I s protest, Downes insisted he would remain in Callao until all Ameri-

oan merchant ship. had .aU.d. 47Th. merchant captain. .xpr....d their
gratitude to Downe. on many occa.ions, happily aware that hi.
their interest••

BUCC • • •

aided

48

Of major con.id.ration during the blockade controver-.y was the legality
of the ·paper blockade. w Downes prote.ted to O'Higgins against the exclusion
of American ships fram the Peruvian coa.t unless the port wa. apecitically
blockaded. 49

Prevost wrote to Adam., lay 16, 1819, that although the trade

to Lima and adjacent port. at that time was too precarious to be of any real
value to the United States, there was still the erroneous principle of the
blockade to be corrected.

Prevost referred to his protest of the paper

blockade and said that it -.as met with great frankness and all claim of
tortei ture for any infraction was disavowed as to any place where no actual
force was employed, and that the form was preserved only to deter unfriendly
neutrals trom entering for the purpose of carl7ing information. ,,50

46. Samuel Holbrook, Threescore Years,

1819.

47.
48.

49.

Ibid., 259, 1819.
-Ibid.,
- 270, .1819 or 1820••
Captains Letters, Vol.
April 23, 1819.

~cedonian,

4.

An Autobiograp& (Boston, 1857), 257,

--

1819, Document

63.

Downes to O'Higgins.

50. Special. Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr.. Prevost to Adams.

Kay 16. 1819.

~
,I
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.An entrr for May 24, 1819. in Beblois' journal on the lacedonian, stated

that the blockade would ·play the devil with merch. t vessels, vessels of all
nations are prohibited entering aJl31' port in Peru, if our merch. t vessels
particularly whalers of which the Pacific i& full of are excluded from
entering some ports for wood. water and refreshmen, their voyages will be
entirely ruined.--. 51 The Macedonian proved invaluable in escorting merchantmentt out ot Callao while British cutters did the same for British shiPs.52
American ships needed 'protection" especially when they carried cargoes ot
.askets, pistols, powder and other warlike stores.

The Chilean Lautaro seised

one such American ship and Downes was most anxious to effect her rescue. 53
Prevost believed that Cochrane's spoilations were perpetuated mostly upon
American shipping but that plundering prize money from neutrals was hardly
the way to "sustain his situation--Jealousies are already awakened and the
plunder of a few ll1dividuals detailed in an illegal commerce will not suffice
to allay them ••••• 54 As far as Cochrane was concerned even a tew individuals
supplying arms and munitions to the enemy could not be tolerated.
did supply the

And they

ene~ as Guido's letter to San Martin, July 8, 1819. indicated~5

Although Prevost admired Cochrane' B ability to organize poor working materials

51.

Deblois Private Journal, 1818-1819, Monday, May 24, 1818.

52.

Holbrook, Autobiograpgr, 274, c1819 or 1820••

53. ~., 273, 274.
54.

Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Darr, Prevost to Adams, July 3. 1819.

5S. DAma. VI, 402, Guido to San Martin.
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into an effective naval torce, he disapproved of the tactics. 56
Downes was equally ft.r'1 ot Cochrane's intentions and activities, although
the commander ot tbe Chilean Galvarino assured Downes that Cochrane ttdid not
I

intend to inforce the blockade of Peru to the full extent imbraced in the
proclamation, but that Lima, and suob otber ports, as he should keep a competent torce before, would alone be considered

as

str1.ctl1" blockaded•• 57

Downes wrote that he would sail 1mmed1ate'b' tor the PeruT.1.an ooast ttto watch
the motions ot Lord Cochrane and give protection to our vessels on the coast.
-I am oonfident that Lord Cochrane's reelings towards us are hostile in the

extreme, and that be 11111 throw every obstacle possible, in the
O0llDl8l"C8

on the ooast ot Peru.....

CommeX"Oe· oonsisted

or

sa

an arms trade

VIq

of our

Downes was aware that some ot ·our

nth the i.oyaU,.ts, e.g., the Montezuma

which vas oaptured b7 the Chil.ean squadron as she entered l.J.aa. 59
'On November 9, 1619, Cochrane armed with extracts t'rCIIl the Law of Nations,

e.g. HUllCCius, Va.ttel, Burlamagurl, to prove bis theory ot the blockade sent

his argwaents to Downes. Downes repUed on the same &q' to the effect that
he could not comment on these extracts. Cochrane maintained, supported b7
the above extracts, t,ha,t tbe erl8lV vas not to be helped in &lV'vq, a neutral
could not 08l"1"7 eneJIiV property' nor engage in oODllerce with a b1.ookaded port.6O

56. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle,
57. Captains Let.ters, Vol.

5S.

-oTiDiena,

Prevost to Adau, Sept. 13, 1819.

Down•• , Macedonia!l, Oct. 20, 1,819.

Ibid.

59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.,
the

4, 1819,

!)orr,

Vol. 1, 182°1 Classified under DO. 11, Cochrane to Downes on board
Nov. 9, 1l:i19.
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nownes

for his part attached an extract from Sir William Scott which stipulated

that a blockade must be so declared that other countries have a knowledge of
it. existence, there must also be an adequate foree to enforce it, else it
ineffectual. 61 This very same day, Iovember 9, Lt. Charles Gauntt of the

.a.

-

laCedoDian made a most interesting ohlerTation.

Referring to his ship 'os stay

in Valparaiso, Downes apparently received information that Cochrane intended

to .ink the Macedonia if she should attempt 'to enter Callao, a blockaded port.
Downes prepared for this eventuality although he doubted its possibility. When
Cochrane stationed his ships for the blockade, there was speculation whether
or not Cochrane was blurfing or actually intended to carry out the threat.

Bo,

the hcedonian "lighted matches, sanded deck.. guns trained at the object, ..n

at quarters on both sides,- and -gave other indication. of readiness to fight."
Cochrane must haw been impressed for be later hailed the llacedonie and
wished her a ·pleasant passage- to the anchOrage. 62

lt the same time that Cochrane experienced difficulties with Britain and
American ships, he alao found himself at var1anee with San Martin's milit817
8trateg)".

Two ot Guido'. letters to San Martin, both dated August 7. 1819,

referred to Cochrane's disapproval of the plans for revolutiOnizing Peru.
one Guido repeated Cochrane's boast that he was not afraid of the English
6
aquadron. ) In the other he also mentioned a different naval strategy trom

61.
62.

-

Ibid.

Gauntt, Private Remarks, f. 69-70, Iov. 9, 1819.

63. ~ IV, $06, Guido to San Martin. lug. 7, 1819.

In
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that presented by San Martin.
Kartin.

Cochrane wanted to attack Callao directl;y.64

Martin and described a detailed.
!'he same day 0' Higgins also wrote to San Kartin
conference with Cochrane reiterating Guido's statements. Cochrane believed
San Martin f s plan to be prejudicial to Chil. and. to the' general cause. 65

In

other matters Cochrane sought official sanction from
trom San Martin, e.g. in
exempting the goods of the Potrillo' from taxes. 66 However, Cochrane further
diSObeyed instructions when he abandoned the blockade of Callao for a period

ot time.
December

effect was .sent by O'Higgins to San Martin,
Information to this etfect

4, 1819. 67

'

The various controversies which raged about the blockade were insufficient
inaufficient

to convince either San Uartin. Cochrane or the Chilean government of it.
tutili ty in the campaign.

A blockade. • .....n wi th it. 1U.1l7 inadequacies.

W&S

a necessity if P.ru were to be liberated. How .lse could the rebels control
the Royalist supply line and, moreover, supervise the commercial life of this
area?

The amount of contraband trade that eluded the blockading squadron, the

dealings of both British and American ships with the Ro;yaliata, and the obvious
need to define the meaning of the term -blockadeMblockade" as far as the rebels were
concerned meant only one course of action--a llew decre..

In A.ugust of 1820,

Charles Gauntt of the Macedonian reported the rigorous state of blockade of
the coastline from Iquique to Guayaquil inclusive. 68 Downes informed

1;4.

IbId., $08.

65.

Ibid., 512, O'Higgins to San hrtin, Aug. 7, 1819.

66.

-Ibid .. ,

509, Aug.

7, 1819.

VIII, 300, Cochrane to San Martin _1820 or 1821..

67. ..!E!!!., V, 484.
68.

Gauntt, Private Remarks, f. 92, 93, Aug. 21, 1820.
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Salith ThOMPson, Secretary of the Navy, 1ugust 22. 1820, about the new Chilean
deCree effective August 25 although -it is not possible for the blockading
torc e to arrive there sooner than the first part of the next month.- 69 Apparently, the mere declaration of the blockade made it effective.

The actual

decree was announced on August 20, 1820, and signed by O'Higgins and Zenteno.
It providedt (1) that any vessel of -whatever Nation" was prohibited. from
entering the bloc Wed ports as stipulat.d in the first paragraph-from
Iquique to Guayaquil.

(2) Proviaions .... r. made for various lengths of tiM

by which interested nations were to be informed of the decree.
penalty for transgression was confiscation.

(3) The

(4) Ineluded 8JIOllf contraband

of war were: arms and _unit ion of all classes and uses, every description
of "Vilitary Stores, - provisions of all kinds, naval stores and, lastly, all
items that aided the enelR1 in carrying on the war.

(5) Carrying of double

papers by neutral ships made them liable to seiaure.

(6) Care was taken for

neutrals to embark their property from enemy ports.

(7) 111 ports which were

under the protection of the liberating &rm1 were d.clared -free and exempt
from this Blockade."

(8) lleutral ship a carrying royalist goods or properties,

"under whatsoever pretext" were to seized and sent to Valparaiso. 70
The

blockad~

was not to the liking of the British, who through Commodore

Thomaa Hard,. protested to the Chilean government challenging its purel,.

69. Captains Letters, Vol. 3, 1820, part of document 49.
:,/0. British State Papers, 1820-1821, 1218-1219, Decree of Supreme Director
of ChIn, declaring the ihock:ade of the Ports of Peru, Aug. 20, 1820; also
in Captains Letters, Vol. J, 1820, part of document 49.
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fictitious basis. 7l The Chilean Ministro de Karina, through JOM Ignacio

z.nteno,

replied to Hardy on December 6, 1820, to the effect that there was

DO intention of violatine British rights and that the government "trataria de
que el bloqueo

Be

ajustara a las reglas navales britanicas. w72

American reaction to t,he blockade was equally quick and vocal.

Robinson

notified Adams, October 2, 1820, that While the Viceroy opened the port of
Lima temporarily to the neutrals, Cochrane t s blockad.e would render such
permission unfeasible.

'urt.hermo~,

Robinson indicated the presence of forty

American mercha."'lt vessels trading alone the Chilean and northwest coast, 150
whaling ships, 80 British whalers and 50 to 60 British vessels trading along
the same coastline.

He also li1entioned the Maeedonian and the !merion going

to Lima while the Andromaoha waited. at Valparaiso to be relieved by another
ship comine; from Rio de Janeiro. 73 Two days later, October 4, 1820, Robinson
further advised Adams of the blockade explaining that the restrictions imposed
would cause much annoyance to neutral ships and tend to "interrupt legal
commerce. a

In view of such circumstances, Robinson urged that "a greater

American Naval force than is at present on this station might be advantageous1
employed, and may become indespeDsably necessary to a due respect and

71. Charles W, Centner. "RelacionEls Comercia.les de Gran Bretafla con Chile
1810-1830, w Reviata Chilena de Historia l Geografia, XCI, no. 103 (Santiago,
1943), 100-101, footnote 20.--

72.

~.,

7~.

Robinson Papers, vol. 5, 1820-1824, Robinson to Adams, Oct. 2, 1820.

101, footnote 21.

protection of the interest,

nag, and rights of the United States in this

quarter of the world.- fI 74 On October 30, 1820, Gauntt of the Macedonian
noted the friction existing between the patriot and U.S. naval

force~

at

Callao. 75
Cochrane' s "plundering" brought protests from American mercantile interata
intereat.t
He justified the seizure of the French Oazelle by contending that it was pri-

vate propert,.., 111 thout any ostensible Ol'O'ler. and, captured on an enemy coast

as

an "infringement of blockade. tI

He claimed the money seized aboard this

ship was privately shipped to prevent its confiscation.

Iliphat Sm1th, master

of the lfacedonian. also lost money during one of the confiscations.

One

source noted that Cochrane exempted Gua:rmey even from a paper blockade and
permitted all neutral ships to enter this port.

In delanse of Smith, this

same source, Forbes, wrote that Smith first tried to sell his cargo in
Valparai80 but was unsucce88ful and therefore sold it in L1ma. 76 This, of
course, was forbidden by the con8tituted blockade.
The Peruvian blockade was not totally successful for "more than one
merchantman slipped pastil and Cochrane's ships already few in number could
not 'IDe bllocated.

Previous to the liberatlne expadi tion, foreigp merchants

had enjoyed a profitable contraband trade with royalist ports which during
the blockade became JtK'Ire difficult and dangerolls to enter.

British vessels

74. .!h!E.., Robinson to Adams, Oct. 4, 1820.

75. Gauntt, Private Remarks, f. 97, Oct. 30, 1820.
76.

u.s.

Consuls B.A., January- 10, l8l8-June 16, 1821, Forbes to Echeverr!a.

Nov. 16, 1820.

106
actually sailed to Peru "under Spanish 11ceooe." Under such conditions
Coohrane found himself

eonstant~

at variance with British naval commanders

who guarded MUsh mercantile interests while "the Merchants, who had a.t
first eagerly looked forward to the U.beration of Peru, were :filled with
exasperation by San Martin's Fabian tactics." 77 'fb.e reference to
is mat enlightening sino. available source.

san

Martin

se. to indicate that Cm:hrane'.

role in the blockade question was the dominant

onth

It wa.s Cochrane who

enforced, m.od1tied, interpreted and often demanded BlOre stringent b1.ookade

measures. What part San Martin played in this phase

or

the expedition is not

easi1¥ discovered. Hem lJ.ke :Segg and Barnard cQfQp1ained about the blockade
and its disastrous effect upon their commerc1alintereats.

In 1820 and 1.621

Begg ,corresponded with Pariosa1em. and in one instance in July of 1.821. wrote

that "Bad not this b1.oc:kade of the Ooast been abandoned 10U were ere this have
seen a British squadron in tront of Callao and the port open to even contraba.nd of war.,,18 Barnard also cried out agaiDst the blockade with even more
A. third British merchant,

gloom.

added

tha'~

J. P. Robertson showed meh impatience and

"the large stocks Of goods in the bands of the fterchants, uke the

Goyernment impatient and the EngUsh uneasy about the delay." 19
The Maoe<loniau achieved further notoriety in Cochrane's qes when ber

n.

Hwapb.reyB, Liberation South

-

18. Ibid., 92, footnote 1,2.
79 •.

!2!2-,

footnote. 2 and 3.

Americ!l. 91, footnotes 4. 5. 6.
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e::lptiain, Dmmes, referred to his blockade as piratical warfare.

the necesnity

c,f

Downes urged

protectir.g A.'llerican C01ll1nerce, provided of course that contra-

bane of war was not involved.

Be added it was ridiculous for Chile to patrol

a 1200 mUe coast vr1 th three fritates lI one corvette and

three

brigs.80

In

July of 1820, Cochrane t s confiscatioll of' money from E. Smith only added to the

disappointmflnt which was hardly relieved by Smith's insinuations that the
American agent Prevost was too much inclined toward the rebels to seek proper
redress. 81

In August, 1820, both O'Higgins and San Martin were guests on the

Macedcnian. 82

Evidence sUbstantiates ~~8' friendly relations with OtHlggin

and his acquiescence to aome of the restrictions imposed by the blockade.
Downes wrote to 0 'Higgins on August 18, 1820, mainly on the question whether

Downes could enter Lima after the liberat1ng expedition was in command.
Earll.ar Downes was informed that he could net attend to American mercantile

interests in Lima until 52.r: MartIn occupied. the area.

Onder rebel control,

Lima was to be ma~e ~cesib1e to Americ~~ shiPe. B3

Downes continued to be very skeptical of Cochrane

I., intentions and

act:l.vlties, writing to Washington that American ships needed the "acedonian'e

80. Captains Letters, Vol. 1, 1820, Doe.
State, Jan. $, 1820.

DO.

11, Downes to Secretary of

81. JlarmiDf.. Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 13$-1)6, Adams to Prevost, July 10,
1820.
82.

Gauntt, Priy&te Remarks, f. 91. Aug. 11, 1820.

83.

Captains Letters, Vol. 3, 1820.
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protection.84
sqvadron.
A,"!}oriCR'1

The case in point was the Lou::i,s&, detained by the Chilean

ncnmes appealed to San ~a.rtln 'o'lho, interesting to note, told the
captaln that he

~mly

bad povrer over the squadron in military af'fa,lrs.

Hownver, San Martin added that he wOJ.ld see to it that American ships received
a f:lir tr1.al a.nC be set free if

pa~')ers 7fere in order. 85 The effect of San

Ma.-t!n I S reply upon Downes c.an be clearly seen [rota Ga.untt t 8 journal,
DecenlJer

?a,

1820.

He referred tc it as '3vasive, "which determ:ined Captain

Downes on takinr her out with the Macedonian."

011 Decem.ber 29, 1820, the

Msc.edcnian left Huacho with the Louisa. under her protection.

The Lautaro

followed but di<i not t'se force to regain the deWned stip.86

On December 28,

DClVnC':)

informed S.a.n Me.rt!n of his dccieiom It! am now under the necessity of

t&~~nf

upon

~8elf,

the responsibility of releasing her cLouisa. that she

may proceed on her voyage_ we7
givir~

A.pparently San liart!.n left Ruacho 1'1ithout

Downes any satisfactory reply to an earlier lptter.

o'Hif-r;ins on February 21,

l821~

Downes wrote

about the Loui~ incident accusinE Cochrane

of desiring to destroy American coruerce and ruining the Louisa.',. cargo. 88 On
Feb!"lary 24., 1821~ Downes lfrota to Pr(;voat that no appeals had been of avail
a'1d he justified his action fer re1easin,g her from

Cochrane' 8 cust.ody.

He,

84.

~ •• Vol.

85.

Special Af,ents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, San Martin to Delme., Dec. 27, 1820.

L.

1820, Downes to Smith Thompson, iov. 20, 1820,

86. Gal.~nt.t, Prlvate Remarks, f. 109 and

orr

Callao.

no.

87. Capt(;cins Letters, V(11. ,3, 1821, DC'WIleS to San Martin. Her cargo W&8 such
that it might indicate condemnation, Downes to San Martin, Dee. 28, 1820.

88.

-Ibid., Downes to San Martin_
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moreover, told Prevost that the Louisa carried 1,000 muskets and was headed
for Callao seeking wood and water. More, the tate at the Louisa
should not
o
have been lett to Cochrane but the ship, it datainsd, should have been sent
immediatelr tor adjudication.S,

On June 19, 1821, Downes reported the atfatr

to the Secretary of the Navy. He wrote that the Louisa was seued on at...
tempting to enter Lima. To protect American interests, Downes recalled his
interview with

san

Martin who was camped near Httache>.

"The General declared to me that he con.sidered
ber detention at Bucbo u~ u.stt bat that he bad
n.o authority to release her. I stated to hirn tha.t
I could not lea.,. ber in the saae uucertain sta.te
inwbich I found her; that unless he would pledge
his word sh. should be released or sent to Chile
tor .adjudication in the space ot eight tiqs, I
sb.ou.ld be _del' tile neo••s1ty of tald.ng her to
sea. with me; after some little hesitation be
was pleasH to sq that be would. gi.,.. . . sucb
pledge.·90

"expresses himself with great warmth both as
to DGtmes and R1dgeq, the tONer tor his conduct
in the atrail" ot the Louisa heretofore deta! led,
the latter tor baviDg attorcled an uy1nm to
'esuela on board the Oonstellation until he was
.nabled to etfect bis .scape-Indeed 80 great
wu the irritation at one lBOment that it was
in ag1tat1on to "strict our 1IltercovIB b7
the 1aposition of additional dutie., the idea.
h ...... baa been abandoned and .... l"emaill on th.

89. Ibid •• Dolmes to San Martin, Dec. 26, 1820. The Louisa had on board. oarg
ot $~, 80118 in perishable goods_

-

90. Ibid., Dowes \0 Secr.tar,r ot state, June 19, 1.821.
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same footing with othera.
others. w9l
If anything, the above documents point clearly to the fact that Cochrane
exercised a great deal of freedom as commander of the Chilean squadron and
that San Martin often had little influence over him.

The escape of the

-

Louisa under the Maeedonian's
Macedonian's cover attests to the degree of confidence Downes
had in San Martin's pledge to aid.
Encounters between Cochrane and British ships grew to the dissatisfaction
of both parties.

Since the Chilean conquest was not a reality, British

merchants refused to cease their Peruvian trade and commanders like
l1ke Captain
position
Searle of the J!Yperion were placed in the uncomfortable post
tion of defending
British intereats.
interests. 92 Captain Hardy protested that the Chilean blockade hurt
British commerce, raised cries of its illegality, and insisted on the rights
of British neutrals.

The Chilean

~overnment

had other views on the matter,

considering neutral ships in Chilean and Peruvian ports as transports and
mail carriers of Spain.

Robinson agreed that "there is too much truth for

lightly._93
them to be viewed or treated lightly.·93
The British had received

many

privileges from the Chilean government,

among them permission to enter Callao.
081lao. 94 These privileges were noticed by

91. lational
National Archives, Washington, Jiav;y Department, Cruise of U.S.S. Franklin,
Prevost to Adams, Oct. 16, 1821. Diplomatic correspondence included with
this cruise has also been used.
92. Centner, "Relaciones
"Relaeiones Comerciales,·
Comerci81es,- 101, footnotes 23 and 24.
93.

~.,

102; also
alao footnote 28.

94. nASI, VIII,
VrrI, 11, Cochrane to San Martin,
MartIn, leb. 16, 1821.
l,
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the Americans.

For

~\.8mple,

Downes noted

on certain Uquors and shoes.

·'~t

the Eritish did not P83 duties

ECheverrIa. informed Downes tha.t the British

commander 01 the Andromacba. solicited Chile lor permission to transport

liquor tram British ships

£01'

its own use, and. the perDdssion wu granted.

He maintained that similar privileges would be granted to Amerioan ships it

requ.ested."

Captain Sheriff of the An*omacha had his own idea.s about the

privileges of neutral ships durluga blockade, buina his theories on international la:fi. O'Higgins, CochratLe and San Marttn rejected Sheriff' a ini;er...
pretation of the ftcU"tel" and blockades that had no other object than to
oollect tees from PC"Jldts.96 Cochrane made his attitude quite olear by' confiscatiug ships that violated the blockade, tor example, the British
Colombia..91 'When a ship ttescapedlt he made arrallgements to have it stopped
at another port, as in the oase of the ~ Cathcart.98
Despite Cochrane's indignation and !lnotwithstanding the blockade," there
were many Amerioan and British merchant ships in Callao in May ot 1621.99

.. - -

Captain C. G. Ridgel\1 of the U. S. 5. Constellation l.am.ented Cochrane's

seizures and informed. the Secret.ary of the l(av that he would. cruise

9S. Special Agents Prevost, Bid.dle, Don,
1.819.

PNVO.~ to Icheverfia, Jan.

E.ch.tmrrr{a. to Downes, Oot.

7j 1820.

30,

96. DASM, V, h89, O'Higg1na to 3aD Kar~{n, April 21, 1821; Ernesto d.e la
Cru.:I,~stolar1o !! l!. Bernardo O'HiGgins (Madrid, 1.920), II, 72, footnote 1.
97. DA~, VIn, )2" Cocbrau to San Mart!n. Hq 23, 1821.

,S. -

Ibid..
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along the Peruvian coastline assisting any American in want.

He addeds

-'rom

Lord Cochrane being on that coast & prohibiting all intercourse I fear I will
find maDT in want."lOO Ridgely further described the lucrative trade carried
on by American citizens from China to Chile and Peru urging the beneficiality
of another war ship.

He had previously indicated that the British government

had four war ships and the British with the United State. carried on all the

commerce 1n this area. 10l
Smith Thompson of the lavy Department wrote to Ridgely on March 22, 1821,
admitting that while the United States did not recognize the legality of the
blockade, it was prudent to avoid

a~

collision with the Chilean squadron so

as not to prejudice the rebel cause. Washington evidently nw the sldes of
independence brightening.

Neutrality waa the order of the day.

Ridgely was

directed to Beek only the honor of the American flag and to act defenaively.
Any

infringement on neutral rights was to be met with "strong and spirited

appeals" through American agents assigned to the Chilean government. 102
Though San KartIn concurred with the idea of blockading all Royalist held
porte,lO) the existence of an unenforcible blockade continued to irritate the
two neutral but interested powers.

According to Prevost, the Bri tim commander

100.

Bavy Area 9 File, 1801-1830, ro1der, Box 1, Duplicate copy, f. ).

101.

folios 2, 3. and 4.
-Ibid.,
Ibid., Duplicate copy; Private Letters, Navy Depdment. February 1, 1813-

102.
Januar'Y2i5, 1840, f. 319, Thompson to Ridgely, March 22, 1821. Similar orders
were also given to Capt. Charles Stewart of the Franklin. f. 324-27 pass1a"
Sept. 8, 1821. This last document also in Private Letters, Navy Department.
103. DASM, VIII, 526, Forster to Antonio Vicara, General de Marina, May 31,
1821. -
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HardY' addressed m.erchants of Santiago respecting the blockade.

Again it was

a question whether a blockade was legal if no permanent force existed to
enforce it.

Prevost insisted that a competent blockading force was essential

for 1egality.104
On June 22, 1821, O'HiSf,ins issued a decree which modified the one

published on August 20, 1820.

His basic reasons for the change were

principles of equity and justice and the successes of the 1iberpting expedition.

Therefore, "having understood that a certain modification in this

respect m.ay be favourable to the operations of the War, the happy termination
of which is already at hand", the Chilean government ordered the August 20
decree operative for twenty more days and then to be effective only between
the area from Ancon to Pisco inclusive.

Designated as a state of rigorous

blockade, the decree stipulated that a sufficient force would remain in
front of every port along the whole coastline between the two ports. loS This
decree coincided with San Martin's promise that once the liberating force
commanded former royaUst ports, they woc:ld be opened to commerce.l06
The idea of an "adequate force" remained a source of controversy even
after the promulgation of the modified decree m.entioned above.

Echeverria

104. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Echeverria, June 18,
1821; Manning, Diplomatic Corre!pondence, II, 1051-1052, O'Higgins to Prevost,
June 2,3, 1821; American state Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 827. 0 'Higgins
agreed regarding presence of adequate force to blockade ports and would so
inform Hardy.
105.

British State Papers, 1820-1821, 1220.

106. DASI, VIII, 526, Forster to Antonio Vicara, May ,31, 1821.

114
replied to Prevost. June 25. 1821, that the blockade was to extend to areas
only where such a foree was stationed. 107 Prevost, in turn, wrote to Adams
on June 30. 1821, discussinp the diverse points of view in this matter.

In

this same letter he referred to the ~ng conflict between San HartIn and
Cochrane. lOB Cochrane informed San Martin on July 22, 1821, about Hardy's
views on the blockade, and himself insisted that not a moment be wasted in
declaring all royalist ports in a state of blockade rather than those between
Pisco and Ancon. 109
There was good reason for the British to dispute the issue of the blockade
since they violated the decree in t he fullest sense of the word.

Dri tlsh shjps

entered Callao and other ports carryiIlp' supplies and enemy property, and
Cochrane so informed San MartIn on July 2, 1821.110 To make matters worse,
there was some indication that the success of the Peruvian expedition was

~orse than doubtful, it is now almost despaired of •••• • lll 80 wrote Forbes
on July 3, 1821.

He further mentioned Hardy', angry discussion with the

Chilean government about the ·paper blockade" and the capture of several
British ships that dared to vl.olate this kind of blockade. What incensed
Hardy even more was the sale of the confiscated goods without his being

107.

Special Agents Prevost. Biddle, Dorr.

108. American State P~ers, Foreign Relations, IV, 826.
21-1822, 390-391.
British State Papers,

r

First part in

VIII. 130.
330.
109. DASM, vrlr,
110. ~
~.,
••

lll.

U.s.

55.

Consuls B.A.,
B.A.. July 3,
3. 182l-August 6, 1826, Forbes, July 3, 1821.

~-------------,
present and "without legal adjudication."

After writing to the Chilean govern

ment. Hardy then informed the British merchants
"that the blockade of the Coast of Peru, proclaimed by the Government ot Chill,
Chili, was illegal
and ths.t, under a sense of all these injuries.
he wanted no advice or remonstrance.
remonstrances from the
Merchants, that he has decided on the course
he intended to pursue and merely gave them
notice that he was determined to protect by
foree British rights and property afloat but
that the British Merchants must provide for their
own aecuri ty an shore or leave the Country as he
could not !~ena any protection to them or their
propert;y.tt 2
Forbes seemed confident that the Ch.ilean
Ch.1lean Government would "yield to the
British.·ll ) Moreover, to compound the misunderstandings and
menaces of the Britiah.·
diffieul ties over the "paper blockade" the Peruvian Vj.ceroy declared Callao

ann Lima trade free to all nftutral nags.ll.4 On July 6, 1821, Robinson adv1.sed Adam.
Adams that, the difficulties between Hardy ann the Chilean r,overnment
had been amicably settled, a8 Chile relinquished its pretensions to a blockade
of the whole coast ann confined it to such places as could be successfullY'
sllccessfullY'
controlled. llS A postscript to the above letter is most enlightening.
Robinson said that the Chilean government would under certain conditions permit
the export of Chilean produce to Peru.

113.

Ibid.
-.!2!i.

Ilh.
llh.

!£!2..
~.

115.

Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, July 6, 1821.

112.

I
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He continuedc "If this statement be

.!2!i.

r---------------,
116

correct. c the measure will tend to protract:t t.he war in Peru and perhap. add
••• nefl and interesting teatures to the contest tor independence. nl16
In 1821 it became increasingly clear that not only did the Chilean
government issue licenses to tradel17 but that Cochrane took it upon himself
to establish fta floating custom-house."

HavinE contacted the cargo masters

of British vessels in Arica. he offered to "relieve them from the annoyance.
they never ceased to feel trom the custom-house officers. that the cargoes
sbould be landed i\ithout obstruction. upon their fixing the valuation thellselves, and payinp to him on account of the government of Chile the moderate
118
duties of eiehteen percent on all goods equally.The cargo masters rejoiced at the offer and paid in quicksilver and a quantity of cables and
other naval stores destined for the Viceroy of Peru.

Controversy arose over

the institution of such a dangerous precedent, were Cochrane to dietate to
British commerce in the area by means of such a "custom-house. nl19 Cochrane
alse issued a license to the Admiral Cockburn to trade in all Peruvian ports,
Chaneay to Lima inclusive, May 12. 1821.

This license was granted in vin of

the need of naval provisions requested by the squadron and supplied by the
Admiral Cockburn. throu.gh Higman and Orammond, charterers cfietadoresa.

In

return for their provisions, Higman and Crammond were conceded privileges to

116. ~.

-Uiers,

117. DASM, VIII, 10, Cochrane to San MartIn, Feb. 16, 1821.
118.
119.

Travels

-Ibid., 64.

i!! Chile,

II, 63.
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dispose of their wares in tha stipulated ports. 120 Prevost cited the issuance

o! such licenses in his report to tdams; July 6, 1821. In the letter Prevost
said:
-The ex1iraTagent cow:klct of W. Cochrane was
the subject ot the adTices to 511' Thomas Hare.V'
•••• It appears that UDder color of duties bis
Le!. ship hubeen selling Ucanses to trade on
the Oout and in OIle instance to proceed to the
Capital. The Brig Robert Forae ot Liverpool
paid upnrds of $19000. and the RebM{,& near'1;r
as l'IlUcb tor the like priv11ege •••• tt '121

Charles Stewart of the hankUn also called attention to the Ucenses in his
Il

report to SlId.th 'l'hompson, stating that "Cochrane by means ot licenses to his
agenta aDd paJ'tnera in co.erce, enabled the place to hold out, and was thus
enricbing b1ueU, wb11e be was defeating the ob., eet ot SaD Martin...... 122
Tb.e reterence was to L1u. and Oallao and the affair took place duriftg the

Protectorate.
On Au.gust 2, 1821., Robinson referred to the lI&'9'al 81staa .,tabUshed.

Cochrane as "auction or contribution."

rus trpe

b7

ot tribute or bush. . .

was in no 11188 acreeab1e 100 the lords ot c_eree. Acoordinl to Cochrane',

arrangEflllent, all neutral vessels prior to entering .A.r1ca 1I6re to pay Cochrane

18 1/2 per cent dutr on tho amoUDt ot their cargoes and. would still be subject
to the lIltmicipa.l. dnties or customs in the pert itself. Batur&l17 tbe British

120.

Sf)eo1al Agents, Prevost, Biddle, Don.

-

121 .. Ibid.
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merchants became excited and Hardy rushed to their assistance.

The blockade

was confined to Ancon down to Pisco and, according to Robinson, tacitly
assented to by Hardy previously. After the unreasonable exactions would have
been imposed, Robinson believed Hardy would not admit to any blockade.

This

report also ind5..cated the policy of the Chilean government to grant trade
privileges, a course of aotion whioh many believed prejudiced the oause of the
liberating expedition. It was true that a bond was exacted for such a privilege as assurance that the goods would not go to the Royalists.

still the

high prices the goods would bring in Peru would be most tempting to merohants.
However, the British failed to comply wi th the restrictions and neglected to
post the necessar,y bond, but Robinson added that Hardy would protect aqy
British ships involved.l23 O'Higgins was .tully aware of the nature of
Cochrane's "customhouse" and the evils it would precipitate if allowed to continue. In a letter to San Martin, December 12, 1821, he expressed the British
disgust over this situation. 124 Cochrane's further "license" and "customhouse" activities specifically during the Protectorate will be discussed more
appropriately in a later chapter. What might be pertinent is the contemporary
British estimate of such arbitrary measures. In his Sketches, Haigh praised
the high calibre of British naval officials stationed along the Peruvian and
Chilean coastline and their suitability for furthering British interests.
One such statement follows.

"On many occasions both firmness and conciliation

123. Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Aug. 2, 1821.
124. ~, V, ,02, ,03; Bulnes, Espedici6n Libertadora, II, 308, 309.
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were requisite, to prevent improper exactions being levied upon the property
of the English merchants •••• ,,125 Singled out for their public and private
character were Bowles, Sheriff, Falcon, Hall, Hardy, Hon. R.C. Spencer, Hon.
Orlando Bridgemen and Captain D. O'Brien. 126
The blockade also brought retribution to CochrA.ne, who found himself in
sore need of supplies and was sometimes faced with unwilling suppliers.

In

such circumstances, Cochrane wrote to Monteagudo and asked for San t4art!n's
intercession in softening the re1actant merchants. 127 Apparently he acceded
to Cochrane's requests, for on Augnst 27, 1821, Monteagudo was able to report
that permission was granted to make arrangements with merchant ships. However
if the ships in question resisted such an arrangement, they were to leave the
port and be prohibited trom

~

commercial activities.

Since the blockade was
i

still considered vital in August of 1821, it was hoped that the acquisition
of the needed supplies would ~uarantee its continuance.128 At times there was
no question of payment; Cochrane simply "detained" ships with large amounts
of American property.129

Ships not c~rry1ng a customhouse permit or bill of

lading were especially vulnerable as was the case of the Louisa.130 Although
the degree of need for supplies fluctuated throughout the expedition, Cochrane
125. Haigh, Sketches, 312, 313.

- VIII, 428, Cochrane to Monteagudo, Aug. 21, 1821.
-Ibid., 430, Monteagudo to Cochrane, Aug. 27, ,1821; same document is also

126. Ibid.
121.

DA~,

128.
found ~ulnes, ESpedicion Libertadora, II, 345-40.

129. Captains Letters, Vol. 4, 1821, C. G. Ridgely, Captain ot Constellation
to Secretary of Nav.y, Aug. 29, 1821.
130. DASM, VIII, sept. 15, 1821, receipt or list tor goods signed b,y Cochrane
I

L
L
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was resourceful in securing much that he required.

In June of 1819, RobiruJon

noted that the squadron came back to Chile to refit and there it would be well
supplied with Congreve Rockets and with -arms and military forces adequate to
taking possession ot such position ••• a. it may be deemed eligible to hold. n131
The contributions of Cochrane t s business cODlpanions, tor example Willia
Hoseason, might also bear inv8stigation.132

lome ot the supplies came from

a lIr. Beale of the British ~ ....
Land=....o..
Land=_ok
k"" to whom Cochrane paid 80 pesos for
a gun instead ot the 120 demanded. 133 A document of Jul7 21, 1821, evideneed
a transaction whereby Cochrane received goods from the Laura, R. L. L. Lawa
captain. l .34
In his zealous attention to the duty of acquiring supp1iea and money to
meet the payroll ot the crews Cochrane plunged headlong into an even more
bitter conflict with San

Jlart,h.

The correspondence that evolved around the

admiral's questionable and unauthorised activities clearly indicated the wide
breach that had opened between the two.

131.

Letters from Monteagud0135 to

Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, June 30, 1819.

132. Robin A. Humphre7., ed., Documentsl - .lame. Paroissien'. Iotes on the
Liberating Expedition to Peru, 1820,· Hi!paniC American Historical Review,
ruI (1a7. 1951), 255, August 29, 1820.
ootnote 10 citing i. vicllBi Lckenna,
The Firat Britons in Valparaiso (Valparaiso, 1884), 31, said he was a business
companion of Cochrane's.
133. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, III, 305, footnote 49. date somewhere
around Aug. 25, 1819.
134. DASII, fIll, 435-.36, Ju17 21, 1821. Lists the supplies received by
Cochrane and signed by him and Pablo del Rio as Contador.
135. Bulnes, E~dici6n Libertadora,. II, ,346, lIonteagudo to Cochrane,
Sept. 1, 1821;
=47, IiOnteagudo to Cochrane, Sept. 15, 1821.

r
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Cochrane, even those from San Martinl36 himself, referred to the unorthodox
methods Cochrane had employed during the campaign.

In the midst of this

controvers,y, San Mart!n as Protector issued a new decree, October lS, 1821,137
which again modified the extent of the blockade.

Only certain ports remained

in the state of rigorous blockade, while neutral and friendly nations were
warned against transgression.
Of particular embarrassment to San Martin and, quite naturally to
0' Higgins was the obvious lack of rapport existing between Cochrane and the
British. In a letter to San Martin, written by O'Higgins, August 6, 1821,
attention was called to the need of conciliating the British for the madness
exhibited b.1 Cochrane and a directive sent to him to be guided by moderation
and tact. l38

The British appealed directly to San Martin when their ne-

gotiations with Cochrane to win modifications of the blockade bore no fruit.
Their demands did not go unheeded. 139
The Americans fared no better with Cochrane.
Adams, November

An agent, Hogan, wrote to

4, 1821, about the confiscations that took place and the

friction that Cochrane's activities produced.

Hogan at the time was on his

way to Santiago to speak with O'Higgins and determine "whether his Acts that
he may commit or that he is not commiting [sic) are to be recognized by this

136.
137.
138.
139.

I

L

-

DASM, VIII, 34S-46, San Mart!n to Cochrane, Sept. lS, 1821.
British State P!pers, 1821-1822, 804-805.

DASM, VIII, 276.
-Ibid.,
- 414, Monteagudo to Cochrane, Aug. 20, 1821.

L
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Government as the Acts of the Admiral of Chile •••• n140 This information vas
necessary, for a "Capt. Rn was determined to resist any insult to the hmerican
flag.

Hogan also stated that in public estimation "Cochrane borders upon a

Pirate belonging to no nation ••••it is possible this Govt. ms\y Countentmce him
till they can

ge~

the Fleet out of his hands ••• he is too much for them all •••

there r;o longer exists any cause for Blockade." 1.41 This was the

Cochr~e

that San Martin had to vork with when he began his Protectorate.
San Martin was further incensed when he learned that Cochrane had con-

fiscated $600,000 from the Royalists and appropriated it to pay his crew.
San Martin insisted that it belonged to the government but Cochrane decided
otherwise.

1.42

,

Forbes wrote to Adams, November 13, 1821, that Cochrane

pursued this course "in defiance of the strong representations of the General •
••• that he has not dared to put his foot on shore since he took this violent
measure. n143

The dispute over wages was of long duration.

Once San Martin

became the Protector of Peru, one observer noted that he refused to pay any
debts which belonged to the government of Chile and even asked Cochrane to
join hiJn and employ his ships for Peruvian service.
according to Miers, San MartIn ordered

1/5

th of the customs receipts to be

put aside and used for the purpose of paying the

1.40.

Cochrane refused and

~

and navy.

Since customs

Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 1060, Hogan to Adams, Nov. L.,

1821.

141. Ibid.

-

112. Captains Letters, Vol.
Nov. 2, 1821.

143.

5, 1821, Ridgely to Secretary of the

British State Papers, 1321-1822, 390.

Navy,
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receipts were small at this time, Miers continued, ttThis pretence of the
protector fully convinced every man on board the neet that he had no
intention ot paying them a single dollar.· 144 The validity ot such an accuaation will be investigated in anpther chapter.

Hiers also wrote that the

interposition ot Cochrane curbed and hulabled San MartIn's power. 14.5 .l
biographT of
ot Cochrane praised his resourcefulness in the Peruvian campaign
but indicated that San Martin "proposed to subject it .Peru. to a milital')"
despotism ot his own ...146 Another statement in the Bourne biographT pointed
out that while Cochrane was welcomed as the great deliverer of Peru it was

San MartIn who won the honor of liberation. 147
During peace negotiations with the Royalists in June of 1821, the
controvers,y between Cochrane and San MartIn entered into the discussion.

The

question ns raised whether or not Lord Cochrane was subject to the orders of
San Kartln. 148 Evidence showed that Cochrane at one specific time in September

144. tiers, Travels in Chile, II, 66-67) Thoma., 11th Earl ot Dundonald,

and
H. R. rox Bourne. ifhe~i!e of Thoma., Lord Cochrane (London
(LoDdon 1869), I, 19.5-96)
Cochrane told San iUtin hecould not Ca'.iiCef hi. debts, Bourne, Cochrane, I,
197; San Martin said he never ·engaged to pay the amount" and "that debt is
due from Chili, whose Government engaged the seamen, n Ibid., 198; Cochrane
later said Chile trusted San MartIn to see to the paymenr-and he failed, the
money was there to do so, Ibid., 200; Cochrane then called San Martin a tyrant
in a letter to O'Higgins, lbId., 206; Cochrane even suggested that after hi.
resignation of the Protectorate San Martin should have been tried for treason,

.!!?g., 210.

145.

Miers, Trave~s ~ Chile, II, 86.

146. Bourne, Cochrane, I, 191-192.

147.

~., 193_

148. Lanzas, Inde~ndencia de America, V, 288, LaSerna to the DipJEtado. de
Junta de Pacificacion, June~, 1821.

1&
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1821. even demanded that the royalists surrender Lima to him
1821,

.2!

separado

i: !!!l inteligeneia
inteligencia ~ ~ Ifartin •••••149

.~

!!

calidad

This last line was

printed in bold type in the edited version of the document cited.
American agents and officials also reported the ever widening rift that
was taking place between the two personalities.

Prevost wrote Adams on June 3

1831, that Oochrane directed his naval force "to a different point, with
objects distinct from those contemplated by the General.- 150 The same report,
dealt with the pillaging of Pisco and Arica by Cochrane and mentioned that
this was the third or fourth time that different sections of the coast were
so besieged

~

a mode of warfare injurious to the Cause, alw&1s
a1w&1s at variance

wi th that strictly enjoined and a

8' rigidly

adhered to by the General ••151 On

December 7, 1821, Prevost noticed that there was a possibility that Cochrane
Ohi1ean yovernment but be himself believed
would disobey orders from the Ohilean
otherwise -not from a!\1 confidence in the rectitude of his LdShip, but from
an impression that he will make any Sacrifice to obtain the favor of Chile
n152 Prevost noted the
in oppostion to the Protector wham he now revil88
reviles •••• "152
prevailing dispute and chose to attribute it to nothing more than San Martin's
state of health although it might have stemmed either from his inaction or
other activities connected with his rule.

149. Ruben Vargas Ugarte,
150.

As
A3 yet Prevost wa3 uncertain which

S.J., Manuscritos Peruanoa (Lima, 1938), II, 293.

British State 'ap!rs, 1821-1822, 390.

151. Ibid., There was also mention of the injury done to the British flag,
Ibid.,390-91.

-

152.

Special Agents Prevost, Biddle,
Biddle. Dorr,
Dorr. Prevost to Adams, Dec. 7, 1821.

1S))
was the real reason. 1S
While Cochrane sou£"ht
90u£"ht more command :in ports not under San MartIn's influence,154 speculation grew as to whom the Chilean government would support

......san Martin or Cochrane.

Conflicting reports circulated on this subject.

One American source, Capt. Ridgely, observed on June 14, 1822, that "Lord
~b1ickll approved of by the
Cochranes whole conduct with San Martin is ~blickll

Director of Chili and the people of Chili are with him, but there is no doubt
of a secret understanding between General San Hart!n &: His ExoY'
ExcY' O'Higgi.ns, and

Lord Cochrane
Coohrane must & will be sacrifioed, whenever he shall have returned to
155 'orbes
tleet.·1.5.5
rorbes related quite another version.
Chili with his tleet.·

On October 1,

1822. he tnformed A.dams that the Chilean government took aides with Cochrane

"who it is said, has proposed that the Chilean government should unit with
Bolivar to wrest the doubtful domination of Peru from San Martin. ,,156
tt156

In

tact, Forbes said that Cochrane had rone to Guayaquil to see Bolivar, but
this was atter San Martin and Bolivar
BolIvar had already met at Ouayaqui1.
Ouayaquil.

Forbes made a most important statement concerning this meeting.
tt1.57
"I
ttl conceive tha.t i.t
tt has been the kiss of Judas Iscariot.
Iscariot.,,1.57

Then

He said;

This turn of

events pleased Forbes, who really hoped that Bolivar would triumph and put

153. ~.

154.. .!!?!!!., Prevost. to Adams, June 12,
12~ 1822.

IS5.

Captains Letters. Vol. 4, 1822, Ridgely to Smith Thompson, June

156.

u.s.

Consuls B.A., July 3, l82l~ugust
1821~ugust 6, 1826, Forbes to Adame,

Oct. 1, 1822.

157. !2!,g.

14,

1822.

'!I'I
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an end to the civil war then raging in Peru.

Furthermore, he called San

Yart!n a military despot. 1SS The outcof.le of the Guayaquil conference 1a an
hi~tor~eal
btrt~g1e

fact--San Martin retired. What part Cocl1Tane played in this

for power has not yet been fully explored.

However, evioenc8 sub-

stantlates the claim that the role was no minor one.

The effect of all this

turmoil upon free trade as decreed and practieed durine the campaign and

Prot.ectorate belongs more appropriate1;r to other chapters.

At the moment it

suffices to state that diverse policies were often pursued. What one deoreed
th(~

other could very well override nth the means !:'!laced at his disposal and

by 11is immediate presenoe in the area involved.

Thus tar little notice has been given to Cochrane's persenal views on
the subject of tre. trade.
dates 1821 and 1823.

These may

be found in three speoific documents

The first document is Cochrane's address to the

Peruvidns dated either April or

M«1_ 1821, containing the oft used phrases

denouncing Spanish policy and offering independence, liberty, just laws, commeree, properous agriculture and peace.

To emphasize the benefits ot freedom,

Cochrane asked several questions. Where was the coasting trade to transport
Peruvian goods to a :nore advantageous m.arket? ·Rhere were the ractories?
Where was the foreign trade?

c1osinp;

t~e

Sparrl.sh pOlicY' plundered

'he co10,nies

co10,nies bY'

ports, forced higher prices through land traffic and destrQY'8d

the prof! ts of the miners, landcmers and the merchants. lS9

1.58.

Ibid.

1S9. ~ VIII, 17-18, Habitantes
1821. -

S! ,l!! Provincias

~ Sur, April or Kay,

,
,
I

I
"

-
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The second source is a proclamation issued by Cochrane to the inhabit-

November ot 1821.
ants of Guayaquil, probably in Iovember

Atter a pledge ot mutual

assistance, gratitude tor the welcome received by the Chilean fleet, and
congratulations upon their newly-acquired liberty, there followed a tirade
against the monopolists and the evils the qstem created.

Cochrane urged

the people to rise aeainst the monopolists who by controlling, among other
items, cotton, coftee, tobacco, and timber, demanded exhorbitant prices.
The exclusion ot foreign trade was not to the best interests of the country.
The surest means to acquire riches and political power was to see domestic
domeatic
goods
toreign goods
good a for the highest price and foreign
gooda at the lowest.
loweat.

Oochrane urged

importation of toreign goods and permission for toreign merchants who brought
capital or industrial competence to settle freely.

Camp*tition was
waa healthy

and under a new economic policy property would increase in value and the

ports and rivers would

~

tilled with ships ot all nations.

Moreover, Cochr
Cochrane

advised moderate customs duties to prevent amuggling
amugg1ing and to promote a greater
consumption ot both domestic and foreign
toreign goods.
import duties as a means ot reverrue.

He apparently did not consider
conside

Since Guayaquil by its position was a

was no reason why
why' it could not also be the center
"central republic," there waa

ot the globe. l60
ot agriculture and co_erce in this
thb portion of
The third and last document is
ia a letter addressed to the British
merchants residing in Chile, January 4, 1822, signed by Cochrane.

Expressing

160. .!E!!!., II, ,1)-,16 2aSldJlle
2as,dJll. The Dolphin Catalog no. 41 (1962), Latin
America and the PhiliWines,
Philippines, page 17, item no. 10" ottered a copy ot this
proclamatIonTor i55
iSS and the date citecl is 10TeJllber 27, 1821; it ..ems
ema
identical with the source used.
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satisfaction at seeing their commerce increased through the opening of ports
once exclusively controlled by Spain, Cochrane apologized for the restrainta
imposed during the liberating expedition.

While such "reatrainta" grieved a

few individual a "who wre desirous to avail themselYea of accidental c1rcum-

stances presented during the conteat," they were neceas&r7 for the common
good.

Cochrane further atated that a.n:y "who conceive themeelves aggrieved

by my conduct, I have to requeat that they will make known their complainta,

with their names affixed, through the medium of the public press, in order
that I may have an opportun1ty of a particular reply ••161 Keeping in mind.
Cochrane I S activities, there were Il8llY who were "aggrieved" and remained.
vocal in their protestations.

Some of the difficulties were resolved in 1822.

The Protector, San Hartin, stepped aside for the Liberator, Bolivar, but the
resourceful A.dJI1ral Cochrane, remained.

161. Stevenson. Historical Harrative, III, 466-67, date cited is Jan. 4, 1823.
Robinson Papers, Vol. $, has an atmOst identical copy of the letter but it ia
dated Jan. 4, 1822 and adelreaaed to the lIerchanta of England and other nationa
trading in the Pacific. This coPY' left out ·by m:r conduct." Some of the
wording is different.

CHAPTZR V

Economic State of Peru: l8lb-182l
The Peruvian

e..~pedition

was hardly a ';uarded secret.

Its politic<"l and

eccnomic implications were widely disseminated in Penl even before San Vartin,
already respected for his Chilean successes, arrived within its boundaries.
As

the Chilean land and naval forces

moved

north, contemporaries specnl:1ted

upon the propitious state of Peru, carefully weighing the economic benefits
to be derived from an early victory.

The economically realistic Viceroy

Pezuela understood the necessity of fighting the revolutionary tenets as well
as the physical forces that threatened. This chapter will deal essentially
~'ith

Pezuela's efforts in the realm of free tra.de; the support or opposition

he encountered in Peru; his negotiations with San Martin; arrangements with

commercially-minded powers,

e.:~.

Britain and the United States; his

supplications to Spain; Spanish policy and the result of this policy upon
the preservation of the viceroyalty.

The invest.igation will revolve around

the policy of free trade as proposed b.1 Pezuela or denied by monopolistic
interosts rather than the practice which belongs more properly to the
following

chapt~r.

The successful revolutionizing of Chile and its consequences upon rqyalis
Peru have been duly notedl and discussed. Contempo~aries viewed San Martinis

1. Odriozola, Documentos, III, 317, Discurso del Virrey del Peru en la Junta
Extraordinaria de Tribunales, Despues de la Batalla de Maipo, Lima, May L,
1318.
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victories and proposed plan for the Peruvian expedition hopefullY and in terms
not conducive to royalist tranquility. Worthington and Prevost belonged to
this optimistic category. On November 18, 1818, Worthington referred to the
effect of rebel successes, citing a probable revolution in Lima. Although it
waS

still too soon to be a certainty, he thought it by no means improbable

that he would eat his Christmas dinner in the liberated capital of the Incas. 2
Reporting from Lima, Prevost notified Adams that there was much consternation
and depression at the expeotant arrival of the patriot forces. 3
Although laoking modern communioation faoilities, news of the proposed
expedition nonetheless reached Peru and eventuallY Spain. 4 Taking into
account the length of time required to forward information and the varj,ous
means by whioh this information was acquired, the content was surprisingly
accurate. Much of the credit is due to the various Ships, British and
American, that voyaged between Chilean and Peruvian ports. Cochrane and the
activities of the Chilean squadron were watched oarefullY. 5 Pezuela was kept
informed of San Martin's movements 6 from suoh souroes as He~ique Villansey,

2. U. J. Ministers Argentina, Ootober 22, lSlS-April 8, 1820, Worthington to
Adams, Nov. 18, 1818J also Manning, Diplomatio Correspondenoe, II, 1024.
3. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, Jan. 15, 1819.
4. Julio F. Guillen, Indea;rdenoia de Amerioa, Indioe de los Papeles de
Expedioiones de Indias (Ma d, 19~3T; tI, 16~, Sept. 12, 1820.

5. Lanzas, Indepenciencia de Amerioa, IV, 410, Minuta de Oficio al rU,nistro
de la Guerra; Oct. 3, i818,-Casado 7 Villena, Memoria Pezuala, 392, Jan. 2,
1819J DA~. V, 175, Pezuela to San Carlos, Mar: 8, 1819.
6. Casado y VilleM, J.!emoria Pezuela, 638, Jan. 29, 1820.

".--.----- - - - - - - - ,
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cargo master of the British Libonia 6 7 and trom the captain of the j[.j.§..
Warrior. 8 The answer to the rebel threat was the promise of a Spanish ex-

-

pedition9 that somehow failed to materialize leaving the Peruvian royalists

mostly to their own devices in coping with impending disaster.
One

phase of the campaign that created economic and ps;ycholofical
psycholofical havoc

amongst the royalists was the restrictive blockade by the Chilean squadro.n.
It most certainly plunged Peru into a

distressi~

economic state.

Adding to

the discomfort was the knowledge that the rebels were aided and abetted by
foreign powers which took advantage of the situation by carrying on a contraband trade. 10

It was unlikely that Cochrane·s naval operations would be

unchallenged, whatever the strength of the royalist squadron.

The minister

of Marine advised the Cortes, July 12, 18206 of the need for more warships
in Callao waters,ll and measures were taken to alleviate the situatlon.
tuation.12

7.
£!
8.

Ibid., 716, 717, Hay 28, 1820.

Included in this notation was
waa a Gaseta

Ch1."le";
~.,

730, July 11, 1320.

9.
DASl4, IV. 3.56, 357; Ibid., IV, )60, 361, Irigoyen to San Uart!n. June 15,
15.
1819; IbId., IV, 303, Ech8'V8rr!a
Ech8V8rr!a to San Ilart!n,
Ilart!n. July 22, 1819; Ibid., IV, )12,
J.
o,
Hig{!ins
to San MartIn,
Aug. 1, 1 819.

10. Fernando Valdes Hector Sierra Y' Guerrero, Conde de Torata, ed., DocUJllentos
DocUJllentoa
pasa 1a Ristoria de 1& Guerra Separ.1st& del Peru (Madrid, 1894-1898), II, 234,
23 , 314-1), JoSIRueda to 'ezuela,
'esue1a, 'eb. ~lB21; "Corsarios
"Corsarioa en los sig10s
XVIII Y
Y XIX," Revista del Archivo lacional
I&cional del Peru. IVIII (Lima, 194)-1946),
84. Pezuela
Pezue1a to seHores~ior
seHore8~ior 7 donsUles del~ar-de1
del~ar-del Tribunal del Consulado,
lay 1),
1817)
Casado
y
Vilana,
JleJlllOria
Peluea, 248, 249, 2», April 21, 1818.
13,
C.sado
'eluea,
11.

British Stat! Paper!.
Paper!, 1819-1820, 1062.

12. Guillen, ~~dependencia, II, 172, Aug. )0, 1820.

1)2
As all added incentive the ConS'..llado of Lima, influenced by Cadiz merchants,
offered rewards for captured ships.l)

In another document the Consulado de

Lima offered 50,000 pesos for each Chilean ship captured. 14 Royalist naval

forces proved insufficient to thwart the Chilean squadron's objectives.

Aa

the liberating campaign advanced, royalist protestations against the land and
sea blockade mounted. 1S
iiilitary and naval strategy is not wi thin the province of this study' but
the economic factor as a prime cause of the revolution is of paramount iJIlportance.

The economic thought, based on the principle of free trade, waa the

special propaganda devise motivating the expedition.

RiTa AgUero, in "Las

28 CaBsas de la Revolucion de .America", clearly irx:licated that the abMnce of
free trade was a powerful and realistic motive for what transpired in Peru
during 1818 to 1822.

Free trade, he argued, was profitable to colonial

industry. agriculture and wealth but diametrically opposed to the interests
of Spain.

The basis of economic prosperit11fas liberty.16 Romero'a discussio

of the economic theories held by the fathers of independence brings out more

13.

Humphreys, "Paroiasien Notes, It 270, Oct. 16, 1820. "The Conaulado of
L5.ma has been prodigiously generous in their offers of re~'8rd6 for the head
of San l.Iartln, Heras &: c, which are valued at from 10,000 dollars to 250
accordlnr. to class, and the aMps are from 25,000 to )00,000."

14. Bulnes, E!pedlcion
Nov. 5, 1820.

15.

Libertadora. I,

479.

Footnote no. 1 tc the Proclamatio

Odr1ozo1a, Documentos, IV, 128, LaSerna to Minister of War, Karch 7, 1821.

16. Emilio Romero, .....punte. sobre las ideas de orden economico durante 1&
revolucion :por 1a indiipendtmcia del Peru, It Mercurio Peruano, In, Ailo IlV
(Lima, 19)9). 36.

l

r
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rully the importance of gearing the economy to free trade. Among the notable
figures cited by Romero are found the Jesuit Juan Pablo Vizcardo y Guzman who
condemned the monopolistic system in his famous Carta ~ !2! Espa601es
Espa60les
Americanos1 7 and Manuel Vidaurre whose Memoria sobre !!
la Pac1ficaci6n ~
de !!
la

------

--

America lieridional (lS17) favored a more liberal commercial arrangement
between Spain and her colonies. 1S Bulnes, in EspediciOn Ubertadora, claimed
that Peruvian economy was geared to the benefit of a few privileged merchants
wi th the mine productions of prime consideration.

The sole effect of Spanish

policy only made more imperative the need to overthrow the economic barriers
~ revolutionary means. 19
Not all writers agreed as to the degree of Spanish oppression in the
Peruvian viceroyalty. Distance between Spain and Peru worked to the decided
20 Stevenson contended that the loudest protestadvantage of the colonials.
ations came from the monopoUsts who had most to lose by a free trade.
already'

SaW

They

a forecast of things to come when British and American ships Itunder

the protection of passports tram the constituted sovereignties of Spain"
arrived in Lima. One of Stevenson's remarks bears challenging. He stated
that although the creoles sutfered along with Spaniards they remained silent. 21
The credibility ot such a statement will be discussed throughout this chapter.

17. Emilio Romero, Historia F.con6mic.!.2!1 ~ (Buenos A.1res, 1949), 263.
18. ~.

3$0, 353, 354.
Narrative, I, 354.

19. Bulnes, Espedicion Llbertadora, I,
20.

Stevenson,

-

~storical

21. Ibid., III, 120-21.
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Proctor's

~arrative

stressed the difference between wholesale and retail

activities under the viceroyalty and the Protectorate.
sya~m.,

privileged merchants were able to amass

much 8.S

keeping a /jingle account. 22

A.long

gre~t

Under the royalist
fortunes without.

80

~ith special conceded privileges

to foreign commerce, the monopolists dreaded the steadily increasing· amount
of contraband that found its way into PerUvi&l markets. 2)
'I'lle main concern of this chapter, however, is not the problem of the
monopolists but that of the liberal merchant who endured the rigors of
restrictive colonial policy.

Just how much appeal did

nouncements have upon the discontented element?
the proposed venture?

revolutio~1'

pro-

Was the time really ripe for

Guido informed San Martin on June 2, 1818, that the

Peruvian disorder coupled with lack of sufficient arms was irreperable and tha
this was the opportune tt.e for crowning their work. 24

Juan Garc!a del Rio

wrote to O'Higgins irom Pisco, October 12, 1820, regarding Peruvian sentiments
for independence. 25

Taking advantage of the obvious discontent, San

and Cochrane issued proclamations to the Peruvian populace.

Martin

Cochrane' 8

address, ejther April or Kay of 1821, contained the usual palliatives.

22. Robert Proctor, Harrative

-- - -

2! !

~ournei Across

Lima •••• (London,
~....-.-.

and 01' a Residence in

182~).. 291.

!h!

Cordillera

He

2! !h!. AndeB,

23. Vicente Rodrf~uez Clisfi>do y Jese ii.ntcmic Calderon Quljar..c. E?ds., Memoria
de Gob1erno de Joselernando de Abascal y Sousa, Vlrrey del Perc., 1806-1816 ..
\SeTil1e, 1944), I, 179, 200.

24.

~,

VI, 290, 291, Guido to San Martin. June 2, 1818.

25. Bulnes, Espediclbn Llbertadora, I, 460-61, Garoia del Rio to O'Higgins,

Oct. 12, 1820.
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explained that the Chileans came as liberators and friends for they could not
stand helplessly by and watch Peru enslaved. To make this appeal even stronger
Cochrane pointed to the lack of free trade as evidence of the plundering policy
of a distant country--Spain. Cochrane also used a direct approach by offering
liberty, just laws, commerce, prosperous agriculture and tranquility a.s the
fruits of independence. 26
The actual situation of Peru is amply described in the various correspondence that transpired between American agents and Washington after the
liberation of Chile. l-lorthington expected Peru to fall to San Mart!n if he
attacked Lima "between this & January next." The letter, written in July of
1818, evidenced the "golden opportunity" presently existing because of the
complex difficulties of the Royalists. 27 Prevost's letter of April 9, 1818,
also referred to Lima's "disaffected population" and military weakness.

28

On June 10, 1818, Prevost admitted that "notwithstanding all the restrictions
of monopolies ••• 1t Lima "is a place of great commerce."
eA~edition

Prior to the San Mart!n

several hundred mines were opened but in 1818 only one hundred and

thirty were being worked successfully'. "In Peru the state of development is
onconceivable, (sic] the mind appears to have lost all its energy and with it

26. DASH, VIII, 16, 17, 18, Oochrane to the Inhabitants "de las Provincias
del 3ur," April or May, 1821.
27. U.s. Hinist8rs Argentina, April 26, 1817-July' 9, 1818, 398, 399,
'fi·orthington t s rem.arks on a Prospective Glance at Peru, regarding July 4, 1818,
letter.
28. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, April 9, 1818.
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all its character.,,29 Two other Prevost letters describe affairs in Peru even
more succinctly.

The first, dated September 1.3.1819, and baaed on existing

conditions considered the Perus irrevocably separated trom Spain • .30 The
second written approximately a year later predicted the outcome of the Peruvian
expedition.

"I «Prevost. however do not hesitate to offer my conviction that

unless a material change has taken place at LiJIla during rq absence, it will
succeed. ,,)1
Before progressing into actual discussion of the Pesuela regime, a briet
study of Peruvian opinion on the subject ot tree trade would prove beneficial.
How did the people feel about the liberating expedition, what were their sentiments regarding tree trade and its etfect upon their economy.

Added to this

discussion will be so-called espionage reports that kept the rebels aware ot
actual concii tiona.

Some of these used or)'Ptio oode signals while others re-

mained . entirely anoll)'DlOus.
Casper Rico enumerated the disadvantages ot free trade, condemned the
insidious but luorative contraband activity, showed British ingenuity in
commercial transactions, and repeated the cry ot the monopolists-tree trade
and absolute ruin were united and inseparab1e.)2

Equally, it not more vocal,

were the elements that found in revolution the answer to Peru's economic

.30.

Ibid., Prevost to Adams, June 10, 1818.
-!2!!!.,
Prevost to Adams, Sept. 1.3, 1819 •

.31.

1.!:!!!!.,

.32.

AASK. VII, 1.32, 1.3.3, 1.34, 1.35, Arbitrios, Gaspar Rico, 'eb. 10, 1819,

29.

Prevost to Adams, Sept. 28, 1820 •
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plight.

Acting in the capacity of obeerTers, more cuually
casually and colorfully

called spies, men like Aristipo Emero
hero carefully noted all pha
phases
..s of Peruvian
life, the effect of Cochrane's blockade upon the morale of the royalists and
people, the British and American activities "in the area, and espeoially the
efforts of the viceroy to staali.. the eoonomic as well as politioal situation.
Emero reported a foroed
forced loan of one million pesos demanded of royalist m.ercl'anu,
m.ercl'antAI
clergy, and other inhabitants, ot which
whioh the merchants apparently were respondie
e1 Soldado" another report dated October 28,
for 400,000. 33 Signed only "Sef1or el

1819, obviously from a patriot agent, 'ave further insight into Peruvian ecoindioted Coohrane for his
nom:r and political stabilit,.. The above report indicted
descriptive were the royalist suspicions
high handed measures but even more desoriptive
aotivities.
and condemnation of British intent and activities.

Still another document

was written around 1820 by a Peruvian whose sentiments favored the saored
cause of liberty.

This was a proclamation to the people of Chile expressing

fond hopes for the expedition and illustrating the sad result of oppression,
abandoned mines and ruined commerce. 34
A different category of reports came from other than political and com-

mercial sources.

Bartolo-*, Archbishop of Lima, reterred to the hardship

caused by a six month blockade and 1nabill
inabillty of royalist troops to withstand
wi thatand
rebel force
•• 3
)'' Fray Felix gave an account of the state of Lima in 'ebruar,y
February
forces.

33.

.!2!S.,

VII, 116, 117, Relacion
Re1acion de Lima, Ilaroh
Karch 16, 1819.

34. Ibid., n, 269, 270, Proclama to the Habitantes de Chile.

-

35. Ibid, V, 1,6, 157, to Sefiora Dofla Violante Freira de Andrade, Feb. 1, l82L.
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of 1821.

In addition to much bloodshed. 10s8 of more than thirty million

pesoS, there were other costs too numerous to mention.

Of vast importance

was Cochrane t s blockade strategy that cut off supplies.

Wi th t he approach

of San Martin's ~, the land routes further restricted the food supp1igs
so needed by the people of Lima.

Fray P'elix believed independence very

probable notwithstanding the vigi1ence of the rove:mment and fidelity and
love for the eovereign. 36 Royalist or rebel. m~ commentators refused to
identity themselves in their correspondence.

There is a June 5. 1821, letter

•

from 180 if •• to "senor don 190-160--." that describes some of the panic

arising out of rebel rictories. 37
Hall's VOYages yields further insight into the state of mudd1ement in

Paru.

Hall points to San Hartin's use of agents to gather the people into

the revolutionary camp.
ItBy means ot political publications, aided by
the exertions of numerous and active agents,
be carried his intrigues not only into the
provinces, but into the very heart of the
capital; in process of time ehe has. acquired
sufficient influence in the surrounding districts. to cut off the principle 8U~ly of
provisions to the capital by land.- 3O

After a conversation with the vieeroy, Hall believed that before long Lima
would surrender

36. Ibid., 158, 159, Fray P'elix to 1t)(1. muy amada Juanita, - Feb. 10, 1821.
Fray JeiTx refers to Juanita as daughter.

-Hall, V21ages,

37. Ibid., VII, 291.

38.

I, 72.

1.39
"not so much to the foree of San Martin's
ot
army, as to the overwhelming influence of
public sentiment, the tide of Which had
decidedly turned, and was at this time
nowing d1rlQtly against the Spanish
authority.aJ'!
In fact, San Martin told Hall that "The capital is now ripe tor declaring its

sentiments, and I Shall give them the opportunity of
ot doing 80 in satety.·40
Despi te numerous pronouncements to the contrary, Hall indicated that the
people of Lima were considerably surprised tlthat they should be so treated by

a man whom they have been taught to consider an enemy.·4l
Of major consequence is the Viceroy's position under the pressing advance
of revolutionary torces.

Pezuela's etforts
efforts to cope with the realistic demand

tor tree trade and the ingrained bias of the monopolists is necessary to an
understanding of just what San Hartin tried to change and how much of a change
really took place during his Protectorate.

Under

obl~ation

from Spain to prohibit free commerce with the colOnies,42
found the restrictions unapplicable.

to fulfil ordera

Pesuela nevertheless

He was well aware of the tree trade

offers made by the revolutionaries in exchange for material aid. 43 The status
of clandestine trade was a further grievance for the Peruvian royalists who

39.
)~o.

41.
42.

Ibid., 85, about the end of 1820.
-Ibid.,
181.
-Ibid., 190.
-Barros Arana, Ristori. CMle, II, 248-49, about 1817.

43. Casado y Villena, Memoria Pez_la, 88, Aug. 17, 1816.

proceeded to legislate against it.44 News that some restrictions had been
lifted in other Spanish colonies,45 as in Guba, hardly promised any definite
solution to Peruvian economic problems. The loss of Chile was an economic and
political blmi that Pezuela refused to accept. On December 9, 1817, he
considered the recuperation of Chile intima.tely connected with the wellbeing
of Peru, naming the various products that were exchanged between the two
areas.

The "reciprocal and necessary commerce" brought in considerable

customs duties, enabling the ra.yalists to carry on war and preventing the
elimination of innumerable merchants who lived by this means.

An independent

Chile could sustain itself with foreign trade and furthermore find the
necessary resources to carry the war to Peru. 46
Impressed with the need for action, various agencies within the Viceroyalty devised means to raise the revenues and curb the illicit commerce that
thrived.

A

commission sent a plan to the Junta de Tribunales which

sug~ested

among other things an increased tariff on wheat and fats coming from Chile.
Pezuela noted on January 16, 1818, that this plan also suggested more reasonable duties on goods imported by the CompaTiia de Filipinas. 47 News from the
Duke de San Carlos, attached to London, made immediate precautionary measures

44. "Corsarios,n 7S-76! Pezuela to Real Tribunal del Consulado, Nov. 6, 1811;
Ibid., 76, 77, 78, 79, ~O, Copia de los articulos de 1a Acta de la Junta .
Particular erigida para impedir contrab&,dos.

4>.

DA.3-1, V,

46.

Casado y Villena, Memoria Pezue1a, 195-96, Dec. 9, 1817.

180, 181, El Conde de

47. ~., 217.

Casa

Flores to Pezuela, Nov. 30, 1817.

r
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that much more necessary.

On February 7, 1818, 3an Carlos informed ?e~mela

of the aid given to the insurgents as the result of ~lvarezts influence,
especially upon British mercha,nts. 48 On r-1'arch 31, 1818, Pezuela wrote to
Cas a Flores that he had done

~ll

in his power to conserve the colonies for

Spain. Most of the reverses suffered by the royaUsts could be traced to the
valuable assistance given the rebels by the
Congressional

legisl~tion,

~mericans.

Despite American

munitioL3 from the
the rebels received arms and mun1tiOL3

United 3tates which also harbored privateers that preyed upon Peruvian
commerce.

Pezuela reterred
referred to San Mart:!n as nEl
uE:1 caudillo principal" and

recounted his meetings with Bowles wham he described as having excessive
partisanship for
tor the enemw.

This letter nlrther described the procedures

b10ckadine the coastline and confiscation of all ships
initiated by Peru for
tor blockadine
that defied that blockade.
cause \-Tere the

3alva~e

Cited for their notorious support of the rebel

Adel1na, both carrying arms and munitions. 49
and Adelina,

In May of 1818, growing Chilean successes crowned by the battle of Maipu
prompted the Junta General de Tribunales to action.

One of the measures pro-

posed was the lifting of some trade restrictions so as to encourage greater
commerce and thereby increase the revenue.

To effeet
effect the desirec end, the

Permanente de Arbitrios was proposed to study specifically
naming of
ot a Junta Permanents
the problems involved.

h8.

~,

~ong

the sirsuatures found on this document were those

V, 113-74, Casa Flores to Pezuola, Feb. 1, 1818.

49. Ibid., 1.86, 188, 189, 190, Pezuela to Casa Florea, embajador de
en 1& corte de Portugal, Mar. 31, 1818.

s.a.c.

of Bartolom'. Archbishop ot L1m.a, Ignacio Mier, Pedro Abad!a and Francisco
Xavier de Ilcue. SO Pezuelats notation ot Mq 4, 1818, referred to the aboft
conmissiotl, and the subject

ot trade. Named to this commission vere D. Juan M.

Ollves, (Intendente de Lima), D. Manuel Pardo (Regente de Cuzco), D. Ignacio
Mier (Arc~ de L1:rrla), D. BartolO'!'d M. Salamanca. (Intendente que tus de Arequipa), D. JOM

IrigO)"EHl (01dol" de Chareu), Jos6 Manuel Blanco ABcoua

(Procura.dor General), D. Jos' Cabero (Rector de la Utd:fttrsidad), D. "Pedro
Abad!a (Factor de F1Upinas), D. Francisco Izctte (Comerciante), D. Jos6
Arizmendi (Coaerciant.e) ,and D. Antotno ~lvarude Villar (Seeretario con

Yoto).Sl Some ot these indj,:ri.duals were involved in commerce.

'fb.e possible extension ot Peruv1an trade was more than a .re rumor,
according to American sources. Robinson claimed that British merchants
obtained trade privileges not accorded. to the ADltricans. He spec1f1ca.11T
52
accused Oaptains Meley and Sheriff' of "entering into commercial arrangements."

On Ju'q' 7, 1816, Robinson again noted that Britain might obtain some exclusive
trade privileges which be would do all in his power to prevent. After a conversation with Abadia concerning the opening of Peruvian ports to foreign.
cOlllMl"ee, Robinson quoted Abadta .s s¢ng that such trade would be upon

reclproeal. pri.ncipl.es.SJaobiuson was not wrong, for Pezuetat s notations

So. ;rot-ata, Doc_ento., II, 3>6,
,1. Casado '1 V111eua, Meaoria
Mq

4, 1.818.

Mq

4, 1816.

Pezue1.a~

262-63, to all the Tribunates en Junta.

52. Robinson Papers, DiU'1, (Mq 22..June 27, 1818), on board the U. S.5.
ODta:r1o, J1lUIe 14, l1n.a.
- --

S3.

!!>!!!_,

(June 28-Septalber 22, 1818).
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of July 24, 1818. reterred to a proposed free trade agreement with the
British. 54 Substantiating the above statement. is a notation in the Pesuela

-

)(emoirs of September 23, 1819, to the effect that the British Catalina was
procedint! from Huanchaco with 1,000 fanegas of wheat, and that the Catalina
had received. permission to transport supplies to Callao from other ports of

the Peruvian Viceroyalty. 55 However, the picture was not entirely in British
favor, for on September 9, 1819, and September 16, 1819, Pezuela referred to
the Palas and the Elena Maria both American ships and both with trade perm1t~6
Rapport bet1reen Spain and Britain fiuctuated.
was informed by the captain ot the American

In December of 1818, Pezuela

!!! Volador

that a treaty of

commerce had been signed between Britain and Spain. 57 In lay of 1819. Pesue18
wrote to the Secretario de istado Y' del Despacho de Gracia y Justicia preventing the introduction of British publications into the viceroyalty.58
Enterprising Americans were not tar behind the British in ..eking out
trade priorities or at least trade concessions.

The avant garde consisted ot

individual merchants but I\Ost frequent and regular contacts came through
naval commanders and assigned agents.

Of the naval commander8, Biddle ot the

Ontario was both welcomed and suspect.

In April ot 1618, Biddle and Prevost

54.

Casado y Villena, Memoria Pesuela, 295-96, July 24. 1618.

55.

~.,

56.

Ibid., 521.
-Ibid.,
- 391, Dec. 30. 1616.

57.

527.

58. tan.as, Ind;pndencia de America, IV, 436. lay 30, 1619. The publications
cited .. "n IspdOCon.tltuC1oDal" and "El Gabinete de curio8idades politic..
1 literaria8 de iapaAa e India•• "
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came to Lima, holding conferences with the viceroy and Don Felix Blanco ot
the Philippine Compaqy "ho entertained all strangers.- 59 The president ot
the Philippine Comp8D1' was listed as Don Pedro !bad!a.

The Ontario journal

mentioned a rewarding visit to Lima. 60
The purpose of Biddle's visit to Peru was manifold.

First there was the

need to safeguard American ships against Spanish cruisers.

Biddle wrote to

Pesuel&, April 25, 1616, requesting that American ships presently in Valparaiso
be permitted

to leave unmolested.

The letter mentioned previous correspondence

to this effect and. then Biddle denied au,r knowledge of a Spanish blockade. 61

Pezuelats letter. April 27. 1818, firmly indicated the contraband trade that
U,S. subjects carried on with the insurgents.

Be argued that the blockade waa

legal on the grounds that the royalist blockade was not one imposed by a
foreign nation but a blockade by a mother country against rebel forces,
Therefore, there was no need to give notice of its existence.

The Spanish

colonial system guarded against foreign intercourse with the colonies and. the
present state of revolt did not prevent the mother country from pursuing her
policy.

Plzuela admitted that since the American violations might have been

private and not condoned officially by the United Statea govermaent. and
since he was desirous of retaining

harmo~, he

would give the necessar,r orders

to the Spanish commander to permit .American ships to leave Valparaiso.

How-

ever, henceforth all entry into rebel ports would be prohibited and. the

59.

Ontario Log and Journal, I, April 12, 1818.

60.

Ibid., III, .Jan. 29, 1818••
-lavy,
Area 9 File. 1801-1830 Folder, Box 1, msa. copy of Biddle' s 1,tter

~~.

to-Pezuela, A ril 25 1818.

Another co

is in Ca: tains Lette

8

Vo

blockade enforced rigorously.62

Biddle conveyed the Viceroy's instructions

to Worthin;.ton, who was to inform any American merchant ships that they might
leave under the Ontario's protection. 6)
Prevost and Robinson also became involved in Peruvian affairs.

On

June 10, 1818, Prevost informed Adams of his meeting with the Viceroy and the
subjects discussed, among them the status of the confiscated Canton and Beaver.
The Viceroy promised not to interefere with U.S. vessels and was found willing
to use neutral ships for the purpose of prisoner exchange and cessation of
hostilities.

Prevost said that this would mean a sacrifice, but if it

afforded greater protection for American ships it should be considered.
mentioned discussing this point with Biddle.
meri ts emphasis.

He

One statement in the letter

Prevost observed that despite the existing monopolies, Lima

was a scene of great commerce.

He specifically mentioned imports of woolens,

cottons, and finer goods valued at fifteen million dollars.

The Indian product

was coarse compared with the better quality goods of the British.
exports were sugar bark and vicufia
vicufla wool.

The chief

Prevost claimed that "crooked"

British policTwas understood in Peru. 64 On July 27,1818, he complained that
Pezuela had not kept his promise regarding the Canton and Beaver, as both were

62. ~., typed copy of April 27, 1818 letter, Pezuela to Biddle.
63. Captains Letters, Vol. 2, 1818, Biddle to Worthington, doc. no. 132 in
book, June 1, 1818. Another copy is in U.S. Ministers Argentina, April 26,
l817-July 9, 1818. Biddle 80 instructed U.S. ships on June 6, 1818.

64. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr.. Prevost

to Adams, June 10, 1818.

-

Ih6

still G.ot:-:.imd nne still wi thOllt a h",arin3;" althouGh Pe7.'lUl:l nffect3d",:ood
f:d.'!;'h, he l,TOuld roma.in in Uma for some time to watch dev.:::lopmants. 65

Robinson's'stwJ in Lima, as reco!'ced in his d:ia:ri~s, inclu(;cc d!.scussions
~;ith\bad!a, htjnd of the Philippine Company.

On July 16, 1818, he al'ru8:i with

,\bn(l:!a re;;3l'din~the right of American ships to enter ports, !~ven though
closed, f.or purposes of shelter and suppli0s, and the right to sail the Pacific
with cari~ocs.

\bad:!a denied this right.

'Robinson's rejoinder "a3

fl.

cit.ation

of'L"l1eric ~m power and resources and annoyance tefi th Spain if ,4mericans were
thw'1rted.
and his

66

In l\.l.lsust Robinson conferred with the Viceroy about frOG commerce

own personal involvement with the Patriots. Robinson's letter to
I

Adams, postmarked Au-::;ust 9, 1818, carried the follOlving notation: "The Vice

King is ostensibly in favor of free trade. ff67

But on August 12, 1313, R0bin-

son believed that the Peru trade would be closed to foreign interests.

The

Consalado preferred to ?ay :;'150,000 into the treasury rather tha.."l depart from
the ex.istinJ monopolistic system.

Since the state of the treasury wa.s prc-

ca::oious, Robinson cCiTlsidered free trade of b,zo.efi t both to the Vicoroyalty
nnd foreicn commerce.

Robinson a..;rln made the statement that the Viceroy was

openly advocatinG free trade.

He qpoteo the revenue at fJ,OOO,OOO and the

expenditures over $,,000,000, the loss made up by loans and contributions.

65.

~.,

66.

Robinson Papers, Diary, (June 28-3eptembcr 22, 1818), JulY' 16, 1818.

Prevost to Ada.ms, July 27, 1813.

67. Special Agents Robinson, iiol,inson to Adams,
68.

-Ibid., Robinson to Adams, Aug. 12, 1818.

Al4g.

9, 1813.

68
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The most illuminating part of the letter, however, proposed the grant of
special licenses. Robinson claimed that Blanco was authorized bor the Peruvian
government

"to grant licenses to secure vessels from
Spanish capture, that would go from Chile
to Callao and that the real object of his
mission was, first to disposses the patriots
of their Ships and militar.y resources, and
secondl\v to make a grand oommercial speculation
in which doubtless this Govt. has some interest.
Mr. Blanco and loIr. Abadia are both Factors of
the Philippine company, who contrary to their
interest and to probability, affeot great
friendShip for foreigners and free trade. 69
In general, Robinson believed that foreigners were disliked in Lima, but
that the British were accorded better treatment than the Americans. Peru, ric
in motals, would prove valuable under a liberal government. So far, the spiri
of revolution was preValent in Lima but the people still had no clear idea of
what they would do with their freedom. 70 Pezuela realizing the gravity of the
economic situation and the impetus it gave to the rebel oause, apparentl\v resolved to compete with

San

Martin by offering a free tra4e program. His

c(.)mmunications to the Conde de Casa Flores 71 and Secretario del Estado y del
Despacho de Hacienda72 evidence this concern. The letter to the Secretario
included proceedings in the Junta General de Tribunales concerning a proposal.
of free trade with Britain for a two-year period.

-

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.
71.

72.

~,V,

210, from Pezuela to Conde de Cass. Flores, Aug. 26, 1818.

......-=------------.
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Deliberations in the Junta General de Tribunales became public, for
San Martin was informed of the various proposals considered by this body.

An

anonymous communication accompanying a letter of July 22, 1818, Guido to San
Martin, furnished light on the dissension aroused by the proposal of free
trade. 73 Discussion of the major ideas in the communication follows.

Blanco

and Arismendi heatedly favored free commerce but were vigorously opposed.

The

monopolists lashed out against the British as their greatest enemies and belie!
on their part respecting a free trade was only self-deception.

Apparently it

was resolved earlier to permit trade with Britain and Brazil for a two 1'I&r
period with a 30 per cent duty and with Chile for two months but the monopolist
preferred to supply the treasur,y with loans rather than submit to such a scheme
The Viceroy had infOrmed the prior and consuls in the Junta de Tribunales that
i f they poured 150,000 pesos monthly into the treasut'7 he would annul the act

of commerce with Britain and Bra.il.
various royalist factions

The sum total of the disagreement between

.ave the patriots great advantages in Peru.

Even i.C

the Vieeroy chose to threw open the trade doors he would still be opposed in
Spain.

Dri tish goods destined for Lima would be barred from entry, and the

sole recourse of the British would be treaties with independent governments.
This last step indicated recognition.
On September 9, 1818, Ouido again wrote San

proposal.

Kartin about the free trade

Sheriff, the commander of H.M.S. Andromacha supposedly was

a

73. Ibid., VII, 57-60, "AnOn1mo COJIlllnicado por Guido San Xartin en carta de
Julio"2'2de 1818, Oomo Envlado por Belgrano. )(qo 16, do ~ de 1& libertad
1 30 de 1& independencia.-

r

I,

I
I,

instrumental in influencing Pezuela I s thinking along these lines.

As yet the

project was inoperative and gave rise to many speculations, but the British
belleved it would be realized around Iovember of 1818. 74

Twenty days later

Guido wrote to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces 7S of La Plata about
the viceroy t s tree trade proposal and a means to paralyse that meuure.

Guido

bad earlier suggested that an accredited person, sent to Lima to negotiate with

the Viceroy on the matter of commerce, lIOuld serve the threefold purpose of
observing the negotiations pending with Captain Sheriff, gain time for the
i

Peruvian expedition, and obstruct

a~

definite resolution with Captain Sheriff

iII!I'I'

!I'I

i!:

and his demands for mercantile preferences.
lIOuld be prejudicial to the patriot cause.

Such favoritism to the British
However, the only measure taken

by Chile was closing the port of Valpara180 for a term of one month to allow

the naval squadron time to prepare for the expedition.

Scarei ty of grain in

Lima and the high prices such grain would bring aight be a temptation to
Chilean business acumen, but Guido believed the prohibition of such traffic
would serve the revolutionary ca....

Lack of revenue, however, prompted

O'Higgin8 to concede permits for the exportation of grain to Lima.

This trade,

coupled with the highly lucrative contraband trade that existed, aided the
royalists.

The Briti8h enjoyed an advantageou8 trade under the protection of

the Andromaeba whose captain furthered Briti8h interests by conspiring with
the Viceroy,

71
Similar remarks were addressed to San MartIn on October 2, 1818. 7

-

74. Ibid., VI, 305, Guido to San Kartln,.
75. Ibid., 314, 315, 316, Guido to Supreme Director of United Provinces,
Sept.2lr, 1818.
76. ~., 312, 313. Guido to San Martin.
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Guido insisted upon the necessity of delaying Briti8h commerce with Peruvian
ports. again emphasizing the vicera,y's predisposition toward the British.
In 1819, the Viceroy inclined even more toward liberalizing the commercial
policy-

Sensing the change taking place. eTen tho Russians pressed their

demands for trade.

Pezuela admitted that Spanish laws could not be relaxed

without some harm but that he ,would do all in his power to help 'elix Dutel,..
the Russian emis8ary who arrived on board the American ship, Flying

!!.!h. 11

Proposals made by the Junta Permanent. de Arbitrios, as noted in the
Pezuela Memoria,. throw light on the economic problem.

The January 29 notation

again emphasized the controversy that plagued Peru--the opening of tree trade
for revenue purposes. 18 The cleavage between the elements favoring such a
trade and those strenuously opposing it widened.

The Vicer07, urgently pressed

for money found ways to circumvent the powerful and entrenched monopoli8ts.
Though not willing to throw the ports open to all trade indiscriminately.
royalist merchants availed themselves of trade privileges by means of royal
licenses issued in payment for donations and customs dutie8.

Such was the

case of ArismeDdi and Abad!a who figured prominently in the coAti8cation8
concerning the lacedonian, Oapt. Eliphet Smith.

Since the contracts79 signed

between the Viceroy and ArismeDdi will more appropriately be discussed in the
next chapter on the actual trade with Peru prior to emancipation, it is

78.

Conde de Casa Flores, Jan. 1. 1819.
-Oa8ado y Villena. Memoria Pezuela,
)91-98. Jan. 29. 1819.

79.

u.s.

77. Ibid., V, 218-19. Pezuela

to

Oongres., Senate, Document 58, 35th Cong., 1st Se.s., 1858, 154,

-

Oet, )0, 1819; Ibid., 158, Aug. 19, 1820.
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necessary only to state that in return tor the first contract Arismendi offered
to pay $200,000 cash.

Of this amount $50,000 was gratuity and the remaining

n50,000 served as credit toward the
the imporations he would make.

p~nt

of customs duties accruing from

In return for this

:~and

sum, Arismendi was

permitted to import goods either from Asia or Europe up to this amount a.nd
bring them in one or two vessels of any nation he chose.

The goods thus

imported would pay on the invoice cost, with 20 per cent added thereto, 23 per
cent of royal and 7 1/2 per cent consular duties making a total of 30 1/2 per
cent.

Ex:ports to Asia on $400,000 worth of goods would pay 8 per cent, of

this

4 per cent went to the king and 4 per cent to the consula.te. The second

contract signed August 19, 1820, brought the Vicero,y a bonus of $10,000.

The

shortage of marine supplies and naval stores induced the Vicera.r to permit
the importation of the necessar,y items from the Luited States, all of course
subject to the same duties paid by goods imported from Cadiz.
Although the above contracts were more concerned with goods imported from
the United States and
interests.

On

A~ia,

1819 was also a highly favorable year to British

March 20, 1819, Cast1ereagh was advised that the Viceroy issued

an order opening the port of Callao to British trade for a two-year period.
This latter traffic, however, required a Spanish conSignee acting as a kind of
middleman.

The duties set for this trade were 30 per cent of the estimated

value; export duties ranged from 7 per cent on silver and

a per cent on

gold

down to 3 per cent on all other goods exported. aO Spanish documentation

80. Dorothy Burne Goebel, ttBritish Trade to the Spanish Colonies, 1796-1823,"
American Historical Review, XUIl (January, 19.38), 319, footnote 151 cites
p. C. Tupper to Castlereagh, Mar. 20, 1819.

p
further substantiates the existence of a Spanish consignee of European
resources.

This same source makes known the dire necessity of raising a

contribution of a million
ndllion pesos to sustain state expenses and notes just haw
81
much support could be expected from the mercantile group.
Although the various royalist
roya.list concessions could hardly be termed free
trade, nonetheless they approached in varying degrees upon one of the best
selling points of the revolutionaries. A brief survey of rebel reaction

to the 1819
l8l9 pronouncements and policies rosy be instructive. On February 12,
l2,
1319, Joaquin de Echeverru. received a letter from a writer designated only
as Philadelpho describing current events in Lima. In regard to the proposed
free trade with the British, Philadelpho characterized all Spanish merchants
as implacable enemies not only of British commerce but of all particular

British.

Despite this anti-British feeling, Philadelpho cautioned that the

captain of the Andromacha was a decided enenv of America and interested in
the accUlllulation
accUlIlulation of money. To this end he would continue exerting influence
upon Pezuela going so far as to pay the Viceroy a percentage for protecting a
definitely contraband trade.

Pezuela's announcement of a free trade worried

Philadelpho who deemed it indispensable that Chile and Buenos Aires contravene
Pezuela was instrumental
instrumental.
a1\'l such plans. Already it was a notorious fact that Pezue1a
in making it possible for a "multitude" of British ships to enter Callao. 82

81. DA3M, VII, 124-25, Representacion de las
bucioii"d'8 un ndllion de pesos, F'eb. 17,
l7, 1819.

c~rporaciones

sobre 1a
la contri-

82. Ibid., 119-22 2ass1m, Philadelpho to Joaquin de Echeverria,
Feb. 'i2";-1819.
'i2";-1.819.
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Guido himself commented upon the Junta de Corporaciones and the Viceroy's
proposed free

tr~de.

Asking a question whether the Viceroy would permit free

commerce, Guido illustrated the two distinct factions, each holding considerable sway in the Peruvian capital.
already well

kn~m.

The monopolists were opposed for reasons

The forei:;n merchants, especially the British, exerted

considerable influence upon the Viceroy to gain a decision in their favor.
Coupbd with the great need for money, it was very likely that the Viceroy
would succumb to a lucrative temptation, ostensibly for the preservation of
roYalist control. 83 Contemporary periodicals substantiated Pezuela's need
for money and the means he would take to secure it, namely, contributions or
free trade, or both.

84

Pezuela's report to Casa Flores, June 15, 1819, chastised selfish mercantile interests and stressed the conservation of "estos dominios" as the first
law to be qbserved.
that of ;3eptember

85

His memorandum to the Real Tribunal del Consulado, e.g.

24, 1819, further attests to his bUsiness acumen in matters

relating to trade. In his way of thinking, relaxation of Spanish maritime
laws need not prejudice the royalist cause.

He advocated the moderate use of

a foreign carrying trade to circumvent the dangers presented by Cochrane's

33. Ibid., 114-15, Junta de Corporaciones sobre arbitrios, Guido [Februar,yMarehJ,'""t819.

84. ItInventario de Documentos PubUcados," Bo1etin del Inst1tuto de Investigaciones Hi storie as, III, no. 2, Sup1emento (Auenos-xrres, 1924-1925), 49,
Periodicos; Chile, Mar. 13, 1819, from Gaceta ~ Buenos Ayres, no. 117,
April 14, 1819.

85. E!:!l, V, 220-21, Pezuela to Casa Flores, June 15, 1819.
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naval maneuvers, 86 but encouraged royalist coastal trade which now was
practically in the hands of the contrabandists.
The economic situation of Peru in 1820 continued to degenerate for want
of money, domestic and naval provisions. and the external influences of the
San MartIn expedition that slowly gained a stranglehold on every aspect of
Peruvian life.
enviable.

A disaffected populace hardly made the Viceroy's position

Private reports from Robinson to Adams credited Pesuela with al-

lowing a ·covert trade" with the Viceroyalty 1n neutral ships.57 !ecording to
a late decree, Robinson's private memorandum of February 9. 1820, showed that
vessels carrying on this ·covert trade" had to pay their duties in cash and
were under the ,rotection of special licenses.

"The Vice King of Peru permits

this commerce also under a pretence of receivi.ng provisions and military
supplie s. _II 88
With respect to the various factions, Pesuela's difficulties only
multiplied.

'!'he privileged merchants. grown rich under protect.ive monopolies,

resisted change.

Rahter than relinquish privilege, this eroup chose to raise

funds by other means such as forced ccntr:i.butions. Any efforts on his part
to quiet or to influence the privilered merchants only brought suspicion of
venality upon the Viceroy, suspicion that gradually seeped down into the
population. 89

86. Torata, Documentos, II, no. 31, .354-55, Pezuela to Real Tribunal del Oonsulado, Sept. 24, 1819; Casado y Villena. Memoria Pezuela, 527; Barros Arana,
Ristoria 2! Chile, III~ .317-18, 1819.
87. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams. Jan. 17. 1820.
88. Ibid., Robinson's Private Memorandum, Feb. 9, 1820.

-

89. Bulnes, Espedicion Libertadora, I, .399, 420.

155
Ttle

Junta de Com.ereio, after much cUscu8s1on t(\ the contrary. preferred the

"safer" alternative of contributin{' jnto the bankrupt treasury instead of
openly relaxing existing commercial la1's. 90
A major problem facine the Royalists and therefore the most widely dis-

cussed, contraband trade, brought vi triolic demmciations in the asseiltbled
juntas and the Real Tribunal del Consulado. 91 Pezuela advised the Tribunal
to curb the contraband trade for the best interests of the Viceroyalty_

Hot

only did foreign ships, like the British, engage in sllch trade but wealth was

taken out of the country at a time when it was most reqlrlred for stability.92

Pezuela addressed himself in similar terms to Brigadier D. Tomas Blanco CabI1n.
On May

4,

1820. after consulting with the Tribunal del Consulado and Junta de

Arbitrios, Pezuela issued a decree naming Jose Ramon Rodil to investigate and
sllppress the clandestine trade. 94 .A study made by the Junta permanente de
arbitrios achnowledged the disastrous effects of an uncontrolled commerce. 95
The benefits of a free tra.de, or at least of one that permitted notifi-

cations baaed on expediency were extolled by Jose de 1& Serna, Jose de 1a Kar,

fo.

Torata, Documentos, II, no. 32, 357, document signed by Pezuela, Torre
taele, etc., 'eb. 28, 1820.

91. Ibid., I, no. 13, 117-18, to Pezuela, April 10, 1820J Ibid., 118-19,
Vay 27'1]'20; ~., 119-20, Kay 4, 1820.
92.

Ibid., no. 12, 115-17, Pezuela to the Real Tribunal del Consulado, Way 2,

1820.~

93. ~., II, no. )0, 351-52, May 2, 1820,; ~., 352, \fay), 1820.

94. !b1q., 353-54, Kay 4,

1820.

95. Ibid., I, no. 14, 121-22, Junta Permanente de Arbitrios to Pezuela, May 6,
1820.--COmposed of ~uel Pardo, ,Bartolome M.a de Salamancas, I Dacio ?fier,
Francisco Arias de Saavedra Jose Cabero Antonio Alvarez d Vi
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Manuel de Ll!.lno and rl~anuel Olagv.er Feliu.

Had it not been for the material

aie: brought a-J forei.;;n ships, ei th';)r the ArrJY nor the I1arine could have been

outfitted. 96

The principle of expediency prompted others to admit the

necessity of foreign trade if the royalist forces were to be supplied.

The

consequence of such thinkine; resolved itself to tolerating .a limited tr"'l.de
upon limited bases. 97

,a.mong the J ereIl'\f Robinson papers t"'as a letter dated

october 2, 1820, written to Adams and
ships.

verif~ying

Cut off from the traffic were ships

manufactures.

the opening of Lima to neutral

carr~~nc Chile~n

produce or

A note to the letter used the word "temporarily" and then added

that Cochrane's squadron would "render this permission of the vice King
(negatory.)1198 However, Robinson1s letter to Adams, November 21, 1920, stated
that the ports of Peru were "not proclaimed open, but all neutrals are allowed
aL1'!1ost free ingress and egress by the ViceKing •••• n99 What followed in the
letter is eVGU more pertinent.

Robinson observed that Peruvian commerce was

increasing and if a
rational syatenl of self Government is acted upon,
--which shall guarantee permanency it will
become of great magnitude and importance to every
commercial state, and especially to those most
remarkable
their manufactures and commercial
enterprises. 0

ffS

II, no. 26, 344 [probably May 16, 1820).
97. Casado y Villella, Memoria Pezuela, 709, May 18, 1820; Ibid., 713-14,
Hay 25, 1820.
96.

~.,

98. Robinson Papers, vol. 5, 1820-1824, Robinson to Adams, Oct. 2, 1820;
S'pecial ftgents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Private, Oct. 9, 1820, also
mentions the port of Lima as open to neutral vessels except those carrying
Chilean goods.
99. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Nov. 21, 1820.
,lon
on Ibid
Tbi if

-....
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Robinson was quite eorreot when he decuced tha.t Cochra'.e's n;wal squ.adron
tJould have m.uch to

f'I?y

about the shipp:tng enter-iu; Perllvian ports.

On

December 10, 1820, Pezuela wrote to Caga Flores reearding the rie;orous blocka.de
Commerce was absollltely
absol11tely obstrpcte0 iy the Chilean squadron which had no respect
for the flag if the carlo proved rich enough.

tathin the last days Cochrane

seized two British frig:--,tes comine; from Europe, but earlier
earlier,.. he employed
Sri tish ships, e.g. the HyPerion" to attack the Esm.era Ida.
Ida.. 10l

It seemed that

no one could rely upon Cochrane to restrain bimself from rich spoils.
v;ith the advance of 5a.n
58.n }~art!nt s expedition, royalist economy suffered
even t~eater disasters.
land routes.

wnile Cochr~ne policed sea lanes, San Martin closed

In January of 1821, justifiably concerned roya.lists
rOYI3.Usts blB.meC' the

commercial losses upon the scandalous contraband trade a.ntl
D.nc.1 the toleration of
forei~:ners, forei~:ners

the enemy.102
liberal Cortes.

who looked after their own interests

rejoiced wj.th

Earlier, a. revolt in :'~pain challenged Ferdinand VII with a

From January 1820 to 1823 the lirleral Cortes in power was

Jl'!iUtary elem.ent..
clem.ent..
c.mrinated by the Jl'!ilitary
chr.ul b e.

~_nd

Royalist defeats me3.nt administrative

Word came from the Cortes to IJima resLl.ltin;1 in cha.nge in polley and

removal of Pezuela as viceroy and demanding his return to Spain.

Per.uela was

replaced by Jose de 1.a Serna, and by 1821 La. Serna was dealing with San
~1art!n in the name of the Spanish liberal Cortes.

Pezuela found it necessary

101. n~SM, V, 245, Pezuela to Casa Flores, Dec.
Dee. 10, 1820.
danianr also helped Cochrane in the Esmeralda venture.

- --

The U. 3. Mace-

102. Odriozola, Docllll1entos,
Doellll1entos, IV, 120, Disposicion del Virf1y Pezuel&
Pezuela. per los
jefes del ejercito real. No date given here but Torata,
Tora.ta, Documentos,
Docum.entos, II, 300,
uses Jan. 29, 1821.

'I"\,

1,8
to defend his earlier position. One of the charges levied against him was his
handling of the contraband trade and tolerance of foreign trade. 10) Not all
contemporaries judged him so harshly.
Peruvian

econo~

Foreign trade was considered a boon to

under existing conditions and with prudent restrictions.

The

sole decision for permitting this trade was not dependent upon the government,
for the monopolists and profiteers were most interested in salvaging it not
enlarging their fortunes. On April 7, 1821, J. R. H. wrote to Senor Don F. de

E. that had tree trade, with its restrictions been a real1t,y three years ago,
the political existence of Peru would not nov be so critical. 104 Short
sighted selfish mercantile interests generously prepared the ground for San
Mart!n. The task facing La Serna was great, challenging him not only
militarily, politically, but also econimically.10' Driven by want, public
sentiment veered toward the man who offered a panacea for their ills.
Contemporary accounts vouch for the impact that tree colonial trade .would
have produced not only upon the people but an empty Spanish ra.yalist treasury.
Hall acknowledged that tbere were some farsighted monopolists who still could

103. Torata, Documentos, II, 268-80 passim, Manifiesto en que el Virrey del
Peru, Don JoaquIn de la Pesuela y :3anchez Munoz de Velasco refiere el hecbo y
circunstancias de su separacion del mando; de nuestra la falsedad, malioia e
impostura de las atrooes imputaoiones en el oficio de intimacion de 29 de Enero
de los Jefes del Ejercito de Lima, autores de la conspiracion, y anuncia las
causas de este acontecimiento. Madrid MOOCCXXI.
104. Ibid., 449, written by a subject of Lima to one in Rio de Janeiro,
April7,l821. Part of Trla Folletos Anonimoa contra los que depuaieron al
General Pezuela.
10,. "Documentos inedi toa para 180 guerra de 1& Independencia, It Revista
Historicry VI, (Lima, 1918), 9,-96, Viceroy La Serna to the inhabitants of
Peru, Ju 8, 1821.

.ee
see ample profita
profits under a competitive B,Yatem
B,Ystem but no such measure was
waa pessibl.
pessible
without direct licence from
trom Spain.

The efficacy of the Chilean squadron

thWarted any possible move in such d1rection. l06 Hall credited one royalist
bUsinessman with promoting the tree trade policy, a man of great stature and
highest influence, but wrote that narrow intereats
interests prevailed.

Om passage in

Hall's account mentioned the adoption of the liberal views held by this
"sagacious·
"sagacioua" indirldual
indiTidual but these were adopted too late.

"'rhus these bigotted

and narrow views of the real principles of commerce, not only paved
pa'V8d the way

for the conquest of the colony, but in the end brought total ruin upon themselves. ,,107
Another contemporary, lliers, had
trade.

even more

to say on the subject of free

He credited Pesue1& with using the "Ystem
eystem of licences to fill hia
his

coffers.

Emphasizing the rigid laws of the Spanish colonial s.ystem, Miers

explained that no foreign ship could enter
or permission *previously obtained."

So

Spanish port without a lioence

Be added that in time of war it was

usual to grant license.
licenses to foreign
toreign vessela
Yessels carr.y1ng
oarr.y1ng Spanish cargoes
oargoes to sateguard

them from capture.

The Viceroy Pezuela had granted, according to Kiers
Miers

and other contemporary documentation, licenses to at least one of the principle
Spanish merchants in Lima, lbadia.
lbad!a.

Abad!a • s connection with Ariamendi was
Abadia

discussed in earlier portions of this chapter and w111
will be more thoroughly inRo;ralist trade.
vestigated in Chapter VI dealing with actual Ro;ra1ist

Miers commented

that Cochrane was fully cognizant of such trade licenses, both in law and

106. Hall, VOY!lJ;es" I, 116-17.
107.

-Ibid.,

II, 76.

160
practices.

The viceroy Pezue1a had granted "for notable consideration" a

license to Abadla who was involved with other rich Spaniards and foreign
merchants.

The.e license. permitted the importation into Peru "of full

cargoe8 from Spain" in eight British ve8se1s" which ill consequence claimed
protection from the Spanish authoritie8 as i f they had been Spanish bottoms •••
••••108 It was necessary under such conditions to give the appearanee that
the ships and cargoes constituted British property so as to escape the
vigilenee of the rebel authorities.

To protect them from Sp&nish legal

entanglements they had to "wear the garb 'I of Sri tish property.

Miers was

explicit in his description of how to circumvent these legal entanglements. 109
A1 though not wi thin the province of this chapter, some mention must be
made of the ViceroT Pezuela's mediations with the San liart!n forces.
important one took place at J4iraflores in the Fall of 1820.

A. most

Representing San

MartIn were To~s Guido and Juan Garc!a del Rio and for the Vicero,y, Conde de
Villar de Fuente and Don Dionisio Capal.

During these negotiations, the

economic objectives were not overshadowed by the mi1itar,. and political, althour,h the latter two proved harder to reBOlve.

Under the armistice .. both

parties agreed upon reciprocal commerce between Chile and Peru, sea and land.
wUh provisions made for future agreements relative to such commerce.
and

American naval co_anders played their role in these negotiations. 110

108. Miers, Travels
109.

British

in Chile,

II" 50-51.

-1bid., 52.

110. Odriozola, Documentos.. IV, 74-7" Sept. 28, l820J Ibid." 78-79,
Sept. )0, 1820.
----

"
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The meeting at Miraflores failed to bring concord in view of the barrier of
basic political differences. lll The next major conference came at Punchauca
in

of 1821. Conmercial arra.ngements between the two countries were
discussed l12 but once again the failure to reach an agreement could be placed
l-!ay

upon political issues.

On June 30, 1821, San Mart!n and the new Viceroy

La Serna, however, reached an agreement to provide the Lima populace with

much needed provisions. ll)
Final decisions still had to come from Spain, a kingless Spain and a
liberal Cortes determined on the preservation of the raN wealth of the
Spanish colonies. Ferdinand VII aired his difficulties before the European
courts, seeking not advice but forceful intervention. In the course of much
clamor for actual assistance,
for mediation.

~pa1n
~pain

offered concessions to Britain in return

These concessions centered upon free commercial access to

colonies long legally off limit to foreign entrepreneurs.

The sum

~tal

of

many years' controvers.y and diplomacy was British 2! facto recognition of
colonial independence. 114 Aware of French interest in the Latin American

PattI'S, 1819-1820, 986-90 eassim, Manifiesto of the Genera
111. British State Patirs,
in Chie? of 'the
'Ebe L!t5era ng Arm:y of Chile on the FaIlure of the Negotiations fo
Peace with the Spanish Vice-Roy of Peru, Oct. 12, 1820.

112. Odriozola, Documentos, IV, 155, 2a Nota de los diputados del general
La .sarna, 1>1ay 7, t821J IbId., 158,) Nota de los diputados del general San
Mart!n contestando la anierior, May 10, 1821.
113.
1821.

~.,

196-97, Convenio sobre la entrada de v!veres en Lima, June )0,

114. For a more complete discussion of British and Spanish negotiations for
this period, consult Bernadine Pietraszek, "Britain and Direct Spanish American
'frade," ~-America, XXVI, no. 2 (Chicago, 1955).
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trade and taking into account the fact that France might back the policy of
restoring Ferdin~d with the hopes of securing this trade, Prime Minister
c~nning

wanted a joint statement with President James Monroe to proteot the

new nations of Latin America.

Monroe finally issued his famous doctrine in

1823.
It would be completely erroneous to assume that no thought was given to
the possible effect stemJtttng from a relaxation of oolonial trade laws upon
snstaining the rebel colonies wi thin the empire.

Spain was ooncerned.

Rebel

successes in Chile prodded consideration of free trade as insurance against
further insurrections. l15 In 1818 much attention was given to pacifioation,
the beRt means to secure and preserve it.

Sometimes the discussions on trade

revolved around the preservation of the status quo and then there were the
116
Various
novel and dangerolls suggestions of allowing little to preserve much.
"Expositions" and rtMemorias" were addressed to the king, the Cortes and public
sentiment.

SOMe

of these were written by Jos~ Pizarro, Marqu~s de Casa Irujo

and the Duke de San Carlos.ll7 Attention also focused on the colonies in many

ll:;,~

de

Lanzas, Inde endencia.2! America, IV, 284, Informs anonimo de un Conjero
July 18 7.

l .... stado,

t

116. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, XI, 621, London, 1818, Representacion
hecha a .3.11.<':. el se!ordon P'e:rna..'"ldO VII en defensa de las cortas, written
by F'lores Estrada.
117. Jaime .Delgado, "La Pacificacion de America en 1818," ReVista de Indias,
X, no. 40, pt. II (April-June, 1950), 275-79 passim, Memoria
nuq-de San
Carlos, con las observaciones de Humboldt sobre 1& Pacificacion de America,
December, 1817; ~., 307-308 p!!sim, Exposioion de Don Jose Pizarro al Re,y
del Marques de Casa Irujo a Fernando VII, Sept. 21, 1818.

981

ll8
sessions of the Cortes.
Corte8.118
The 108s
1088 of Chile made the Ro7&llsts
Royalists even more nervous about Peruvian
safety.

But, in response to Pezuela' s8 numerous solicitations for greater
Bute

military and naval protection came generalizations on the status of mediation

and promises of aid which were only feebly kept.119

Instructions were given

commissioners to pacify the rebels but their powers were 11mited.
l1mited. 120 Pezuela
frantically appealed to Spain when it became quite apparent that Peru was to
meet the Chilean fate, referring also to the Dcaudillo" San KartIn and the
negotiations at Miraflores. l21

The Consulado de Lima122 and "augustios& del

comercio de Limaw123 pleaded for assistance.
the royalist colonials hoped for.

The response was not alwqe what

One document suggested that Callao be closed

to foreign commerce. 124 Another,ian official report from theS.cretar,r of
Finance, D. Ratae1 Morant, diacussed free trade and the deplorable state of

Diaeusiones de las Cortes, Legislatura
Legis1atura de
118. Spain. Diario de las Actas I Diseusiones
los af10s de 18~0 7 1821;-1' (1820), 353::.5fi, July26;-r820; Ibid., II, 244-45,
Aug. 9, 1820; Ibid., II, .344-356 passim, Aug. 13, 1820; Ibid:; VI, 1-25 ~
Sept. 16, 1820}lbid., X, 17-44 :eass1m,
:ea8s1m, Oct. 24, 1820; Ibid., XI, 26-32 ~,
Iov. 8, 1820. 119.

DAS!f, V. 197-99 passim, Casa nores to Pezuela,
Pezue1a, Feb. 11, 1818.,

120.

Torata, Doclxmentos, 111-2, no. 69, 246-56 Eassi..
Easaim. June 18, 1820.

121. Julian Paz 7 N:agdaleno, ed., Dooumentoa Relativos a Ift1aterra (12541834), Seeretario de Estado, Archivo de Simanea., Cataiogoft
Cataiogoff (iadrid, 1947),
414, 1egajo 8.223; ~., 346, Legajo 8.179; .!2!!!., 469-70, Legajo 8.298.
122.

Guillen, IndeE!ndencia, II, 175, leb. 22, 1821.

123.

Hay 3l-September
31-September 22. 1820.
-Ibid.,
Ibid., 175, Jan. 1, 1820.

124.

,...-------------,
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tne present commerce. 12'

The Minister of War reported to the Cortes, July 11,

1820. that althoug-h the v:iceroyalty of Peru 'was at thE.t time tranquil. its
:croximtty to Ch1h: ard BUEP...oS Aires !lulde its position rrecaricus. 126 The
ccnt~:;ned

barrage of correspondence indicating that this tranquility would be

cnly short-lived. if not presently fictitious, precipitated some action in

.

SPain.

Cochrane's activities were to be met b~ sending additional ships and

lten, c.p.
- the

S.;Hl Juli&n, Asia.
---.
--

and

was toe late and too ineffectual.

_

San ..................
Pablo.
-..;;.;.;;;;;-.-

127 Whatever assistance came,

Lima fell to San iIlartin in July of 1321.

One might well ask where was the king to whom so many colonials awed thei

allegiance.

Ferdinand VII was busy maintaining his own weak position, pleading

with the colonials to "hear the tender voice of their King and }!"athar" and
askinG' thorn to put aside their weapons and return to the fold.

Whatever help

he offered came only in the nlost ambiguous terms, e.g., reconciliation through

constitutional changes. 128
hirhly dubioua.

In 1821 their possibility and effectiveness were

Rebel guns drowned out the cries of "Long Live the king."

125. Lanaaa, Independencia de America, IV, 377. May 4, 1818.
representation trom the ConSUl.do
ConSUlado de tima, Kay 3, 1t17.
Itl7.

126. British

Sta~e Papers,

Discussed in a

1819-1820, 1056.

Lanzas, IndeE!ndencia de America, V, 82, D. Ratae1 del Valle to Mlnistro
de Ultramar, Sept. 20, 18~OJ-nu!11en, Inde~endencia, II. 48, Uay 3l-8eptember
1820; Ibid., 49, October 20-November 2;, 1~20; IbId.. Feb. 22, 1821; Ibid ••
166, July 19, 1~21. lne last is Pezue1a's repo~o Spanish Ambassador-at
London upon the critical state of affairs and need for maritime forces.

127.

Britis~ State P!pers, 1819-1820. 281, Address of the King of Spain to the
inhabitants oftha
of the spanish American Colonies, March, 1820; Ibid., 857-860
£ass.!!!, Speech of the J(il'lf on openin.r of Cortes, July 9, 18~Odriozola,
Documentol!' IV, 89, Ferdinand VII to the Inhabitants of Ultramar, Oct., .1820j
copy also found in DASI, II, 316, 317, Maniliasto
Manifiasto del Rey Fernando a 10.
habitantea de u'ltramar; British State Papers, 1820-1821, 1214, Speech of
ot the
King of Spain on the olosing of the Cortea, June 30, 1821.

128.

,

CHAPTER VI

Oontraband Trade with Royalist Peru 1816-1821
The prohibitive forces of 3panish laws and rebel squadron curbed ouly
the frail of spirit while the bold and adventurous tradesmen continuee to
bring their goods to the Peruvian market.

The mercantile zeal of the Eri tish

and the Americans was often matched by that of the Ohileans and Argentines
who tended to overlook the broader aspects of the revolutionary movement in
favor of immediate financial gain.

Trade with Royalist Peru was "a going
\

business" attested to by numerous sources. The prime concern of this chapter
is to explore as far as possible the specific nature of this trade solcq
during the time of the San Mart{n campaign. As is often the case with illegal
trade,

80

much that transpired was based on verbal commitment. Still, the

physical evidence of the trade with royalist Peru is clear and bound by the
limitations of source materials we shall investigate the who, the what, and
the how much.
LogicallY, the British trade makes a good starting point. Scattered
figures showing British exports to

Li~

prior to the Peruvian revolution

acknowledge the existence of such a trade. In 1814, these exports amounted to
approximatelY 9,509 pounds while in 1816 there was a drop to 1,429 pounds.
The incompleteness of the above figures must be kept in mind.

1

The principal

1. British State Papers, 1816-1817, 571. Reference is to pounds sterling.
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port was Callao. making Lima the general market for all foreign and domestic
commerce.

A contemporary account showed Peruvian preference for British goods

citing the presence of English glass,
gla8s, brass furniture, tables, chairs, linens,
clothiIlf, kitchen and table utensils in Peruvian homes. 2 This yery trade
grieved the Spanish merchants who saw a lucrative monopoly slipping from their
groupBritish merchants who came to Latin America went quite a step beyond the
sale of their wares.

Men like John !egg, Samuel Haigh, Richard Price, James

Barnard. and William Hodgson armed themselves and joined the Chilean patriot

calV&r,1 as volunteers.)
calvar,r

Other British merchants or industrialists listed as

establishing themselves in Chile weret
_eret Josue Waddington, David Barry, Proctor,
Schmidmeyer, JUers, Caldclugh, John Sewell,
Sewell. Alexander and Robert
Brandt, Head, Schm1dmeyer,
Walker, Henry and George Good, John Barton, William. Anderson, R. Macfarlane,
R. Parrish, Thomas Davies,
Davies. George Perkins, Thomas Green, M. Walton. J. G. Brown

Charles Black, A. Livingthone, Y. Young, Y. D. Dawister, J. J. Hoorrey, F.

~

P. Campbell, Onofre Dunster. Thomas and Edmund Eastman, David Ross, George Lye
Lyon
Samuel Lang, Diego Clark.

Many of these British confined themselves to 801ely
solely

Chilean business though others, such as, Antonio Gibbs and Sons, apanded into
Peru. 4
Venturing into Spanish controlled porta was not without haurd.

2.

Stevenson, Hiatorical Narrltive, I,

3.

Killer, Memoirs,
Memoirs. II,
II. 222 footnote.

4.

Encina, Ristoria
Historia Chile, I,

1$4-55.

349.

The
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penalty for illegal trade was confiscation and on

M~

24, 1817, Bowles

notified Croker about the capture of British merchant ships by

~lthorities

t~e

Spanish

in Valparaiso and Lima.' Both royalist and rebel authorities were

fully aware of the fact that British flags flew stop royalist ships.
indicated to San

Mart~n,

O'Higgi

in a letter dated July 27, 1817, that the Venganza

and Pezuela entered ValparaiSO under a British flag.6 William P. ~~te's
letter to Se~or D. Nicolas Rodr!guez ?~, November 22, 1817,7 further
showed the interest that Britishers harbored with respect to Peruvian trade.
~lite's

reference to British ships of war protecting the fruits of such a

trade reflects on the "unofficial policy" pursued by the British government
at this time.

There are virtually no statistics to pinpoint the exact amount

of commerce curried on in 1817 between the British and rqyalist Peru.

That

it did exist is borne out also by the Royalists themselves, e.g. Pozuela, who
constantly referred to British ships entering Peruvian uorts.8 li~hat disturbed
the Royalists even more was the contraband trade that flourished right under
their watchful e,yes.
More satisfying statistics are available for the year 1818. American
sources cite the grateful thanks given to the Americ3.n naval cOIllrr'.anders by

5. ?iccirilli»

~

:HartIn 1 Pol.!tica, 429.

6. DASM, V, 384.
7. Ricardo R. Caillet-Bois, "Documentos referentes a Guillermo p. White,"
Boletin del Instituto Investigaciones Historicas, V, no. 32 (Buenos Aires,

1926-19217; 703-704.

8. Casado y Villena, Memoria Pezuela, 121-22.

..------------------------------
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British merchants trading in and around Santiago.

The Ontario, Captain Biddle,

protected the interests of Chs. Higginson, John Begg, Sam. Haigt, lI. Reynolds,

,

R. Newton, C. Delagal, J. J. Barnard, C. Campbell, and W. Hodgson.

9

Henry Hill

note dated April 11, 1818, referred to the British ship Will, Francis Hartley
master, which had entered Callao and Hill's own assistance in helping take in
cargo.10

The

!ill. was

involved in other commercial ventures which will be

mentioned later.
The jealous American kept e. steady eye on the British entrepreneurs seElldqr

a market in Peru.

Robinson' s diary for June 14, 1818, stated that British

merchants were obtaining facilities from the Government of Peru, facilities
that were denied to the Americans. ll On October 22, 1818, Worthington accused
the British of attempting to open trade at Lima and secure advantages for their
own commerce, speoifically mentioning the Andromae~ and the ~ as cruising

the Pacifio with such intent.

Worthington added that whereas a short time ago

1t was criminal to speak of openinr- the trade with Lima, it was presently
agitated, discussed and talked of freely.12
treely.12 Worthington's letter to
Echevarria, December 17, 1818, Santiago, had a notation to the effect that the

9.

u.s.

Ministers Argentina, April 26, 1817-July 9. 1818, !larch
»arch 2, 1818.

10. Special Agent.
Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Received in Prevost's of April 9,
1818, dated April 7. 1818.
IB18. On bottom Hill's notation is dated April 11, 1818.
Deposition of Hill as Tice
vice consul at Valparaiso.
11.

Robinson Papers, Dia!7. June 14, 1818.

12. U.S. Ministers Argentina, October 22, 18l8-April
lBlB-April 8, 1820,
1B20, Worthington to
Adams writing trom Santiago, Chile.

1.69
British and A_r:1ericans were '"mgaged in the Lima trade and made use of the

American ship
of U . Jna

u~r(l

~

Cntherines.

Jines the supercargo, captain and governnent

cognizant of this fact, and "se<9med to like it" he did not "care

a pin about \·mat they were dcrtng."
!\.

1.3

communication sent by Guido to 3an !'1art!n, in a letter dated July 22,

1319, noted the British activities !lnd the royali3t discussions for opening

the trade at cryrtain tax -ates to the British.14 The Peruvians needed grains,
a:rrnn:; other i terns, and efforts were made to rais(! the restrictions.
uncovered further interesting bits of information.
to San Y·!art!n,

~ugust

E3pionaga

Mat!as de lrigoyen wrote

'-7, 1818, that the British ship Anfion was involved l1ith

the Conde de Casaflores and a contract w:l.'th the houses of Hill, i"larch and
Turner to purchase armaments.

The British ship Alexander was also involved

in the supplying of munitions. l '

On September 2,

1818, Guido inf'ormeti 3an

Martin th:lt the commander of the British Andromacha, Sherif,f... had asserted th:l
British ships should be permitted to deliver goods into Callao. 16

Sheriff's

negotiations wl th Pezuela were further studied in Guido's letter to San Mart1.n,
September 9, 1818.

Sheritt tavored tree trade and propagandized the Lima

11

CO:1::';'.llado and cabildo with hi::> plans.

13.

Bri Ush pressure centering; on the much

~., Worthington to 1<~heverr!a, Dec.

18, 1818.

11~. fJ\SH, VII, ,7-60 a:8Sim.. Anonimo comunicado pOI' Guido a San Mart!n en
carta'"(If;-Julio 22, 181~ como enviado por Belgrano.

15.
16.
17.

Ibid., VIII, 203.
-Ibid.,
414.
-Ibid., VI,
- 30" Guido

to San f.iart!n, 3apt. 9, 1818.
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needed grains was applied in Chile for licenses to trade with P<eru. 18 The
tact that the Viceroy Pezue1a himselt had proposed opening the trade to
Bri tish sbips stirred fear among the rebels ....ho among other troubles saw their

own profits evaporating and those of the British rising in proportion.

Again

the "grains" were of prime consideration in the concessions. 19 Guido's letter
to San Martin, October 2. 1818, also reterred to the proposed Dri tish trade
wi th Peru which found much favor w.l. th Pezuela, but gave little comfort to

rebel torces. 20
The best source of British-Peruvian trade during the year 1818 is the
royalist correspondence and Pezue1a t s own Memoria.

On lebruar.y 13, 1818,

Pezuela noted the presence of the Anf'ion in Callao. 21 Eight days later he
referred to the leni.%, another British ship ....hich came into Callao trom Valparaiso.

Other foreign ships in the port ....re also noted. 22

fezusla IS

Memoria tor April 4, 1818,23 and his letter to the Spanish Ambassador in
London, Karch 30. 1818. 24 refer to the Britiah

"!I..

orw.lpat,· probably !f.2,

•

18. Piccirilli, San Hartin l Politica. 463, O'Higgins Resolution, Sept. 24,
1818, Inclosure to-JOWi.a.
19. DA~ VI, 314-18 Eass~ Guido to Supre. Director of Un!t.d Provinces,
Sept.29. 1818.
20.

~.,

21.

Casado,. Villena, Memoria P~zuela, 229, Feb. 13, 1818.

312-13.

22. ~., 234, 'eb. 21, 1818.
23.

ill9..,

244-4S.

24. Spain, Archive de Simancas, Seccion Estado, Legajo 8,291 r. 39, Pezuela
to Ambassador in London, March 30, 1818. Manuscript 19pated t.hrough Julian
Paz y Jlagdaleno, Documentos Relativos)a I~laterra (1254-183ll), Arcbive de
S;tmancas, CAt.alo~~.. XVll 1Iidf'id, 19117 -;
~ure citanons-mi be Archive de
S)~a". Jlicroll..la.
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.hich came to Callao for commereial purposes and with an interesting proposition.

The captain ot the .lsp, .John lent., suggested to 'ezuela that in

return for securing rifle a, sabres and a last corvette for the ra,yalists, he
.ould be allowed to import at the same time a proportionate amount of comJDSrcial cargo.

Pezuela pleaded with the ambaasador in London to lend his

.eight toward obtaining permission for such a transaction, since the state
of Peru waa precarious and he waa without the much needed rifles or aunitions.
On April

4. 1818, Pezuela again wrote to the ambassador in London and mentioned
4,

British ships trading in Peru.

.bong these was the

!!1; Capt. John Kent,

and

again mentioned were munitions and the name of Ari_ndi, a Royalist merchant.
Pezuela also mentioned Juan and Eduardo DuBois 1'de ese Comereio· and Kenne)"
.y Page" "encomendados deade aqui por Arismendi p.a consumarlo. w He further
stressed the high tariffs which were highly prejudicial to commercial
25 On Jul.7 29, 1818, Pezuela again informed. the ambassador, Duke
interesta.
de San Carlos, of varioua British ships nen aquellos m&rea. w26
It mpt be mentioned that not all Bri tlsh shipa coming to Peru are
engaged in a ·proven" trade.

Some were used by the royalists as "messengers"

for their own correspondence to Europe, and at other times supplied the
royalists with information concerning the revolutionary movementa.

One ship

which did carry news of rebel aaneUTers was the British Andromaca.

This ship

25. !2!!!., Legajo 8.291 F. 42, Pezuela to Ambassador at London, April 4, 1818.
lame of this ambassador was Duke de San Carlos.

26.

Ugarte, Manuscritos Peruanas, II, 376.
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despite its usetulnes8 to the RoyaUst was highl,y silspect. It was beUaved
that she not

on~

favored the rebels but protected British interests in

Peruvian waters. 27 For that matter, the Andromaca was also suspected by the
•
rebels tor transporting royalist property out ot Peru. 26 Juan Tbwaites wrote
to

San

Martin on March 16, 1819, further intormin& him ot the Andromaoat 8

ra,ralist tinge and also indicated that the British were at onoe supplying the
rebelt with munitions and the royaUsts 1t1f the pnce was right. 1t Tbwaites
mentioned a Bri Usb. ship which headed from Rio d. Janeiro to Lima 'td.th a rioh
cargo atter having obtained a 11cense tor such activities trom the Spanish
ambassador on condition it would also briug in ritles. 29 On 1pr11 10, 1819.
Tbwaites again informed San Martin that a British ship was carrying _DiUon.
to Lima, this t11lc the Recurso, Captain Picktord. He added that th13 trigate
abou.t which he bad. previou.sq written, wu despatched by the same persons 111
tio de Janeiro who sent a munitions laden ship into Oallao.)O
The Obi1ean blockade pl.qed havoc with British cOlIlIerCe. Ouido sent
word to San Mart{n, April 21, 1819, that the British merohants "screaaodtt
after learD1ng of the restr1ct!...e blockade because the great part. of thea

had their intere.ts in Lima.

However. Guido added that Sher1ttI the oODlNnder

..

of the Andromac,., ackaow1.e4&ecl the :rebel blockade u did Captaill Downes, of

27. Cuado '7 Villena, Maori,. Pezuela, )80, Noy. 11, 1818.
28. ~~, '911, 118, ae1&oi&1l de L11Ila b7 Aristipo Ela.ero, Mar. 1.6, 1819.
29.

!2!!!.,

30.

~., 2.5), April 10, 1819.

VIII, 24'..)0, Juan 'lhva1tes to San Martin, Mar. 16, 1819.
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the U.3.~. Macedonian. 31 Not all the hazards had to do with the rebel blockade,

---

for some of the British ships were captured b,y the royalist navy, e.g. the
32

~uila.

Pezuelats Memoirs again offer pertinent information on the British trade.
He wrote that the captain of the British

Indian~

had been granted trade

concessions. 33 This captain was permitted to bring into the port of Pacasmayo,
free of duty and in good condition, one million bundles of tobacco at the
price of two reales, and moreover allowed to bring in goods from Chile, such
as wheat, tallow, beef, almonds. 'lwenty thousand pesos was to be discounted
from the total price so that the captain could buy a ship or charter one. Of
the sum total of 280,250 pesos debt he was to

p~

60,000 pesos in reaqy cash,

80,000 upon the return of the ship from Valparaiso, and the remainder, 140,250
,

pesos, were to be paid from the duties of the

p~nt

of the 80,000 pesos, in

installments of 23,375 pesos each month.
TWo weeks later, Pezuela told the Catalina which was coming from
Huanchaco with 1,300 fane gas of wheat. It was of British registr,y and one
of those permitted to transport supplies to Callao from other ports of the
vice-ro.yalty.34 One d~ earlier, Pezuela referred to the British 31an!l.
31an!l, a
corvette of war, Captain O'Brien, and its arrival in Call8o. 35

..........

31. Ibid., VI, 384 •

32. Lanzas, Independencia de America, IV, 4W~, Pezuela to Secretario de
Estado y del ~epacho Universal de Gracia y Justicia, July 7, 1819.

33. Casadu y Villena, Memoria Pezuela, 520, Sept. 7, 1819.

34. ..........
Ibid., 527, sept. 23, 1819 •
35. ..........
Ibid., 525, Sept. 22, 1819 •

It was obvious that in 1820 the British were still trading in Peru, this

despite the advance of the rebel forces and the pronounced Chilean blockade.
Holbrook's AutobiograpSl referred to the lacedonian, an American ship, which
escorted merchantmen out of Callao accompanied by British cutters which also
protected British merchantmen. 36 Cochrane found himself at variance with
British commanders who protected British traders operating in the Pacific

under Spanish licenses, Uen like Begg and Barnard found that their interests
were not served by the restrictive measures initiated by Cochrane or San
lIartln.

San lartln's "slow" liberation of Peru irritated the British whose

well stocked warehouses sought new markets.

J. third irked Britisher was

probablY' J. P. Robertson)7
fezuela listed the presence of the Andromaca, In!p!etor, Catalina and
Dragon in Peruvian ports, all British ships_

The names of Arismendi and

Calvo were listed aa -consignatorios- in mercantile affairs in regard to the
Britishers. 36 The British frigate Hercules wu also involwd in Peruvian
traffic, as were the Dentlez, Hanez and Canton. 39 These last three brought
aJl{"uish to Cochrane

)6.

who

found them funning through the blockade or seUing

Holbrook, Autobiog!!pb,r, 274.

37. Robin J.. Bumphre78, Liberation in South America 1806-1827 The Career of
James Pariossien (London, 1952), 91-'92; also rootnote'85"""~ in above work
cited on page 91 and footnotes 1, 2 and .3 on page 92.

38. Casado y Villena, Memoria Pezuela. 625-26, Jan. 3. 1620.
39.

P!!!t

VII, 170, ReJai.gio de Domingo Silva to San Mart!n, Mar. 11, 1820.
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arms to the Boyalist8. 40 Statistics 8how that between 1819 and 1821 the
commerce of Peru had yielded to Spanish authorities 689,248 peS08 and the
Consulado 966,17) pesos. 41 Since these figures are isolated fram the bulk of
statistics in connection with the Peruvian trade and since much of the trade
was clandestine or at least dlsguiaed, they do not contribute measurably to
the whole picture.
Statistics for 1821 are also ver,y incomplete.

At best most sources in-

dicate the presence of the British-Peruvian trade and let it go at that.
There is little effort made to pinpoint either the individual merchants or
ships that were involved.
exceptions.

Some ships achieved notoriety but these were the

_r-

The British !zEerion, belonging to the notorious category, carri

5 million dollars belonging

to the Royalists from Callao to Eng1and. 42

iean sources established the fact that the United States and Britain carried.
on all the commerce in the Pacific. 43 Holbrook's autobiograpbJ noted that
in May of 1821 there were many British merchant ships in Callao "notwithstandq

the blockade.-

Be also stated that Amerie ...., prisoners found ellPloyment on

merchant ships in the harbor. 44 The American agent, Forbes, wrote on Jul7 ),

40. Romero, Ristoria EconOmica, 266.
41.

~.,

42.

S"ccial Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Mar. 7, 1821.

30).

43. :Navy Area 9 File (1801-1830 Folder, Box 1) Duplicate copy of Captain C. O.
Ridgely's letter to the Secretary of the Navy, From aboard U.S.S. Constellat.1o

Mar. 7. 1821.

44.

HOlbrook. AutobioF!Ppz, )01.

- - -

•
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1821, that Cochrane's paper blockade irritated the British Sir Thomas Harqy
who found British merchant ships captured right under his eyes and thus protested to the Chilean government, condemning the blockade as illegal.
was

equal~

Harqy

determined to protect British rights and property afloat but that

the merchants would have to provide for their own security on shore or leave
the country as "he could not extend aDiY protection to them or their property. It
Forbes then added that "To stimulate a general resistance to the paper
blockade of the Chileans, the Vice Ro.y has declared the trade of Callao and
Lima free to all neutral flags •••• n45

Another contemporary source, Miers,46 also wrote of the Vicero.y's resort
to the system of licenses, a device with which the British were all too
familiar.

Sometimes these licenses were granted to Br1tishers in return for

financial backing but the title always belonged to a Spaniard. Arismendi a.nd
Abadia were well connected with foreign merchants a.broad.

British vessels

also took in Spanish cargoes and disguised them as Bri Ush property to pass
the inspection of the rebel squadron. However, some such were stopped, as
f;;.;f..,i..,e.;;l...
d and sent to Valparaiso for adjudication.
The seizure of the British property was protested
HarctY.. Capt. Hall of the
the Edward Ellice and ~
Lord

~ffield
_.)u
...

by

Conway and Capt. Mackenzie of the Superb. Miers made another noteworthy
remark.

He said that while previously British mercantile agents in Peru and

Chile, "who had received constant protection from Lord Cochrane" praised his

45.

u.s.

46.

Miers, '!'ravels

Consuls, B.A., July 3, 1821-August 6, 1826, Forbes, Ju~ 3, 1821.

12

Chile, II,

50-59 Eassim.

-
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efforts, they soon heaped abuse upon him when he put an end to their smug,;:,;ling
ria the use of "entremedios."
among other colorful titles.

Instead of a hero he became a pirate and robber,

The ships seized carried two sets of papers,

each giving a different ownership of the goods, and Cochrane plundered what
he believed to be Spanish property, no matter what flag waved. When Capt.
Mackenzie left the Pacific, however, he wrote to Cochrane and praised him for
his cona'uct, sta.ting that "he neither knoew of any case of injury having been
done to the British nag by the Chilean vessels of war, nor any impediment
thrown in the way of British commerce •••• If

The confiscated ships wera freed

and in the process Chilean judges rose from rags to riches, "no less than
80,000 dollars had been given to the judges •••• "
granted permission for British commerce

contr~

The Peruvian viceroy also
to the rigorous colonial

laws, which permission rested essentially upon financial and material need.
Again false papers were substituted to hide the real identity of the ship
or cargo, yet the greater part of the trade was carried on through smuggling
without the cognizance of royalist authorities.

Since the major ports were

under surveillance, the smugglers resorted to "Entremedios," e.E;. between
Pisco and Chile.

The ship in question would come as close as possible to shore

and then would be met by natives with money who would carry
chases.

a'ltlay'

their pur-

When some of the cargoes were landed, Sri tish commission agents

accompanied the ship.

These agents often resided in Valparaiso or Oallao and

guided the ship through its "selling stage."
agents showed up in "native quarters."

Sometimes these commission

Their services were reflected in the

exhorbitant prices that were asked for goods in market places. Miers'
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friend found
8.

40

British vessels at Aneon and after Cochrane took Arica he met

market f1utted 'With Bri Ush r,oods.
Cochrane's naval

8y8t~m

of the floating

custow~ouse

with its accompanying

exactions or cont.ributions was highly unpopular with neutrals who not, only had
to pay Cochrane 18 1/2 percent duty on the amount of the €,ooda they carried,
but once in port were subject to further duties.

laturally the British

merchants were aroused and Hardy sailed for Peru to see what could be done
about this expensive orodedure.

The blockade was confined from Ancon to Pisco,

at lea.st on August 2, 1821. 47 as Robinson's letter to Adams makes clear.
Earlier Hardy supposedly had tacitly assented to the blockade but on the above
date he refused to adldt its existence.

Robinson further informed his superio

that on the morning this letter was written, "a British vessel hAd fone to sea
without having eompUed with the restriction or having r,iven the bond.-

HardT

probably would protect this vessel, Robineon went on to say, despite the infraction of Chilean municipal regulations.
simply this.

The explanat,ion of the "bond" is

The Chilean government, in relation to exporting Chilean produce

and provisions insisted that vessels post a bond p,uaranteeinr. that none of the
stipulated goods find the:f.r way into royalist markets.

However, "as the de-

mand is great and the prices excessively hieh at the ports in their possession
these

commodlt1~s

will go where they are wanted •••• "

The British vessel

mentioned above by Robinson failed to comply wi th this bond and thus was
htehly

su~ct.

How right Rob:ln80n was when he said that the Peruvians greatl

needed the supplies.

In addition to the controversy raging among the Royalist.

47. Special Agents Robinson. Robinson to Adams, Aug. 2, 1821.

-
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theMselves over the openil)? up of free colonial trade. the Chilean blockade
restricted royalist supplies and kept the treasur.y in a state of bankruptcy.48
Hall recounted the precarious state of Peru :1 n his VoVees.49 As captain
of the Cornr![, previously mentioned in connection with the British and Peruvian
trade, he stationed himself in ttle harbour of Ancon, "to be near the
merchant-ships •••• It

En~:'ish

Although the Royalists had abandoned Lima, at least by

July 13, 1821, the date of Hall's entry in the Voyages, they still held Callao
which was constantly besieged and cut off by land and sea.
vessels could not land in Callao, they headed for Arleon.
Peruvian trade was lauded in John Lowe's plea for
Colombia in 182).50

Since the merchant
The value of

British recognition of

A1 though no specific figures were cited, he did aeknowlacte
aeknowlacttl

the existence of this lucrative market.
Further proof exists in the

iOl'1R

of a letter from Pedro de Goysneche, to

Sedor Juan Viguel de Lastra, Lima, February 22, 1822, charging that both the
Jlaeedonian and the H:zperion were involved in royalist affairs to the extent
of conveying royalist funds and goods out
Goyeneehe found the state of Peru

80

0; royalist territory for safety.5l
safety.51

precarious that he made provision for

sending his goods to Cuba or to London.

He himself had made two unsuccessful
unsuccesstul

attempts to leave for Europe in British ships.

The

par~zing

effects of

San Martin's campaign upon royalist resources is vlvidly described in Pezuela's

48.
49.

Hill. Voyages, I, 116-17.

-Ibid.,

251.

50. John Lowe, "On the Recognition of Colombia by Great Britain, It
!!!phlateer, XIII (London, 1823), 489-90.

51. DASM, V, 164.

!!!!.
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JJanifieau,52 upon his viceregal withdrawal from Peru.
Cochrane also proved to be a good source of information concerning

Sri tish commercial operations.

On April 6. 1821, he notified the Ch:Dean

minister of marine, Monteagudo, regarding the activities of the General Brown,
a British vessel. 53

Sometime in April. 1821, he mentioned the British

£!!!

Glendower. which came to Callao from Valparaiso, and the intended arrival of
five or six British ships from Spain,

probab~

the Besostris Giant and

~

among them. 54 On April 17. 1821, he added the British ship Columbia to his

list and made note of the disembarkation of three British ships with Spanish
careo landing in .Arica.'5

In this same letter, which incidentally was written

to the Clilean Minister of Karine, he referred to a French war ship and ~
French m.erchant ships in Peru waters.

Cochrane patrolled Arica, .t'ully

realizing its strategical location for commercial operations.

When the

-

Britilih merchant ship, ~
Lord _C
Catheart
...
at.-he;;;.;;;,.;;art;;;;., ;;;, .Cathcart., created trouble for Cochrane,
he appealed to San MartIn for orders to detain her in whatever port she
touched.

56

Another British ship eluding his.blockade and aidillf. the Royalists

was the Columbia. 57

52,

On JulY' 2, 1821, Cochrane wrote to San Martin about the

'l'orata. Documentos, II, 270-73, 279-80 passim.

53. DA&'Y, VIII, 315.
54. ~., 23, Cochrane tc San 1hrt1n, April. 1821.
;;;:;.

1'11111<38,

Espedicion Libertadora.. II, 154.

56. ~., 325, Coep.T<m.e to San Mart!n, May 20.. 1821.
57. .!2!9,., 54-55.

-
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Colonel .Allen which cooperated with the Royalists and gave comfort through
supplies tor the starving Limei1os. 58

Along with other ships so involved. the

Colonel Allen collected wheat in Mollendo and delivered it to lti!!la.

Blockade

infract10ns only det.ermined Cochrane to be more vigilant and he in turn made

demands upon San Mart!n to make this blockade more rigorous.
came on July 22, 1821.59

One such srpeRl

In addition to violatine the bloekade. Coctwane

accused the British .rehants together with the ].i'ranch of giving the Royalists
ten million pesos.
It was a well established fact that the British traded with the Royalists
at one And the same time as they made pronouncements favoring the rebel cause,
pronouneements backed with material aid.

However, to substantiate the tmlount

and nature of the trade carried on remains a perplexing problem, so few were

the illegal transactions committed to paper.
The Americans were equally careful not to incriminate themselves bY'
pu.tt:i.ng on paper the trade they indulged in contrary to the law. of' SpaL"'l, and

the policy of the United States government was often shown as partial to the
revolutionari.es.

The statistics for United States trade with the Royalists

are even flimsier than the British.

Still, they are indicative of such a

trade and must be considered.
Numerous Americans gained quite a reputation in connection with the
royalist trade.

58. .!2.!£..

The names of Henry' Hill and Estantslao Lynch appear over and

Cochrane to San Martin.

59. ~ •• :3.30, Cocr.rane to San Martin.
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O"Ier again in the voluminous correspondence surroUl'rling the revolutionar,y

period.

Both were men with commercial vision.

Some of the agents sent by the

American government became involved in commercial ventures, case in point,
William Tudor who formed a partnership with Nixon and McCall of Lima.

60

American naval commanders were not above protecting the commercial rights ot
American citizens.

For example, Killer, Memoirs, indicated that Commodore

Stewart supported the merchants against the laws of neutrality. 61
Some of the best evidence supporting American trade with Peru comes trom

royalist sources.

Pezuela'. notations indicated the presence ot the Sidney

in Callao on Karch 9, 1817, Captain J. Mannerch, listing as supercargo an

"!&mit" who had the privilege of selling his goods in this city.

The notation

also names the frigate Warren, as having permission to enter with its cargo.
At the bottom of the above notation Pezuela listed the Chiston .Cllfton.,
Captain Davey, the Montesuma, Independencia, Romber, Tubey, .Q!, and Eapencer.
The "nationalitT' of the last five is most difficult to detendne. 62

On

October 22, 1817, Pezuela notes the arrival of the Montezuma trom Talcahuano
and information concerning the Canton, which carried contraband goods such a.

guns, gunpowder, cartridges, pistols, saber. and other store •• 63
Pezuela's biggest headaches came from. the American warships protecting

60. 1fb1taker, United States

~ Independence,

61.

ll1.l1er, lfem.oirs, II, 221-22.

62.

Casado y Villena. Kemoria Pesuela, 121-22.

63.

-

Ibid., 173.

153.

18.3

the existent trade, not so much because they protected trade with the Royalists
as their dupliCity in also safeguarding American efforts in supplying the
rebel forces.

He was well informed about Biddle and the Ontario. 64 Captain

Biddle, in company with Prevost, paid a visit to Lima in April, 1818.65 Upon
their arrival, ther informed the Vicero.y of royalist defeats in Chile.
According to the Ontario journal, Biddle and Prevost entertained and were in
turn entertained by Don Felix Blanco.

Another entry in this same journal

listed the president of the Philippine company as Don Pedro Abad!a. 66
Prevost's correspondence is highly informative on the subject of trade.
Contained in one of Prevost's despatches was Hill's notation of April 11, 1818,
to a document dated April 7, 1818, concerning the case of John Robinson,

American, who found his ships, crew and himself taken by the Spaniards, and
the detention of a 111-. Samuel Curson, an American living in Lima.

According

to the deposition made by Henry Hill, Vice consul at Valparaiso, Robinson
escaped from Callao on board the Will, Francis Hartler, master, a British
ship in the port. Robinson apparently stayed on board this ship and assisted
in loadin,; the cargo, eventually sailing in her as chief mate. Curson was
also eventaally placed under restriction by the Royalists. 67
, Robinson's note to Adams mentioned the names of the Viceroy's agents
conducting the exchange of prisoners with the rebel forces, among them that

6L.

~.,

229, Feb. 13, 1818;

65. Ontario

Log

!.2!2.,

259-61.

and Journal, I, April 12, 1818.

66.

ill!:!.,

61.

Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr.

III, Jan. 29, (l818J.

~

I
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ot Senor Don Felix Blanco, a Lima merchant. 68 Robinson stated that this man
.as a chief factor of the Philippine Company in Lima and questioned his
presence in these negotiations.
liberated

Pe~

Robinson speculated on the possibility of a

which would provide a most comfortable market for wheat, beef,

tallow and mules and lIOuld yield sugar, bra.ndy and other exports from Lima to

Chile.

Furthermore, since considerable American capital was invested in this

Pacific trade there was greater need tor naval protection.

Robinson's diary

for June 2, 1818, again referred to the tact that both he and Prevost agreed
on one point-tithe protection of our commerce by force, .. 69 and the appointment

ot an agent to royalist Peru to protect American interests. John HigginsoD.
according to Robinson's Diary tor June 3, 1818, had been appointed vice consul
at Lima and Callao the past April.

Thi. diary notation also included tbe

following statement:
There is no doubt that Captain Biddle and Judge
Prevost have in conjunction with John Higginson
80me great mercantile speculation on toot between
this and Lima. from wh ich they 81:8 to deri'V8 some
benefit if carried into ettect. 7
Prevost had his

own

version of American activities in Peru.

His reports

to Adams did not convey bis personal interest in American speculative ventures.

On June 10, 1818, be tells of a visit with the Viceroy and ot the American

68. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, June 1, 1818.
69. Robinson Papers, Diar,y, June 2, 1818.

-

10. Ibid., June 3, 1818.
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ships Canton and Beaver which were in the rqyalist territory.71 The Viceroy
prow~sed

not to intcrf9re with &Tterican vessels and suggested the use of

American sM.ps for the exchange of prisoners.

P.lthough this meant a sacrifice,

Prevost believed that it would afford the Americans greater protection and so
discussed the matter with Biddle of the Ontario.
Biddle was "induced" to act as protector.

Prevost suggested that

FUrthermore, the Viceroy addressed

a note to the royalist squadron to let any ATterican ships leave Valparaiso
without interruption. This same letter rather

positive~

stated that despite

monopolies, Lima was a scene of great commerce. Woolens, cottons and finer
Goods were

~~rketed

at a total cost of fifteen million dollars.

Prevost did

not fail to mention British interests in this region.
Writing on board the OntariO, Rotinson remarked in his diary that he was
received politelY by Don Felix Blanco. 72 Robinson, however, flatly stated
that British merchants were obtaining privileges from the Peru RoyaUsts
,,rhieh were denied to United States citizens. To add to the confusion,
Captain Hicky and Sherifr were entering into conrnercial arrangements.
The August 31, 1818, memorandum from Robinson to Adams written in Lima,
referred to Peru as a valuable commercial asset. If a change did taka

p~ce,

referring to a successful revolutionizing, the commerce would be highly
profitable to individuals and interested nations alike. Robinson went on to
state that "no Amerioan merchant shipping has entered the port before the

71.

Special Agents, Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams.

72. Robinson Papers, Diary, June

14,

1818.
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visit of the Ontario excepting under special Licences from the King of Spain."
Thjs hardly seems true in the light of existing evidence to the contrary,
especially in the case of contraband materials.

It would also imply that all

ships that openly entered the royalist ports had received such a license.
last canot be substantiated through documentation.

The

Robinson did mention the

Governor Shelbz of Sew York which arrived in Callao with a cargo of arms and
a license from the Spanish government.
Catherin~8,

furtheI'llOre, he included the

!!2

of Providence, with a cargo of wheat from Chile which would

"probably be permitted to take a cargo away with her ostensibly for Europe but
actually for Valparaiso.,,73
Among the Hill Papers are references to latamalao Lynch and Henry- Hill
as interested in the Peruvian trade and in connection with them were the ships
Flyi&-fish, Beaver and £ata.lina.. 74

Casa Flores 'wrote to Viceroy Pezuela on

October 8, 1818, Rio de Janeiro, about the F~ns-Fiah, Captain Beriah Fitch. 7'
Fitch was apparently interested in securing permission to enter Peruvian ports
and

to dispose of his cargo of naval goods. Also Don Pedro lico1&8 de Chopi te

presUJlably put some goods aboard this ship with the intention of supplying the
royalist marine.

13.

There are further references to the Governor Shelby and the

Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, A.ug. 31, 1818.

14. Salas, ~ Hill, 21-23 P8.8sim, footnote 23 cites K.S.I Stgo 24 de
Septie1llbre d.--uJI8;-urll Papers.

15.

DAS!I", v,

213-14.
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-

r\~o

Catherines.

In October,

\~orthington

told Adnms that the Governor Shelby,

-

Two ------...-.,;;.;.;.;..;.
of t;ev;rYork, was sold to the RoyaUsts.7 6 Referrinf;. to the .!!!£
Catherines
of Providen~e, a.I., he said this ship sold wheat in .Lima for :~16 per fanega

while in Chile it only brought $~2 to $3 per fanega, hence the Captain of the

-

Two Catherines, had boue;ht the wheat in Chile and sold it in Peru.

\~orthington

indicated that such trade waf; frowned upon by the revolutionaries.

:3till, he admitted that iihile a short time ago it was criminal to speak of
opening the trr>.de with Lima it was now openly agitated.
F,cheverr!a, December 17, 1318, 77
,~harl-es

Catherines,

paraiso to Callao.

~"orthin:~ton

In writing to

again referred to the

1!2.

Hyatt master, which stopped during her trip from Val...
He further admitted that other ships were carrying on

trade with the royalists, the British among them.

l';orthingtont s notation to

this letter again brought up the rn.'3tter of AmeriCan and British trade with
Lima and presumably by means of the

.!!2

Catberines for he added that the

s:lpercargo and captain and the Lima eoverThllAtlt "all seemed to Uke it [and]

I did not care a pin about what they were doing, so I did my own duty when
.aPt'lied '-:'0. rt
v,'hen Joel Roberts POinsett, ex-Agent of the United States to South
AmerIca" wrote to Adams on r~ovember
c011'..mercial

possibiU ties. 78

4" Id18, he described the various Peruvian

Among the products of Pern could be found wine,

oil, sugar, corn, wbeat, bark, and (;oooa.

76. U. '5.

Adams,

n.
78.

~!inisters

The annual mine production amounted

Argentina" October 22, lB16.April 8, 1820, ~iorthington to
Argentina,

Oct. 22, 1818.

Ibid., worthington to :e;cheverria,
-Mannin
Di lomatic Corre ondence

Dec. 17, 1818.
III 1720-1728

assim.

1.88
to 4,500,000 dollars. The accuracy of these figures cannot be

.as1~

checked.

Tbe fact does reru1n that America.n ships put 1n at Peruvian ports and did thU

1n search of more thau refuge from the storDw se&.. Wb11e there is

l10

1nd1-

cation that man,y of the ships that entel'tld :PeruY1an ports traded ther., their
presence is caul. for speculation. One such sh1p, the
mentioned b)" Pemuela in hi. Memoirs as

!!! 'f01ador,

•••

bri1le:.~ng information.79 A logical

question 1s what was this ship doing in .. r01'aUst port?
PUOI, in Letters on

.!!! Vatted

~O'fibC&S ... , wrltteu to

Hfnl'17 C1q.

lauded the virtue. ot Peruvian markets.80 !he pt'ox1Jld.t7 of the Un!ted States
to this marketw.s of considerable adnntage, an advantage

tha~

should be

explOited to the ful.lest.

Peruvian_tals were abundant and tn exchange thAt

United State. cou14 supply

Ooa.ztM

cottons, ships, leather, turniture, nails,

carriages and other goods which could mare ea8117 alld more cheap17 be obta1Ded
in the United States than elsewbere.

Puos quoted the s . of $),000.000 ..

the alIlOUnt shipped aDl'luallJ to Cld.na trOll Peru for "the singl. article ot
tea." Furthermore, trOll .1u11 1817 to April l.81.8,:lS, 700,000 (Spani8h dollars)

l..

arrived in Canton in American v....

!be magnitude of the trade held great

speculative prospects tor the United States citisens that would canto out
their mercantile lot with tbe new "sister aepubUcs."
Apparent1;y.. -n.T were wilUng to take this risk.

Holbrookts!At1~to~b1!:!1t!1-!II'L

referred to the American schooaer, ll!!2art, out of Baltimore, which had been

79. Oasado '1 Villena. Memoria PElZuela, 391, Dec • .30, 1818.
80. Vicente Paso8 JCanld., Letters on the United Proviaees
trans. Platt Cr08b7 (Nev Yori.. tBl.JT,'"'l4'1:na.

!! Sou:th

Amenca ....

r:::ac'::,d:)~.ian, 1..rhich

,.;a8 determined to

Emter '::allao "blockade ~ E.2. blOCk,:ld:;;.n d2

T:-:is course of action uatur:tlly caused frict,ion between the 'unericans an.d
Cochr'me.

However, Holbrook insi.sted th:lt thearriv.1.1 of the .ftlacedonian in

Callao '.:'a3 a cause for re.joicinr;, for th9re N'ere man,y British and merlc&n
ships carr,vin3 large Stuns of rrloney oresent in this port.
t~,Rre

were m3.n;,v merchant ships in this S,:lme harbor.

H~.cedonian, w~.s ap~)1a.uded
orot~sts

Not only that, but

Downes, Captain of the

for rnnning t."'J.rouih the blockade.

fell on deaf ears, for Dmmes stated he

~:lould

Cochr:,me's

remain in Cnllao until

!!11 ~rr:er:5.can merch.:mt ships had g,dbd. 83 The merchant captains henrti.1,y
welcomed Doh"nes on this occasion and others when he eluded or
,'lnG op'3nly defied Ccorn-ane' s block~de.

order since t.he safety of the

m0rch~.mt

succ~~i3sf'ul1y

These conrrratulations were well :tn
ships depended he.1.Vily upon the daring

.'1nd determination o.f the ~l,acedoni3.n. 8L
tl.pparently, there

1"-3.3

another ship with the rt'4me of the M9.cedonian, this

one alsc American with Capt. Eliphalet :3mith listed as sup3rcarr:O.
Macedoni~~

found itself in difficulty with Cochrane on several occasions.

81. Holbrook, Alltobiogr!ebz, 267, (1819).
82.

Ibid., 257; Macl3donian did enter, ~ • .t 258-59.

83. ~., 259, 1819.

84.

This

-11,1(\., 270.
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The French brig Gazelle (Captain Rowcel) was involved in similar adventures

1f1th the Macedonian. 65

On March 26, 1819, Cochrane wrote to Jose Ignacio

Zenteno about a ship he had detained, an American ship which was running the
blockade and carr.ying on aetivities with the Royalist Philippine

comp~.66

The detained ship was determined to have carried rifles, sabers, munitions,
and naval provisions along with other contraband gooda.

The mmers of the

ship, not identified by name, were also the owners of the cargo earr:ted.
Cochrane proved satisfactorily that the goods were being delivered at the
request of the Peruvian Viceroy through the Spanish ambassador in the United
States.

Identified in the transaction was the Spanish royalist. merchant Pedro

Abad!a.

Cochrane's letter to Zenteno, dated April 8, 1819, mentioned Captain

E. 8m! th of the Mac.donian and the money and cargo he carried as actually

belonging to the Royalists. 87

The money, Cochrane illticated, belonged to the

Philippine CODlPalV and Abad!. and Blanco.

This letter showed that Smith

acknowledged thE: house of Abad!. as the real owner of the money the
Macedonian transported.
scrutiDT.

The adventures of the Macedonian warrant much closer

In 1818 the brig llacedonian, owned by John 8. Ellery and eommanded

by Eliphalet SDlith, sailed froll Boston with a valuable cargo belonging to
Ellery and Perkins.

The ship stopped at several places along the cUst of

Chile and Peru, disposed of part of her cargo and then proceeded to Lima

85. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, III, 2.3.3, footnote .38J Ibid., 25.3-54, footnote .3.
86. Odriozola, Documentos, III, .3.36-.37, Mar. 26, 1819.
87. ~., 34.3-45, Cochrane to Zenteno, April 8, 1819.
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th:t.3 amonnt

:'(,0, (lr;O of
:~O()P.

'1-7;:"8

f'Or"rJIlrCkd

hy ',mi th throu;:;:h an agent to Gua'Tley.

·",!'ten{ardSrn.ith left., I,im:"!. Hith the remaini.ng

h",·~;.dtn~

for

(JUt3Jn:?y.

At this point S:mi. th

WiS

;~:30,OOO

intercepted by Chi l!~ ".n soldiers

:m(: t."l~(en aboard the O'niZ.~ins around April

5,

l~tcr

~qO,OOO.

but not before he hOld si:;ne(l away the

hopin::: to find the aGent there Hith the

in specie, also

1819, and released several days

~60,OOO.

He proceeded to Gnal'J'1ey

H01-l0VOT,

the agent. involved

hArtrd of' t,he first confiscation :rod dooidcd to de po si t the mone:; not on

board his o.rn ship but the French brif, ,Ga.zella .. which was also lyinCT, in

C}ua...l'J'1oy.

Cochrane learning of this 4:60,000 boarded th6 Gazelle, capturing her

and the mone-f.

In 1820 EllerJ and ferldns presented a. memoria. to the

Uni t~d States 21tate Depnrtment seekin:;: rf\sti tntton of all
confiscnted.

t~he

money which was

After no?,otiat:i.ons tdth the Chilen.n govern.ment .. this

~overnment

agreed to pay the full qmount of tho '80,000 plus a part of the ,~60,OOO-a
totn.l of $101..,000 with interest.

3ut, there was a third seizure invo1ved--

tM.s one rr.,ade by Cochrane in 1821.
r'~a(ledonLm

After the first seizures in 1319, the

conttnued to trade along t.he various ':>outh American ports and

f:tnally proci)eded to Canton .. China nwith a permit obtained from the authoritie
in Peru, to

~r'\.,rt into that countl"'J a c:u-go from China. ha8 A.t Canton, on or

ahout October 9, 1320, merchandise Wlounting to ~5h,ooo and upwards (cost at
C8nton) WaS shipped on board the
Company of Canton.
and J ot}n B. Cushing.

Macedoni~

b.1 the house of Perkins

and

Involved in this house was Thomas Perkins, James Perkins
The rasidue of the cargo was made up by .3mi th from flmds

85). Senate Document no. 58, 35th Cong., 1st Session, No.
No.1, 3-5, Memorial of
~
N
N

L
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of other United States citizens.

Early in 1821 the Macedonian arrived at

Arica where he sold part of the goods and then to Tacna where more goods were
sold at a profit of nearly $3 for one of the invoice cost.

The total amount

of his sale came to $70,000 and taking this sum and the residue goods he proceeded to Arequipa, Peru.
On May 9, 1821, in the valley of Sitana, Smith was again arrested by
Chilean soldiers and the money confiscated. He did, however, manage to obtain
a receipt for the amount.

All efforts at restitution failed when Cochrane

was unwilling to give up the plunder.

Perkins maintained in his memorial that

the property of a United States citizen "openly engaged in a lawful trade"
was unjustly taken for the United States maintained friendly relations with
Peru and Chile. 89 The return of the money was highl,y in doubt as William
Miller's deposition indicated that Cochrane had alreaQy distributed the
1IlOney.90 Furtheraore, the Chileans argued that the goods and money were
really Spanish property and associated with the merchants Abad!a and Arismendi.
The whole situation became complicated when the Chileans advanced their proof
for such claims.

Arismendi, one of the factors of the privileged Philippine

Company, secured, through the Vicera.r, permission to introduce goods up to a
value of $200,000 from :::urope or Asia, "on board
nation which

2

.2! .2!!!. .2! ~

vessels

.2! !!!if.

miiht choose," for which privilege he paid into the public

treasury $50,000.

In addition, he advanced $150,000 on the amount of duties

89.

~.,

5-8 passim.

90.

~.,

Deposition of William }iiller,

14.

,..~

1.4fI
l.'+

------------------------------------------------------~
--------------------------------------------------------------------~
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he would have to pay on such importation. 91 To make such things even more
complicated but also more interesting, Smith sold one half of the Macedonian

1,,','1.'

I

'1:1

to Don Felipe Mercier of Baltimore, but residing in Lima, for $15,000.
Mercier transferred his half of the vessel to Arismendi on December

Later

4, 1819.

Arismendi then added $3,500 for expenses, bringing the total paid to $18,500.
supposedly, this was not an uncommon transaction since Spanish merchants in
Lima had interests in several vessels distinguished by foreign neutral ownership.

Among these was Don Francisco Xavier rIsoue) owner of the Pallas.

The

trip to Canton followed the above arrangements, the money for the Canton
purchases was delivered to Smith on board the American frigate Macedonian by
Vicente de Lazoano, the agent of Abad!a and Arismendi. 92 There is considerable
evidence to substantiate the claim that Arismendi had an interest in the
Ma.cedonian. He had also negotiated with a British ship, Robert Page, supercargo. 93 The contract signed between Arismendi and Smith, in addition to
stipulating the costs of the Canton venture and instructions, allowed this
Captain EUphalet

~ th

to ship from ten to .fU'teen thousand dollars on his

own account, "free of all deductions from the Ucense. n94 The clever Arismendi

l

91. Ibid., 138, translation of the paper accompanying a letter dated Nov. 28,
1846,-rr;;m Don Manuel Carvallo, Envoy Ex.traordinary of Chile, "~1emoria of the
facts relative to the capture of a certain sum of money in the valle.y of Sitana, in the Peruvian territory, by' an offioer of the Chilean squadron, in the
month of May, 1821,", Ibid., 154, Contract between Arismendi and the Government of Peru, Nov., 18~ Import duties amounted to 30 1/2 per cent on the
invoice oost.
92. ~., 139-41, Memorial by an officer •••• , Mq, 1821.
93. Ibid., 142, Carvallo's account, perhaps the Admiral Cockburn; Ibid., 162,
EXtra'Ct"1rom the record of the Prize Court of Peru, Opinion of ilie F'iscal,
April 16, 1822.
94. ~., 153, Agreement between E. Smith and Arismendi (trans.).

'. ii"

r

r
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had also secured a second contract from the Vicero.y, again using the
~acedonian,

this time to import much needed naval stored from the United

states. 95 One of the documents names Juan Tbwaites in connection with the
6
Arismendi affair and the ships Cockburn, Lyndock, and Colonel Allen.9 San
Martin's possession of Lima intertered with Smith's activities, who tound the
house ot Abad!a and Arismendi dissolved b,y cause of revolution.

Through his

nephew. Stephen B. Howe, Smith managed to have the goods conSigned to the
"English house of John Thwaites. 1t However, tithe military government of Lima"
tound it necessary to condemn the ship Macedonian and her cargo, using the
pretext that this propert,y belonged to the Spanish refugee Arismendi.

The

American, of' course, continued to den;y that Arismendi had arry part in the
ship or cargo.

Smith insisted that Arismendi failed to live up to his

bargain and that he, Smith, made the trip to Canton "on his own initiative. 1t
United states protests were embellished with insistence of neutrality and
Chile's illegal interterence. 97
The name of John Ellery, supposed owner of the Macedonian, was further
mentioned in a document dated April 26, 1821. Ellery was in Tacna with his
cargo where he kept abrp,ast ot the critical state of
ot Peru. He mentioned
that five large vessels were in Arica laden with English goods and two or
three more were expected daily, among them "Mercier's expedition." He

95. Ibid., 158, Arismendi's Second Contract with the Viceroy, Aug. 19, 1820.
This C'Ontract cost Arismendi :$10,000 as a bonus for the Viceroy.

-

96. Ibid., 172-73, Petition of Palacios (trans.).
97.

~.,

184-85, 192,247-48 passim. Reply to Carvallo.
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admitted selling over

~?60,OOO

ori,:;inal expectations.
commander of the

!L. 1-

lforth of goods but this hardly fulfilled his

Ellery daaperatel;r tried to communicate with the
~_

Cousc,t:lllation, Captain Ridgely, with whom he hoped

to deposit the proceeds of his sales "the only sa.fe

depo~ite

[sic] that ca.n

be made of mone,y as times are at present •••• n98
the names enumerated as having interest in the sales at Tacna,

~ong

LaPaz and

~requipa

werea

Perkins & Company, John Hart,

S~el

Russell, Pitman

& Gordon, John Jones, J. E. Heron and others, J. S. Ellery and others, E.
smith and others, Dan. Coit, Thomas Forbes, Edward Dorr, and Paqua, Hong
(Kong] merchant.

The total amount of sales distributed among the above
99
individuals was $296,616 and 6 reales.
~Ierciert

1819.

s name was affixed to a letter he sent to Ellery, Lima, May 11,

In this letter, Mercier admitted employing the Macedonian, Captain

Smith, in the coasting trade which held much commercial promise. According
to this letter, the Macedonfan was to make the trip from the port of ltuarney
to Pisco, where she would take in a full cargo of branqy for "our joint
account.'t

From Pisco, the

~cedonian

was to proceed to Guayaquil and back to

Callao or as near to this port as possible, with a possible cargo of leather,
coffee and straws.

98.,

~.,

All in all, Mercier expected handsome profits from this

267, John Eller,y to (ArismendiJ, April 26, 1821.

99. Ibid., 274, Deposition of John S.

l

~ler,

Feb. 10, 1848.
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arrangements. 100
r
doman una
~ 11~
vihen the }lRce

.

arr~ved

21 1821.,
in Boston, June',

101

s he

brought home 343,232 Spanish dollars and 30,441 ounces of silver for the
account of the following persons: John S. El1er"J,
Eller"J,
~2,OOO;

Richard J. Cleveland, $3,000; W. b. :3wett,

~t32,OOO; W.

~4,700;

;;;;1,355--a11 of Boston; order, $1,500; Edward Carrington
;;;;1,355--all
~63,OOO;

York,

&

Ignatius ;;)argent,
Co., of Providence,

Jamuel Coop, New York, ;jil,224; order of Brown, Watson
Jamue1

,~9,560

and 1,690 ounces of silver; Von Kapil

&

I,ewis ?c. Co.,

&

Co., New

Brune, Baltimore, $78,861

and 2,459 ounces of silver; Baptist Mezick, $6,000; Mrs. Eliza Farren, $),330;
Thomas Tenant, Lemuel

T~lor,

and others, $51,440; John and George Hoffman,

$6,12$;
$6,125; Crosdale & Wilson, $2,012; P. O. Guestier, $1,728; John }wers and 00.,
Co.,
O. Nelson, $448; Edmund Didier, $174--all
$174--a11 of Baltimore; to be
$7,200; J. C.
deposited in the United States Branch bank, and to order $62,357, and 26,952
ounces of silver.
~mith

had also availed himself of the Constellation for an invoice listed

the amount of :Wl,143 shipped on the account and risk of James

&

Thomas

Perkins, merohants of Boston. This document, however, was dated April 27,
102
1822.
The names of Perkins had previous~ been mentioned in connection
wi th

Ellery and the Macedonian.

The letter books of Perkins

&

Company of

-Ibid., 1, 392, The Salem Gazette, vol. 11,35, 1819.
no. 50, 3al$m, June 22, 1821,

100. Ibid., 297-98, Meroier to Ellery,

M~

101.
probablY quoted from the Boston Jazette.

102. Ibid., 443-44, Extracts from the invoice book of J. and P. H. Perkins.

Canton, showed that a letter dated Spril 17, 1820103 written to the house 1n
Boston, annou.nced the intention

or

shipping goods to the west coast

America., e.g. Chile and Peru as the markets

wert~

highly tavorable.

or

South

fbe

Canton hr,anch requested the Boston branch to secure insuraace at a ta1r
premia. The letter goes on to st.ate that American 8hips were ·allOwed to

8811 their cargoes at Lima, and to carry on the coasting trade between Chil.
and Peru.... ft

Ano\her letter, this oae dated April 22, teS20, repeated the

Wc.rll8.tlon that ftr07a118ts as well u patriots sutter AIle1"lcan YeSS8la, as

,

well a8 all others, to trade at their portltu.....

lOu

This Was a rather im-

proper usumptioa, tor Cochrane' 8 activ.1t1es bespoke quite &'DOth.. poUq
toward vessels tra<.t1ng w1:t.h the J'01'3.1:1.8ta and eYen. with the "bela thems.1Yes.
Among th3 &hips that Cochrane ordered

Mac.doDian,

.!!! Catheri...

O11t ot Callao, March

or

1819, were the

(a,.att), Beaver (Oleveland), Boxer (Skid",,) and

Canton (Ooffin). lOS
Goin.g back to Oocbrane, he

IIftt

another letter to Zen.tellO, April 8, 1819,

berating the contraband t.rade and l11egal activities entered into between the
-neu.trals" and the Royal1st8. Once IIOre the Maoedord.an 80bieTed notoriet7
through her deaU:ngll with t.he l07al18ts, this time in compalV' with the British

Coloabla. Cocbrtme 8uspected &11 neutral ship. leaving J'07a11st

pona,

446, Enracts trOll the letter books of Perk1ns It Company of Canton
lOU. Ibid., li46, Lettsr ot April 22, 1820, Ex:trac~ from Letters, PerJd.na Ie
Compan;r of qmton.
105. Ibid., 393,I118s Rep.stier, vol. 16, 318.

103.

~.,

106. Odriozola, Docum.entos,

nI,

346-h7, Cochrane to Zenteno, April S, 1.819.

I""""
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especially since the sad state of affairs prompted the weal thy to despatch
their holdinps to more secure territory and neutral ships offered the best
protection.
ships.

In this category one could list the Bri t1sh, American, and ,tI'rench

Especially the first two for there were always the protection of an

important flag and more to the point the guns with whiot. to back it upPezucla's ~moria107 also referred to the American "Shm1t" and tho
Macedonian, which carried 62.000 pesos resultinr from the sale of goods in
Callao.

Pezuela noted the entrance of the American Btlavcr at Callao" r:ith

royalist permission, and wi th a cargo of the mcuh needed wheat, rice and
other necessitie8.

108

He admitted granting such permi.Jsion to oth.or foreign

ships, having been driven to such measures by the restrictive blocka.de.
September 9, 1819, he indicated that the Pal..., Captain Holl

c Halla

On

had

permis,ion to trade in C81.1&0.10 9 On September 16. 1819, the ilona liaria
'10
was cited as having a similar privilege. Both were Ame~'ican ships.
cording to a. September 23" lf31"

Ac-

notation, the British Catalina, proceedillg

£rom Huanchaco with 1,300 f'aneg&a of wheat also had permission to transpc"4t

suppli.s to Callao from. other ports of the Peruvian Viceroyalty.l11
Adm! tting that the trade 1fi th royalist Peru was precarious, Prevost none-

Oasado y Villena t 1!ellOria Pezue13t 4.34-35, Informed by rebel deserters
of the above, April 10. 'Ti, i2, 1819.

107.
108.

.ill2,., L72-73,

109. ~
110.

lL

..

521.

~.

111. ~., ."),'
"'''7

-

June

3, 1819 •

199
theles. challenged Cochrane'. right to institute what he and others
as a "Paper Blockade."
in a letter to Adama. 112

de8ig~~ted

He expressed himself quite frankly on May 16. 1819,
American correspondence generally indicated that a

political change in Peru would most likely result in greator economic
stability a."1d with it aecompan;:ring aLhnmtages 1'01' interested parties.
Robinson. July 29, 1819. notified Adams that a complete change 'ilas necessary
1.0 apolitical health and econom;,y.n 1l3

Auterican trade statistics for 1820 remain sketol:',y and not conclusive of

a flourishing trade but they do admit the existence of A.>n€;rican...Royalist
mercantile activities.

Pezue1a's lIemoria for July 24, 1820, recorded the

.ailing from Callac of the Warrior, Captain Elliot Lux, and i.nvo1ved the
royalist merchants Aba.du and Arismendi. 114 Rufus Cof:1in, Captain of tr..e

Canton, was also implicated with the royalist merchants. l15

It dld not

follow that American trade activi.ties necessitat€;c. loyalty te· t.he royalist

cause.

The ver,y

Americ~n5

aecused of prejudicing the rebel

C&~se

by tr&dir~

with Per'U '''ere themselves suspeeted by thE'> l'OYtl1ists. 116

Some of the Americnn ships were not. fortunate enourhtto elude Cochrane
and his squadron and thuz found themselves confiscated.

The UacedofJ.ian.

112. Special Avents Prevost, Biddl€, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, 1ic.y 16, 1819.
11.3.

Spectel Arent3 Rcbin6cn, Robinson to Adams, Jt)ly 29, 1819.

114. Casadc y VUlena,

Memoria Pezuela,

738.

115. Hwq;:>hreys, uParo1ssien Notes," 256, Sept. 7.
116.

1820.

Casaz'.!o y VillcM, lI.em.ori8. Pezuela, 797. Nov. 9, 1820.
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bnt, .r-dJ:tr..:; to do

DO l;~r:mt

to Lima.

Tho French 'brig

~~.!, C:mt..

Rot'IXell,

lo~t ~6?,OOO dne t,C the conf"lsea.tlona. 117 Holbrook's Al1tobi~graph;:Ment.ion6d
tt,~ t

'Ot.mes of the Macedonian was anxious to seok the release of' an '1m eric an
•

ship carryin[: a cargo of muskets, pistols, powder and ottUftt warUke stores,
aei:r:ed by the rebel s..".lp .b?-ut¥":O.

The Macedof\1~ Holbrook f:Oes on, escorted

merchantmen out of Callao While BritiAh cutters did the same tor British

merchantmen.

One of the !unerican ships r;;1ven this !'fservlce" was the Pantq.er,

Cap~in Austin, out of L'IOston. ll.8 Althoueh only one Americ.'m ship is named,
most likely there were others.

'1'he journal of one Charles rJ'anntt of the

I;;nc_odonian .. entry tor Decemher 28, 1320, referred to the LouiS'! of Providence,
Cl1ptain Hicks, as being detained for carrying the prohibited oontraband.
Gauntt wrote on the following dA..T that the Macedonian took the !puit'J,! out of

Hn.acho. hfhile the rebel Lautaro followed, it hesitated about taking the
~uisa by

force.

Sarlier, Ibwnes hlld written to San Mart!n concorning the

Louisa but received !'tau evasive repl,ytt and decided to give ber

hifi

119
protection.

The Constellation cruised the Chilean-Peruvian coa.stline in r'lorch of

1821 and in one descr1pti.'t'e report to the Jecretary of the liavy, its ca.ptain

117. TJ. S. Consuls B. A., Jan. 10, 1813-June 16, 1821, Forbes to I;;Cheverr!a.
l~ov. l<i, 1320.
113.

iToibrook, f,.utobiotZ'?Ph,.:, 273-74.

119.

Gauntt, PriVata Rl3faarks, 109-110.
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c.
C.

Ridgely, March 7, emphasized the need for more American warships to
G. Ridgely.
,

protect trade.

i

Cochrane's seizures were becoming all too frequent and

expensive not to mention irritating to the American traders and warships.
Ridgely further added that he was cruising along the coast of Peru to afford
whatever protection he could to American citizens and ·From Lord Cochrane
being on that coast
want."

& prohibiting all intercourse I fear I will find many

in

Moreover, Ridgely made definite reference to a lucrative
lucra.tive trade carried
carried.

on from China to Chile and Peru by Un!
ted Statee
United

oj ti zens .120

Holbrook also
al80

vouched for the trade carried on in Callao "notwithstanding
"notwl thstanding the blockade.·
During negotiations with the Viceroy, Holbrook indicated as we have seen

.

above, that American prisoner.
prisoners found employment in merchant ships anchored
121
in Callao.
Ca11ao.12l

The revolutionizing of Chile separated her not only politically but
commerciallY' from Peru.

manitesto to the peoIit of Chile, May
O'Higgins· manifesto

5,

1818, had called attention to the market that Peru afforded to Chilean
l22 Robinson noted on May 31, 1818,
1618, that Peru and Chile "are naturally
goods. 122
friends" with Peru receiving among other items guano from Chile and Chile in
supplying many d17 goods. 123 On June 1, 1818,
1618, Robinson wrote Adams that
turn supplY'ing

120. Navy Area 9 File, 1801 Folder, Box 1, Duplicate copy of Captain C. G.
Ridgely's letter to Secretary of Wavy, March 7. 1821, on board U.S.8. Constellation; original in Captains' Letters, Vol. 1, 1821.
--121.

Holbrook, Autobiographl. 301,
)01. )lay,
J4ay, 1821.

122 • ~ II, 65-66, Manitesto del Gobierno a los pueblos que forman el
estado de Chile, Bernardo O'Higgins, Kay
May 5, 1816.
1818.
123.

Robinson Papers, Diary.
Diary, May 31, 1618.
1818.

I
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there were many ships in Valparaiso and if the Peru trade opened up there
would be a market for wheat, beef, tallow and mules.

Lima, he added, could

we 11 provide sugar, brandy and other exports .124
Worthington's correspondence also indicated a strong Chilean interest in
the Peru trade. 125 Robinson voiced similar opinions when speaking of the
value of Peruvian markets. 126 The high prices that Chilean grains might
bring in Lima forced even the Chilean revolutionaries to speculate upon
dealing with the Royalist en~.127 Interested in this grain trade were the
British and Americans. Wheat, as has been mentioned above in the instance ot
the

~

Catherines, sold for $2 a fanega in Chile but brought a price of

,!~l6 per fanega in Lim&.128
Merchants of Santiago and Valparaiso were despatched to Peru qy the
Chilean government with the double purpose of espionage and the procurement of
commercial markets. One such man was Don Rafael Garfias. 129 Though
apparently these activities did not

alw~s

meet Cochrane's approbation,

Chilean s,ympathies were highly in favor ot the San Martin expedition and its

124. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, June 1, 1818.
125. U. S. Ministers Argentina, April 26, 1817-July 9, 1818, Worthington to
Adams, July 4, 1818.
126. Special Agents Robinson, Memorandum, Robinson to Adams, Aug. 31, 1818.
127. D~SMt VI, 315-16, To Supreme Director of the United Pr:>vinces from
Guido, ept. 29, 1818.
128. U. s. f.1inisters Argentina, October 22, 181S-April 8, 1820, !tiorthington
to Adams, Oct. 22, 1818.
129. Barros Arana, Historia

l

~,

XII, 1.62-63, 480.82eassim, 1819.

1"'1
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promise of recol~ing a lucrative trade.l)O With all the information availa'l.
on the great interest the Chileans had in the Peruvian trade, the statistics
to back them up are rather inconclusive.

---

Gauntt's Journal aboard the U.S.S.

)lacedonian, dated December 28, 1820,1)1 noted. the presence of Chilean
transports at Huacho, together with British and American
Ameriean vessels.

Cochrane's displeasure to the contrary, the Chilean government issued
Coehrane's
licenses for ships wishing to trade in Peru.

On ,'ebruary 16, 1821,1.32

Admiral Cochrane wrote San I4art!n that the Montenoma, perhaps the U.S.
JIontezuma, with a cargo of wheat and a Chileanlieenae
Chileanlicenae was near Callao.

Robin-

son advised Adams of the change in Chilean policy on July 6, 1821. 1 )3 Apparently Chile had relinquished its pretensions to a blockade of the entire
feaaible one 1n certain restricted areas.
areaa.
coast and maintained a feasible

More

i8 the information that under certain conditions, Chile allowed the
strildng is
exportation of Chilean produce.

Robinson' 8a estimate was that such a measure

would only protract the existing eonflict
conflict in Peru, and on August 2, 1821, he
brought up again the Chilean licenses which favored the Royalists. l34

Be

admi tted that a bond was extracted that the prOvisions
provisiona delivered to Peru would

not be given to the Royalists, but the demand and priees
prices were high and thus

130.
131.

Ibid., 365-66, 1819.
-Gauntt,
Private Remarks, Dee. 28, 1820, 109.

132. DASi, VIII, 10, on board £'Higgins, Feb. 16, 1821.
133.

Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, July 6, 1821.

-

134. Ibid., Robinson to Adams.
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CHAPTER VII

San Martin

and Commerce 1819-1821

With the noble purpose of the expedition extolled, a worable expeditionary
force fitted out, tempting commercial inducements propaganized, it now remained
for the expedition to liberate Peru and fulfill its promises.

But between the

departure of the Peruvian expedition and its culmination in the Protectorate
1.r ~ crises and conciliations, each demanding the attention of San
and each jeopardizing the successful outcome.

Kart!n
Kartln

Conflicts arose over British

and American rivalry for trade, over the Chilean blockade and over Cochrane' s

conduct. .ldmuttaa
.ldm:f.tttaa tMre ...
were
re others, this chapter will concern itselt on17
with a study' ot commercial problems that arose, with emphasis upon what San
Martin promised during the campaign itself and his efforts, if a:tf1', to thwart
Kartin
counter proposals of the Peruvian Viceroys.

His attempted armistice and peace

negotiatioll8 in 1820 and 1821 will conclude thi. chapter.
It the statements of American observers are to be taken seriously. it is
the British to whom San Martin evinced devotion. l

Certainly the British put

pressure upon the Chilean government and San Martin for trade privileges in
Peru even betore the campaign had begun.
Royalists, as the British

pl~ed

both sides favoring whichever seemed most

likely' to concede better advantages.

1.

lL

Pressure was also exerted upon the

Marta remained posted on these
San Martin

Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Mq 16, 1818.
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duplicities and was encouraged by Guido to subvert royalist concessions if

these were likely to occur.2 Ever ready to seize a profitable opportunity,i l
British ships as the

Il!!!

and Andromacha lingered at Valparaiso, hoping for an

open Lima trade. Worthington spoke of the change in attitude taking place
within Chilean official and unofficial circles respecting free trade with
Lima.

Where it had been a criminal offense to talk openly of such possibility

now it was aired freely.

In fact, a British collDlOdore offered Worthington

passage in his ahip to Lima.)
Worthington estimated San Martin more liberal than Cochrane who, while
prof'essing great admiration for civil liberties. insiated upon blockading
Peruvian ports to American di8advantage. 4 The blockade viewed from the
revolutionar.y angle .aa'not rigid enough, f'or it permitted a considerable
sale of' arms and munitions to the Ro7alista by the British and Americans.
Juan Thwaites so advised San Martin on March 16, 1819.'
The damaging results of' a contraband trade with the Royalists under the
very prows of' the Chilean squadron and the conatant barrage of' complaints surrounding this trade brought about a more firm blockade declaration on March 1,

2.
IllSM, VI, 414-15, Guido to San Martin. Sept. 2, 1818; Ibid., )05, Guido
to San iartIn, Sept. 9. 1818; Ibid., 314-17, Guido to Supre~irector of the
United Provinces.
3.
u.S. Ministers Argentina, October 22, 1818-Apri1 8, 1820, Worthington to
Adams, Oct. 22, 1818.

4.

~., Worthington to Adams, January 26, 1819.

5.

~,VIII, 249-50; ~., 252-53, Tbwaites to San MartIn, April 10, 1819.

l

l"""""""'lII

-

207

1819. 6 The tormal decree provided tor the bloekade of the whole coast of
Peru; all vessels were strietly prohibited fro.

arrr

I

eOJlllllereia1 traffic in

the designated area} neutral or friendly ships anchored in the royalist
harbors had to leave wi thin eight days J neutral nags were not permitted to
earry property belonging to the Royalists; neutral ships sailing under Al.se
or double papers were liable to contiseation as enelV goods} neutral ships
harboring officers. aa,sters, supercargoes or merchants subject to the Spanish
ldng 'WOuld also be restrained and sent to Valparaiso for judgement according
to the Law of lations.

On April 20. 1819, the Supreme Director of Chile.

O'Higgins, issued another deeree Which provided for the closer surveillance

ot all Peruvian ports. 7 Atter a brief statement eondemning the oppressiveness
of Spanish commercial monopoly "Which is carried on to the prejudice of all
the other Mercantile lations of the World" the April 20 deeree virtually reiterated the stipulations made on March 1.

This was a difficult project to

put into operation since the Chilean squadron lac ked ships.

Two specific ·Mercantile lations·, Britain and the United States. found
the new restrictions more obnoxious than the old.

Deblois' Macedonian Journal8

verified the exemptive nature of this ship's eruise in restricted waters.
While Deblois referred to the protection of whale fishing. he thought that
one or two warships ·constantly on this coast I! 'WOuld do much toward freeing

6.
Odriozola, Doc um.entos, III, )59-)60, signed. by Cochrane.
is found in British State P!Pera, 1818-1819, 1110-1111.

An English COPY'

7. U.s. Consuls B.A., January 10, l81B-.1une 16, 1821J English copy is in
British State Papers, 1818-1819, 1110-1111.
8.

Deblois, Private Journal dface<ioniana, 1818-1819:1
1818-1819" Karch 31 .. 1819.

I
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.American merchant ships from insult and plumer.
The attitudes and policies of American commander. were not always con-

sistent.

The middle of April, 1819, Captain Downes of the Macedonim was

requested by the Chilean government not to enter Callao until his return from
the Northwest Cout. as it might prejudice tm. cause of the revolutionaries.

I

Down.s replied to the Secretary of State, EcheverrIa, on April 20, 1819.. that
he would delay his visit to Callao as requested. 9

On April 2), 1819, however,

Downes proteated to O'Higgins against the blockade stating that United States
ships should not be excluded from the Peruvian coast unless the port was
10
specifically blockaded.
This was not the only letter in which the legality
of the blockade was made dependent upon its effectiveness.
Downes objected to the

R~a1ist

A month later,

molestations of U.S. ships and made it quite

clear that the object. of the laeedonim was "to protect American vessels
trading in this area."ll JIost eertainl,.. this "trading- was contrary to the
principles of the blockade announced by Chile and enforced b)" Cochrane.
Deblois lamented that the blockade would "plq the devil 'With mereh. t vessels"
a8 ships of all nations were proh1bited from entering any Peruvian port. 12
What kind of game was Downes engaged. in when he seemed to abide bY' Chilean
wishes and then proceeded to argue the legalit)'" of their position?

9. Captains' Letters, V01UM 4, Echeverria to Downes.. April 11.. 1819, coP)"
destined for O'Higgins; Ibid ... Downes to Echeverria, A.pril 20, 1819.

O'Higgins, April 2). 1819.

10.

.!2!!!.,

Downes to

11.

~.,

Downes to Pesuela, May 2), 1819.

12. Deblois, Private Journal dlscedoniana, 1818-1819, Konday, Kay 24, 1819.
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Little.
Little, if anything.
anything, is hLlOwn regarding San Martin's verbal statements
concerning this blockade.

In sending a copy of the blockade decree to the

Supreme Director of the United Provinces he failed to make his opinions

known. l )

O'Higgins was not so reticent in his proclamation to the Peruvians

issued probably sometime in May 1819. 14 Reference was made to nations who
vied with each other to bring products of their country, their knowledge,
their arms and even their personal aid to the independent United Provinces
and Chile.

however, failed
tailed to cover up the stark reality
Such pronouncements, howeTer,

of a commerce regulated to suit Chilean poliey.

Perhaps a big factor behind

San MartIn's "silence lt was the poor state of his health which coulrl well have
limited his activities and to which he himself

ar~

ethers alluded more than

l
15
onee.
onee. '

San Marth
Martin realized the importance of a free Peru.

8S

did Cochrane, but

the two men differed about how this independence YlOlild be achieved.

Ii

Of the

tw'o, Cochrane was most vocal about the clash between them, San Marth choosing
to operate through 0 'Higgins and Guido.

Thus while 0' Higgins and San
Sall .MartIn

expounded the glories of unrestricted trade, free of Spaniah monopoly, Cochrane
was busily engaged in preventing any British or American trade with Peru.
Although not altogether correctly. American agents complained that not only

13.

I!ASK,

IV, 444.
444, to lupreme D~tor, April 30,
30. 1819.

14. u.s.

Ministers Argentina, October 22, 181S-April
l81S-April 8, 1820, OtHiggins
O'Higgins to
the Peruvians,
PeruVians, trans., n.d.

15. DASM, IV,
IV. 46"
465, San Yart!n to Ministro de Estado,
Estado. Don J. EcheverrIa,
Kay 2),1819; Special Agents
Agent. Prevost, Biddle,
Biddle. Dorr, Prevost to Adams,
July),
July 3, 1819.
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san hrt!n but the Chilean r:overntnent and Cochrane favored the British.
Robinson insisted that new Chilean tariffs gave the British an edge and that
Cochrane displayed a good deal of national teelinv. probably keeping "a return

hOme and a restitution of his lost honors in view. ft16
to frighten American warships he failed.

If Cochrane intended

The Jlacedord.an cruised t.he eoast

of Peru to watch him and protect American ships on the coast.

Downes was

convinced that Cochrane's leeline's were hostile townrd Americans "in the
extreme" and that Cochra.ne would "throw every obstacle possible. ln the way
of our commerce on the coast of Peru •••• ,,17

In communication 'With the

commander of t.he Galvarino. one part of the Chilean squadron. Downes was
assured that Cochrane d~.d not intend to enforce the Peruvian blockade

t()

the

full extent of the proelamati on. What Cochrane really intended was often a
matter for speculat.ion.

1
1
1

Most likely it was to blockade Lima and those ports

before m.ch he wOllld have a competent force.
Examples of his activities are many.

On November 9_ 1819, Cochrane

c hall€nged Downes' concept of the bloc leade arming himself w:tth extracts from
the Law of Nations. 18 Downes replied the same day attaelrlng extracts from
S'!r W. Seott. 19 Cochrane insisted that durillf. a blockade the enemy could not

,

be aided in any way; a nation was not to carry on trad.e in grain, or carry

16.

Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, July 29. 1819.

17.

Captains' Letters, volume

4, Oct.

20, 1819.

18. ~ •• vo1UJ1e 1, Cochrane to Downes, Iov. 9,. 1819.
19.

.!2!£.,

IkMnes to Cochrane, lov. 9, 1819.

r __--------------------~

,I,
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enemy property or carry on commerce with a blockaded port.

Downes demanded

that before a blockade was errective it had. to be declared for all n a t i o n s . li

!

I:

and had to have an adequate rorce to make it bind.

Because of the antagoni8lll

existing between Downes and Cochrane, there was mcuh to support the contention
made by" Lt. Charles Gauntt of the ~edonian on November 9. 1819.

Gauntt

believed that Cochrane intended to sink the Macedonian if she attempted to
enter Callao which was blockaded by a Chilean rorce.
possibility but prepared for battle.

Downes questioned this

All men alerted and guns manned, the

1Aacedonian must have impressed Cochrane, for Gauntt reported that Cochrane
"hailed us shortly after, and wished us a pleasant passave to our anchorage. ft2
Apparently, merchant ships were far better prey than warships.
opinions on this matter were not available.

San Martinis

How closely did Cochrane follow

orders issued by the Chilean government and how far did he respect the wishes
of General San Martin?

One thing is certain, O'Higgins disapproved of cap-

turing veseels not laden with

&rillS

ror the Royalists. 2l

It is also a fact

that both O'Higgins aDd San Martin had paid a call to the Vacedqnian on
August 11, 1820, and had been received with a 21 gun salute. 22 furthermore,
there were other conversations between Downes and O'Higgins which dealthwi_th
the ticklish problem or the blockade.

Earlier. O'Higgins requested Downes

not to proceed to Lima until the liberating expedition arrived.

In mid-August

20.

Gauntt, Private Remarks, 69-70, Iov. 9. 1819.

21.

Special Agents Prevost, Biddle. Dorr, Prevost to Adams, llarch 29. 1820.

22.

Gauntt, Private Remarks, 91. Aug. 11, 1820.
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Do1me.

i~

it he could go to L1_ to attend. to American mercantile

interests it the liberating terce was there, and O'Biggins gave hi. ap....

proval. f )
Howeftr a tree Peru

o'Biggins

ftS

&till in the tuture and to deal wi til the pr.Hnt

i.sued another blockading deoree on August 20. 1820. 24 Tn. decrM

forbade 8%17 trade with the eMII1 under the pe%lll.ty ot Hizu:re.
other minor change., there

lI'a8

Along with

a major change in the cOl'IIIIereial polie1' o.f the

Chilean tore.s during the a_palgn, nam.el,. tbat all porte or eo.ats 'Ullder the
1lImedlate infiuence or protectionot the ll'bltrating arrq .ere declared tree
and l:mllpt from the blockedl'h

!he PeJ'Uvian expedition represented relat1veq vast financial n.c1"lt1oe
tor Chileans.

In view ot the complaint., Ian Karth received he pl'Oldaecl to

repq the Chileans at -the first place be oonquers_ ,,2, lot on1.7 were the
Chileans drained -to the la.t cent· but acoord1Dg to Gauntt of the

!!9ed.or4az!.

experienced lION oppre•• h>nthan under the Spanlard... .!htt Chilean

plic" 0 _

to the attention

ot -Reyxaold." who wrote OtHiggina in late SeptEl111ber questJ.C!IdrII

'an Marth'. eooncm1c poltcie••16 a.p1Olds clearly LJtateci that i t San lart.h
from the tirst day had. pel'llitted a tree flow ot trade there would have bee.

great amount. of
tel'1"ed to

ape.

mo.,.

COIling IJ):to the i:reuury.

Instead., San

Mart1n

pre-

111. U. finding _ _a to prevent the contraband trait..

ftd.a

'UC. 18, 1810.

2).

Capt.aiu t Litter., 'Y01.. 1, :Downe. to OtHigg1u,

24.

Brltiah State • • • 1820-1821, 1218-l22O.. Alii. 20, 1820,Capta1u'
vot.. J, ..• to 8aith !hoJIpecn, AuI. 22, 1820 and Decree.

Lettera,

2,. Gautt, P.r1vat. leu.rk., '2-93, .lUl-. 21.. 1820.
cion tibertadora, II.. 21)9~, "Un d1at1Dn1do e.trwero que
M::t:.o) 811 • C e • o
que e.1"1b1a IIil e1 castellano,· to thi

26 •. hlnea! I

>

'''';''!'I'~

I""'"
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letter

clear~

blames 3an MartIn for the stagnant Chilean commerce and

attributes much influence to him.
In the meantime, Jan Mart!n had landed in Pisco and addressed himself to
the Peruvians promising to fulfil their expectations of freedom. 27 Prevost
advised Adams on September 28, that unless a material change took place at
Lima during his absence, the Chilean expedition would 8acceed. 28 Following
the troop landings cae the rumors "that a monopoly of the trade of Peru for
a specific period after the independence of that province shall have been
established has been granted to several individuals who furnished money I
29
proviSions, arms ••• for the expedition."
Tbe estimate of the Chilean debt
was between one and a half to two million dollars raised through forced loans,
contributions and exactions. Apparently foreigners could not engage in the
coastal trade) Chilean produoe would not be exported for some time either to
30
Peru or ports north of Peru, and duties continued to be exorbitant.
Robinson told Adams of a possible cooperative effort between San MartIn and
BolIvar to free New Granada and the West Coast of l-Iexico. 31 Robinson judged
that suoh plans would involve a blockade of nearly the .hole Pacific coast

27. Thomas Sutcliffe Sixteen Years in Chile and Peru 1822-1839 (London,
[1841J), 43, San MartIn to Fe'opie at Hsco, Sept.,-rB2'OTO'driozola, Documentos~.
IV, 33-34, San MartIn to the Inhabitants of Peru, ::~pt. 8, 1820.

28. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, Sept. 28, 1820.
29. Robinson Papers, volume " 1820, 1824, Oct. 2, 1820, letter had this
information in a postscript dated Oct. 7, 1820.
JO.

~.

31.

~.
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nth the exception of Chile. Naturally this would conflict with the commercia

\

interests of neutral vessels.

'mersfers,
'merefere, Robinson advised Adams that a

greater American naval force would be "indespensable necessary."

The efficacy

of the American ships cruising along the Peruvian coast in 1820 cont.rary to
the decreed blockade could
oould not be doubted. Gauntt of the :'1acedonian recorded
attack
a meeting with the Chilean sQuadron. 32 Downes expected the Cochrane to attaok
the shipping at Callao and so rushed to the protection of American merchant
anohored there.
ships anchored
her protection.

Following the Maoedonian, all the American ships sought

The strategy worked and a frustrated Cochrane headed away

£rom Callao.
from
Ha.ving successfully landed at Pisco, San Martin issued a decree governing
the commerce for Peruvian ports under his control. Dated October 21, 1820,33
and countersigned by IJarcia del Rto, the decree promised to benefit free
commerce and to promote agriculture and industry so long stified by monopoly.
All ports under the protection of the liberating armf were to remain open
to commerce of all .friendly, neutral nations under the following conditions.
foreign goods brought in foreign ships were to pay an import duty of 20 per
cent of the total value of the invoice presented by the importer; foreign goods

32. Gauntt, Private Remarks, 97, Oct. JO, 1820.
33. SpeCial Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, San Mart!n decree from Pisco,
ori;~inal copy in Spa.nish can be found
Oct. 21, 1820. This is a translation, ori;~ina1
in Peru, Archivo Historico, Ministeno
Ministerio Hacienda y COM3rcio, O.L. 1-1. Future
references to manuscripts fro~ the above archives, which are on microfilm,
will simply be designated as Ministerio de Hacienda. Manuscripts used were
located through Cata1o~o
Catalo~O de 1a
la Seecion
Seccion Republicana
Republicans 1821-1822, Archivo
Historico, Ministerioe Hacienda y Comercio, Republ!Oi orer-Peru (Lima, 1945).
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imc)orted in ships
to'~al

f~!'inG

value; productions

an "indepfmdentrt flag i)uid only
0.['

15 pGr cent of the

inde,endent countries introduced in foreign

vessels were to pay only lS per cent of value listed on the invoice; products
of independent countries carried in ships f'13ing an

indep(~ndent

flag paid

only 10 per cent; quicksilver, <%,?!'icul tural and mining tools, articles of
war, books, scientific instruments, printing presses and machinery were to be
free of all import duties in the stipulated ports; domestic commerce of the
country under the control of the liberating armf remained

SUbjl~t

to existing

regulation; coined silver which could be exported from liberated ports paid
only S per cent and coined gold 2 per cent duty; plata pina paid export duty
expori
of 10 percent and virgin gold 7 per cent; wrought silver was assessed an expol"
duty of 8 per cent of market value and wrought gold

.5 per cent; all other

Peruvia.n products exported in foreign ships under foreign nags were to pay
one third of the duties established, some products exported in

shi~s

with

independent flags was to pay one-half of the duties assigned} merchants importing and exporting in the designated areas upon presenting the invoice had
to take an oath that the prices stated therein were legitimate and the "least"
fraud woul.d subject the entire cargo to confiscation; the payment of >!uti6s
was to be completed in three stages: the first in JO days, the second in 60
d~s

and the third

p~ent

in 90 days from the date the invoice was presented

by the m;3rchant; arr:I discrepancy in either quantity or quality of the cargo
listed would incur confiscationJ if the owner of the cargo also happened to be
the owner of the ship, it too was subject to confiscation; if the offense
were

repr~ated

a prison term of two months would be imposed and the merchant

violating the laws would not be able to continue his trade either

,I

I'

r

r'
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activelY or passivel1; though the political and militarj situation of Peru
did not then permit complete enforcement of the decree nevertheless it would
remain subject to reforms and additions a.s :m.lbrht be required "without contradictin,;; the liberal principles herein announoed •••• "
'the lure of forbidden trade, however, with its rich rewards tempted many
merchants and ships to run the blockade.

In November of 1820, Cochrane

plundered American goods) ships and money.34 Part of the mon~J had been in
the hands of El1pha.t Smith, master of the Maoedonian, a.nd part on board the
Frenoh brig Gazell!, Captain Rouxell.
$62,000 belone;ing to Amerioan citizens.

From the latter Coohrane "acquired"
Cochrane seized the Gazelle on the

charge thnt it was privately owned, was property oaptured on an enenf3' ooast
without any ostensible owner, and because it had defied the blookade.

Coohr

insisted the money was "privately shipped" to prevent its confiscation under
the municipal laws of Peru.

Did Cochrane mean the laws of Peru as interpreted

by the deoree and the blockade?

It

w~uld

seem so, for

~th

first tried to

sell his cargo in Valparaiso and then had to sell it in Lima. though expressly
forbidden by the new decrees.

In some instances he did not adhere strictly

to the proscriptions of the blockade.

For example, Guarmey was not blockaded

and Cochrane permitted all neutral vessels to go there exempt even from the

paper blockade.

Smith's experience led Downes to inform Smith Thompson on

November 20, 1820, that American ships required the Macedonian.s protection
ar;ainst Cochrane. 35 Cochrane had too few ships to polioe the extensive coast

34. U. S. Consuls B. A., January 10, 1818-June 16, 1821, Forbes to Echeverria,
Nov. 16, 1820.

.,
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north and south of Callao.

Still foreign merehants
merchants objeeted
objected to any
a:rI3 blockade

.hich
.h1ch threatened a profitable eontraband trade.

I

I,

British ships objeeting
objecting to

eheck took advantage of a Spanish lieense
license but found themselves often deany eheek
commanders faced with the necessity of defending
tained and seized and their eommanders

'I'

il",

Dri tish eommercial
commercial interests.

The m.erchants who hoped for a free market in
I,i

II!i

a liberated Peru ·were filled with exasperation by San Martin's Fabian
tacties.tactics._ 36 John Begr, who was involved in eommercial
commercial activities in Chile and
hoped to embark on a trip to Lima, on arrival at Guayaquil in 'ebruar,y, 1821,
found the port open Hbut under prohibitive duties on foreign trade."

In

~

of 1821, Beg@' wrote to Paroissien that "The system your head man has adopted.
for procrastinating the war ••• has not been attended with the great results
expeeted."

Begg then added that "had not this bloekade of the Coast been

abandoned you would ere thia have seen a British squadron in front of Callao
and the port open to even contraband of war.,,37

b1aedtbr much
San Martin, blaedtbr

of the disordered eo.eree,
comeree, rightly or wrongly, was eOgnizant of the mereanti1e speculations attending the Peruvian venture. 38
llueh of what Coehrane did on his own initiative

W&8

blamed on San Jlart!n.

When the Louisa was detained by the Chilean squadron, Downes proteated to San
MartIn who replied on December
Deeember 27, 1820, that he only had powers over the
squadron's movement in military affairs)9

t.

However, San Martin promised to

36.

Humphre7s, Liberation, 91, footnotes 4, 5 and 6.

37.

.!2!!!.,

38.

Bulnes, Espedicion Libertadora, II, 15, San MartIn to Zenteno, Dec. 3,182

39.

Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, San MartIn
Martin to Downes, Dee. 27, 1820.

92, footnote 1.

Ii
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see to it tnat American ships should receive a fair trial and be set free if
Papers were in order.

Downes wrote to San Martin for a specific commitment

on December 25 but San Mart!n had lett without giving Downes
an....er.

a~

sat.isfactoI7

Downes then sought the release of the Louisa through other channels;o

On Februa17 21, 1821, he wrote to O'Higgins regarding this ship.hl

ae

accused

Cochrane of wanting to destroy American co_erce on the. Pacific coast and the
ruination of Louis.t. cargo.

Part of this cargo consisted in 1,000 muskets

boand for the Coluabia River. h2 The.e incidents aarrounding the detention of
the Louisa took plaoe at Huacno afld were also recorde'.i by' Gauntt of the:
Macedonian.
J.

Gaunt.t reported that. beside. Chilean transport..
there were
,

.e...er.l British ships ami the A.merican Loui.a, Capt. Hicks, in Huacho, all

de\a1Ded b7 the order of Lord Cochrane, charged with c&n7ing cOlltraband goods.
The Kacedonian and. .Do1roea were

primari~

interested. in securing the Louisa'.

release. Sinee San Hartin wa.e gone, lJOwD••

1IU

determined. to take this ship

ou.t under the Macedon1an's protec1.;1on, therefore, on December 29_ 1820, at
1 p.m. the HacedoniaB succe.sfu.llJ escorted the Louisa
out of Ruaeho although
,
followed. by the Chilean Lao.taro.1.3 EarUer correspondence between Downes and
San Martin concendrJg the Louisa i8 a180 iuteresting. The Louisa ~ad a cargo

40. Captain's Letters, volume 3, 1821.

41..

~., Do1mes

42. !2!2.,

Ilotrnle8

to O'Higgins.

to PreYOst, 'eb. 24, 1821.

43. Ga.unt.t, Priva.te Remarks, 109, Dec. 28, 1820) also
1820.

~.,

110, Dec. 29,
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amounting to ;$1.00 .. 000 some ot whieh was in the form of perishable goods. 44
According to Downes .. the 3an Mart1n pledge would app~ on17 if the Louisa's
cargo was sUch that it would not indicate probability of oondemnation. 4S

Downes objected to suoh a stipulation.
By January, 1821,

the whole coast

frOll

Guayaquil to Atacamta, excepting

the capital, had been Uberated and opened to oo_&rce. Prevost wrote ldams

on that subject stating that this commeree would be charged a duty ot 20 per
cent upon the invoice prices. 46 In February ot 1821, h? the Chilean. senate had
approved a decree whioh cha.nged' the duties on exported

~!OOd8

to Peru. A

February 8, 1821, deere. reserved to nationals the exportation ot Chilean
goods to tree Peruna POl"ts and reduced by o__third the export duties on
fioa.r and other goods. b8 '1'be Chilean :~overnment also issued licenses to trade

in Peru.u9 Robinson told Adau the coasting trade could probably be carried
on 1>7 neutral ships until the patriot governaent would oontine it to their
own ships soon atter the tall of

Lima.SO In that e'f'ent, the trade would

then.

44. Captains' Letters, volume .3, Downea to san Mart!n , Dee. 26, 1820.

45. Ibid., nowes to San Mart;!n,

Dec. 28, 1820.

46. Special Agenta Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Pr8'V'oat to Adams, Jan. 6, 1821.
47. En.oina,B1atoriaChile, X, 177.

48.
49.

-DA.*. VIII, 10, Oochrane to San Mart!n, Feb. 16, 1621, refers
Ibid.

[Konten~j carrying

to

wheat, .!!?!2,., Coohrane to San MarUn, Feb. 16, 1821.

SO. Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adus, Mar. 7.. 1.821.
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be

eal~ried

on by "naturalized foreigners."

Prevost speculated, reporting to

Adams in Maroh that as soon as tiTl1& fell to San Mart!n it would be open to
commeroe.51 In this tetter Prevost also noted that French ships of war had
arrived in Chil.ean waters.
Cochrane's activities in 1821 oontinued to harass the British and
Am.erieans. At times he permitted contraband runners to esc<\pe after al.lavia:t...
ing the desperate oondition

ot his squadron

w1th oonfiscated gOOds. 52 More

nUllerous were the oooasions where be l.auncbed tirades ,g,gainst ships defYing
tb9 blookade. 53

'!'be United gtates did not admit the blockade but Captain

Ridgely of the ............
U.9.3. Constellation wa.s told to avoid all coll.ision with
Cochrane and to protect on~ tbe Amerioa.n 0 ause-commerce. Sh How Ridgely or
other American naval commanders could have avoided an open collision with
Cochrane undertbe eircwnstances is hard to envision.

Of' course, Cochra.ne

was quite willing to permit trade f'or a price. Prevost heatedl¥ inf'ormed

Adams on Jul;r 6, 1821., that Cochrane had been selling licenses to trade along
the ooast and in one instance gtv1n.g permission to proceed. to Lima.55 '!'wo
aMps were singled out as examples.

the Robert Forge

or

Liverpool had paid

upwards ot $19,000 and the Rebeoca nearq as moh tor trading priv1leges. A

51.. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, Mar. 10, 1821.
52. Bulftes,Es2edtci&n Libertadora, II, 118.

53. DASM, VIII, 310, Cochrane to sa Martin, Mar. 13. 1821.
54. Private Letters, Navy Department, February 1, 1813-Janua.t"T 20, 1840, 319,

SDdth ThompSOtl to Charles R14ge'b', Mar. 22, 1821. A similar order went to
Charles Stewart of the t.rankl.1n, 324,27, Sept. 8, 1821.

55. Special 19ents Prevost, Biddle, DolT, Prevost

to Adams, July

6, 1.821..

p
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most unpleasant feature of this news flas that the British were the reci.pient.
of Coctrrane's renerosity and Prevost insisted this information should be

transmi.tted to the Chilean government and Cochrane's removal insisted upon.
The Admira\ Cockburn was also granted a license from Cochrane to trade in all

ports of Peru in return for

supplyin~

the squadron with certain necessities. 56

San Mart!n's personal views in these matters cannot. be ea.sUy ascertained.
Pta differences with Coehrane over naval cperations are however, well known.
Furthermore, he was kept informed concerning Cochrane t s acti
act! vi ties th:rough

vario~s

sources, one being O'Higgins. 57 He knew that Cochrane had consolidated

his position in the expedition by courting the favor of the Peruvians who were
told to regard the Chilean foroes as liberators and friends.

In one such

address, Cochrane told of the unhappine.s pervading Chile becuase of an enslaved Peru. 58

The royalist commercial m.onopoly hampered all concerned.

was the coasting trade?

Where .ere
yere the open ports?

Where was foreign trade?

Where

Where were the factories?

Since the answer to theae must huve been in the

nepative, Cochrane promised the Peruvi.ans independence, just laws, commerce,
prosperous agriculture, all benefits cominr like manna from heaven through
the aid of tho expedition.
Th" comb:1.ned efforts of San Vart{n and Cochrane exercised ~eat influence
upon not only Peruvians but also the foreigners who speculated upon the

56. Ibid., lL9.y 12. 1821. Supplies came from lli.fman and Crammond, charterers
of theAdmiral Cockburn.

57. BASK, V, 289-90, O'Higgins

to San Kart!n 6 April 21, 1621.

58. Ibid., VIII, 16-17, Cochrane to Habitantes de las Prorlncias del Sur,
April"""Or'May. 1821.·
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outcome of the expedition. On

~pril

1, 1821, Forbes described San Martin

in less than glowing terms. 59 If one were to believe Forbes, all had doubts
vieli'S but, as for trade,
about the sincerity of 3an Martin's "republican" vie\iS
Forbes did state that once the liberation of Peru was accomplished Lima would
be declared a free port.
The extensiveness of patriot success was explained by Prevost in a
letter to Adams. 60 Districts already under control by the liberating forces
had set up temporary governments to maintain order and preserve "inviolate
private property •••• " San Martin's capture of Pisco earlier had also assured
him control of the most productive mining region.

This same letter further

mentioned the confiscation of several richly laden British mercha.ntmen
captured b.1 Cochrane.

One of these was the Rebecca. cited above as having paid

Cochrane for trading privileges. The Rebecca was captured the same time as
the Canton and found guilty. But
to San Martin and in

M~

'~revost

was confident that Lima would fall

wrote to Ridgely of the Constellation
that he would
...

visit the different ports of Peru and place agents in them for the protection
of American citizens. 61
wbile the Peruvian expedition encountered one success after another, the
blockade remained a constant irritant.

Some of the complaints reached San

Martin who was expected to intervene in behalf of the foreign mercantile

59. u.s.
u.S. Consuls B.A., January 10, 1818-June 16,
1.6, 1821, Forbes to Adams.
60.

Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, May 2, 1821.

61. Robinson Papers, volume 4, Prevost to Capt. Ridgely,

l

May

20, 1821.
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interests. 62

The British pressed their demands for lifting the blockade but

according to Prevost's letter to Joaquin de Echeverria, Chilean Secretary of
State, June 18, 1821. Sir Thomas Hardy had informed the British merchants in
Santiago that the whole coast of Peru was blockaded. south of the capital.
even though there was no force stationed at

a~

port except that of Cal1&0.63

Prevost challenged the Chilean position stating that sovereignty and exclusion
from port demanded competent force to control the entrance of the port or
harbor.
Despite protestations Cochrane continued to police the Peruvian coast and
went so far as to seize again the trouble making Louisa for attempting to ente
the port of Lima.

Downes wrote to the American Secretary ot the Navy on June 1

1821, that he had gone to see San llartin about this matter. 64 This time San
llart1n gave Downes some satisfaction by indicating that he termed the Louisa's
detention at Auacho unjust "but that he had no authority to release her."
Downes insisted that he could not leave this ship in its present predicament
and that San

Kartin give his pledge that she would either be released or sent

to Chile for adjudication within eight days or that he, Downes, would have no
other alternative but to take her out to sea with him.

San MartIn, "after

62. DASJI, VIII, .526, Forster to don Antonio Vicara, general de marina,
Indepena;neia, May 31, 1821; Ibid., )29, Roberto Forster to San MartIn,
June 14, 1821.
63.

Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr. Prevost to EcheverrIa, June 18, 182

64. Captaina' Letters, volume 3, document no. 8, Downes to Secretary of the
Navy, June 19. 1821; see also San llart1n letter, Dec. 27, 1820.

f
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some little hesitation" gave Downes such a pledge in writing.
On June 22, 1821, O'HiJgins
O'HiJg1ns modified the August 20, 1820 blockade decree
citing the principles of equity, justice and the successes of the liberating
expedition as the motivating force for the change. 65 The blockade was to be
effecti va only between t!le Ports of Ancon and Pisco, and its enforcement
dependent upon the stationing of an adequate naval force in front of every
port so blockadej. On June 23, 1821, O'Higgins wrote to Prevost informing
him of the modified blockade and reiterating the necessity of an "Actual Force
to be stationed at the sight of the Ports that are to constitute the
Blockade. 1I66 Furthermore, O'I!igi5ins indicated that he was informing Sir
Thomas Hardy "this very moment" of the change. The new decree would also be
forwarded to Cochrane and San Mart!n.
Much rejoicing accompanied the lifting of the blockade and Ridgely wrote
the Secretary of the Nav.y

th~t

the areas possessed by the liberating forces

would doubtless be opened for traffic. 67

Strict control would be exercised

over areas not under patriot rule. Ridgely's more pointedly accusing letter
described the quarrel that had taken place between San r.1art!n and Cochrane
over the latter's confiscation of $600,000.

San Mart!n insisted this money

was private property belonging to the government and Cochrane asked what better
use it could have than as pay for his naval squadron. Ridgely believed that

65. British state
of

cbIts,

June

Pa~ers,

22, 18 t.

1820.1321, 1220, Declaration of Supreme Director

66. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr.
67. Captains' Letters, volume 5, Ridgely to Secretary of Nav.y
Nav.y,J Nov. 2, 1821,
enclosed Ministerial Gazette of Chile.
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22.5
i ,'"

"I'

Coohrane t 5 conduot was "publiokly approved of by the Direotor
Director of Chili and

1

"

II'
"

, ,

the people of Chili are with him, but there is no doubt of a seoret understanding between General San llart!n & His .Exe1' O'Higgins, and Lord Cochrane
must & will be sacrificed, whenever he shall have returned to Chili with hi.
fleet.,,68
Charles Stewart, Captain of the

.!!.!.

Marth and
franklin called San Martin

Coohrane both rogues, both wishing to plunder Peru.

Stewart insisted. to Smith

Thompson that Coohrane sold "licenses to hi. agents and partners in commerce"
thus enabling the royalists to retain Lima and Callao and thereby defeating
the object of San Iart!n •••••69

Cochrane' s variance with San Martin' 19 wishes were observed by Prevost
and

relayed to Adams on June .30, 1821.

The latest Cochrane outrages were

committed against the British flag, the seamen impressed and the ships used
for transport.

The Chilean government had disavowed such action and the

British protests were loud and clear.

Prevost asserted that "There have been

upwards of a dozen English merchantmen under capture, some of which have
already been dondemned •• • 70

In his own behalf, Cochrane justified hi. action.

by pointing to infractions of the blookade.

On July 2, 1821, Cochrane
Coohrane wrote

to San Martin and explained hi. reasons for detaining the Colonel A.llen. 71
68. Ibid., volume 4, Ridgely to Thompson, June 14, 1822.
u5.
11.3 wMch i8 a duplicate of document no. u.5.

69.

-Ibid.,

This document i.

volume 1, Stewart to Thompson, May"
May.5, 1822.

70. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 826, Prevost to Adams,
June 30, 1821.
71. DA.SIt,
DASIt, VIII, .54-.56,
,4-,6, Cochrane to San Martin. July 2, 1821.
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British CoJllJl4llder Thomas Hardy, angered by Cochrane's "paper bloclcad.e"
protested to the Chilean government that the captured British property was
sold without his presence and -.ithout legal adjudication."

Having protested

to the Chilean government, Hardy then wrote to the British merchants.

Besides

tt-..e above information, the Forbes report of July), 1821, gave Hardy' 8 eye
witness account of the capture of several British merchant 8hips and the
desertion of British seamen encouraged by Cocbrane. 72

Hardy challenged the

legality of the blockade and informed the merchants that he was determined
to protect British property "afloat" but that the Brl tilh merchants would
have to "provide for their own security on shore or leave the Country as he
could net extend

a~

protection to them or their property."

that the Chilean government would "yield to the

_naMS

Forbes feared

of the British".

To

counteract Chilean policy, "the Vice Roy eof Peru. has declared the trade of
Callao and Lima free to all neutral flags •••• 1t

This same document questioned

t~~ success of the San Martin Peruvian expedition stating it "is now worse

than doubtful, it is now almost despaired of......

Forbes I estimate proved to

be wrong for on July 28, 1821, San Karttn entered Lima and d9clared the inde-

pendence of Peru.
Relegated to the last portion of this chapter are the peace negotiations
carried on between San Martin and ••Co888ive Peruvian vioeroys Pezuela and La
Serna.

It now remains to sketch briefly the propoaals and counterproposals

offered by each and to evaluate them in the light of the prinoiples motivating

72.

l

U.S. Consuls B.A., July), l82l-August 6, 1826, Forbes, July). 1821.
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the Peruvian expedition and the changes taking place within Spain and the
Viceroyalty once the campairn had begun.

Tomas Guido and Juan GarcIa del 110

represented San KartIn at the conference at Miraflores and the Conde de Villar
de Fuente, Dionisio Capas and Hipolito Unanue acted for the Viceroy.

Neeotiations for this meeting began in October, 1820, and on September 1,

1820, San MartIn accepted the Vioeroy's invitation to suspend hostilities and
di3CUSS

peace. 73

On September 19, 1820, Pezue1a informed San MartIn that he

Ti'cl;ld do his best to end the bloodshed and discord which existed. 7h

armistice was finally sifned on September 26, 1820. 75
the beginn1,nf".

The

Difficulties arose from

San MartIn wondered if the Viceroy had the power to negotiate

peace w5.th him. 76

On September 27,

18~0,

the Viceroy proposed that, during

tbe nerotiati0ns, the marit1,me activities be suspended, the naval forces be
left at status guo and not increased, number of troops be not increased and
the COlilJrterce of Chile sn.d Peru be returned to the pre-war buis. 77

The next

day the deputies of San MartIn presented the following c0ndi tional the

commerce between Chile and Peru be open and a commission appointed for the
t.wo part1es to consider a provisional commercial agreement.; the internal
co~~eree

also be unrestricted and a commission appointed to look into further

73. Lanus, IOOependeneia!!! America, V•• 65, Sept. 1, 1820.

74.
7).

76.

-

10, Sept. 19, 1820.

~.,

84.

Ibid.,

~.. 79-80, Sept. 26. 1820.

SEpt. 27, 1820.

77. Odriosola, Documento8, IV, 70, Deputies of Pezuela to those of San
MartIn, Sept. 27, 1826.

L

,

"
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agreem<3nts; British and

p~erican

naval commanders

~~ere

to be invited to see

to the fulfillment of the preceding articles. 78 On 3eptember '.3C, the Viceroy's deputies agreed thnt the com.;'l!erce betjleen Peru and Chile vlOuld remain
free in the custom and form prevalent before the war and c()mmissioners would
be named to solve the controversial issues of commerce raised during the
liberating campaign. 79

There was some disagreement as to the rights of

Chilean vessels in ports under royalist control.

3an Hart!n challenged the

legality of the Spanish constitution on October 5, 1820, stating he could not
di3cuss peace on tha basis of this inadmissable constitution. 80 According to
Paroissien's notes, San HartIn proposed that the Peruvians be allowed to
choose their form of bovernment, even if the,y wished a Spanish Bourbon king,
but insisted that th~ seat of government be located in America. 81 The
Viceroy refused to agree to such terms claiming lack of authority to do so.
VirtuallY doomed from the start, the negotiations failed to achieve peace
and San Hart1n issued a manifesto on October 12, 1820, citing reasons for
the failure. 82 First of all he refused to swear allegiance to the Spanish
constitution; secondl1, the terms were unreasonable and so he was resolved

78.
79.

74-75.
-Ibid.,
Ibid., 78-79.

-

80. Lanzas, I~deEendencia ~ America, V, 97, San Mart!n to Pezuela.
81. Humphreys, "Paroissien Notes," 265.
82. British State Papers, 1819-1820, 989, Manifiesto of the General-in-Ghiet
General-in-Gbiet
of the Liberating Arrow of Chili on the failure of the negotiations for Peace
with the Spanish Viceroy, to the Peruvians; also see Despatches U.S. Consuls
B.A., January 10, 1818-June 16, 1821, Forbes to Adams, Jan. 18, 1821.
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on oontinuing the war to free Peru.

Most unreasonable of the terms was the,

evacuation of the Chilean army from Peruvian territory and :tndemnif1caM.on
for oertain expenses.

San llart!'n made no referenee to free trade preferring

instead to extol the virtues of independence.
On December 10, 1820, Pezuela wrote to Casa Flores, Spanish ambassador

in London, informing him of the invasion of Peruvian terri tory by the Chilean
forces and the paralyzation of oOJ!llDerce and industry in the Viceroyalty. 8)
On December

14,84

Pezuela invited San Martin to new negotiations and on

December 15, San Martin agreed providing that the independence of Chile,
Bueno. Aires and Peru be recognized. 85
In a diacU8sion with Manuel Abreu, a representative of the viceroy, San
Marta indicated that the Peruvians were not yet ready to form themselves into

an independent republic and that "out of honor and deference to the Peninsula,
advantageous commercial treaties 'WOuld be made ••••• 86 General La Serna.. who
became Viceroy after Pezuela, doubted San MartIn's intentions. 87
lamed aa San Mart!.n' s deputies to the new peace conference .erer TomAs
Guido. Juan Garcia del Rio and Jon Ignacio La Roza. 88

84.

-Lanzas,

85.

~.,

Acting in behalf of

83. DASK, V, 241-42, Dee. 10, 1820.
1~20.

IndeE!ndencia de Amerioa, V,

--

152,

Pezuela to San Martin, Dec.

152, San Martin to Pezuela, Dec. 15, 1820.

86. E. Larrabure y Unanue, "The Monarchical Plans of General San llartln,"
Pacific Ocean .!!: Histo17 (lew York, 1117), 313, Mar. 28, 1821.

!E.!.

87. Torata, Documentos, 111-2, 257. La Serna to Hinistro de 1&
88. tan.as, Independeneia S! America, V, 247. April 27, 1821.

~Jer.ra.

14,

2)0
the Royalistsf D. 1fa.nuel del Llano y laxera. D. Manuel Abreu and D. Jose
Maria Galdiano. 89 Kay 7. 1821, the deputies of General La Serna offered
trade concessions upon the signing of the armistice which provided for a degree of commercial freedom. 90 A British guarantee of the armistice treaty
was sought by San Kartin. but on Kay 13, San Martin was notified that the
British Commander Spencer refused to act in behalf of his government. 9l On
Kay 23, 1821, a 20 day armistice was signed.

San Martin proposed the recog-

nition of an independent Peru, provisional constitution and that commissioners
be sent to Spain with notice of the constitution of a junta gub!rnativa under
the provisional constituion "and to invite his majesty to place a prince ot
his fanily on the throne of Peru, upon the condition that the new sovereigh
should swear to accept and maintain the constitution.- 92
At first the viceroy agreed but two days later dubbed the proposals inadmissable.

.An armistice was signed June 12. 1821, and each party made

certain that the other abide by the regulations it entailed.
articles dealt with the provisioning of the belligerents.

One of the

Coohrane kept a

watc htul eye on the loading of wheat in neutral vessels at 14011endo.
to the governor of Arequipa suggesting a breach of' the armistioe.

He wrote

He was

duly informed that the wheat belonged to Spanish merchants residing either at

-

89. Ibid., 248, April 30, 1821.
90.

Odriozola, Documento~. IV, 155.

91. Lanzas, fndependencia 2! America, V, 256, Kay 12, 18211 also ~., 257,
Diputac:ion de la Junta de Paclf'loacI6n del Peru a1 San Martin" J4.ay I), 1821.
92.

l

Killer, Memoirs, I, 289.

f

l

231

L:tma. ar Arequipa and that no part of it belongs to neut.rals.

the governor

of Arequipa &freed that. if neutrals were supplying either belligerent it
defini tely was a violation of thE' terms of Punchauca.

Cochrane left. Mollendo

but sent a boat to keep an eye on the act.ivities of this port.

Report.s

reached Cochrane that. the loading of the wheat continued so the

"!!rr Hartin

returned to Mo1lendo on the nineteent.h of June, and shipped the remainder ot
the wehat found on shore. tl93

On June 30, 1821, the deputies of San

Martin

and La Serna signed an agreement for the provisioning of Lima calculated to

be abso1uUly nec.ssary for the welfare of the 1'80p1•• 94
La Serna, now the Viceroy, addressed the people of Peru on July 8, 1821,
brealdnf down any confidence in the liberal principles held by San MartIn and
~""

the Chilean expedit10n.~'

At the same time he was carrying on negotiations

with San Martin who on July 10 throu~h his deputies sent proposals for a peaee
settlement which included certain t.rade stipulations. 96 Ap,ain they agreed to
unrestricted commerce between the states of Chile and Peru; the coin of the
independent states to be recognized; and commissioners appointed to draw up
a provisional agreement respecting commerce founded upon a liberal basis.

Robinson evaluated the armistice situation in a letter to Adams, which indic
that the Royalists wished to persevere in their allegiance to Spain, to make

9). Stevenson, Historical Narrative, III, 3.36-37.
9'1,"+.

Odrjozola, Documentos, IV, 196-97_

9~;. f!Documento8 i~dltos para 1a guerra de 1& Independencia." Revista
Hi storic a, Organo del Inst:i.tuto Historico del Peru, VI (Lill"dl., 1916), 95-97,
!jocumentos ineditos.

96. Odriosola, Docum.entos, IV, 208, 209, 211, "lH.nuta de un Armisticio
Definitivo," Jul 10, 1821.
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the1r constitution the bada for their relations wtth the patriots, and that
t:-l<~

royalists ?'"ere willing to offer free trade tc the patr:i.ots and neutrals

t1uJlon condition that the revenue produced thereby be appropriated to the use
of Collonial Gcvernment--To this overture, it is unde»8tood, that General San

Martin had not agreed •••• • 97
The peaee negotiations failed, San flartin' s military exp€dition did net.
jt'()llowill€ tb.e declara.tion of Peruvian indpendence on July 28, 1821, San A-{artin
pledged himself to guarantee the principles whieh motivated the expedition.
The Protectorate was the crueial test of San Mart!n I s convictions and inevitably of those who followed him on the Peru"dan expedition.

Brieny

stated: we know what he promised but what did he really do--how tree was

free trade?

97. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson

L

to Adams, July

16, 1821.

CHAPTER VIII
Economic Pblicy Under the Protectorate
The City of Kings watched the triumphant entry of the Patriot force. on
July 6, 1821.

Although the Royalists still controlled some areas of Peru, San

Martin and Cochrane now leld Lima and much of the valuable coastline.
situation was provocative.

The

Foreign interests iJIPatientl;r awaited the "new

order" while the liberated Peruvians bound their wounds and prepared for the
fruits of independenee.
sation after San

Martin

title of "Protector. -

Chilean backers sought their dividends and compenhad declared Peruvian Independence and assUII8d the

This chapter will concern itself only with the decrees

and laws ot his economic polic;r as Protector while the next ohapter will investigate the actual operation of trade and commerce under the new regime.
San

Martin, 'was he despot or deliverer' Be has been called both. Bow capably

did his Protectorate draft legislation during its precarious tenure thirteen
months to fulfil the promise of free trade.
San Martin issued a bI'Oad

am nower;r proclamation of Peruvian indepel'ldama

on July 22, 1821,1 and. followed this with a decree dated August 3, 1821, which
established his Protectorate. 2

In this decree he denied being motivated by

personal ambition stressing instead the need for centralizing the political

1.

British State P!pers, 1821-1822, 1270-1271.

2.
Ibid., 1271-1273. Copy can also be found in Hall, VOlyes, I, 223-26.
Hall CIiis the date as August 9.
233

lL

L

234
and military power in his ,erson.
Royalists~

on AUGust

4~

3ince beautiful phrases failed to sway many

1821, he found it necesoary to issue

Ii

declaration to

the European 3paniards which asked them to seek the protection of his liord in
safe';uarding their person and property.3

Of course the alternatives were

clearly spelled out: those who chose not to show confidence in his word were
to leave the country t-Jith all their movable possessions.

If, however, they

preferred to rem1in and continued to agitate against the newly established
government, they would "feel the whole Vigour of the laws'· and lose all their
possessions.

Hall

r'1markt~d

that the proclamation

~ave

the "3paniards a shock

from which they never recovered. n4 However, Han defended San Nart!n's
assumption of the Protectorate in
government.

vi~d

of a populace uneducated for self-

The Royalists found it difficult to adjust to the nffil reeulations

and according to Hall t 11is preci,itated "r series of despotic measures on the
part of the tJytotector" endinz thus in their banishment and ruination. 5
Sharin:: somewhat the bitter pill of the Royalists were the British and
~merican

ships confronted with Cochrane's system of "exaction or contribution.

Robinson described this offensive practice to Adams on August 2, 1821. 6 All
neutral shipsl! before entering the port of Arica had to pay 18 1/2 ver cent
duty on the total value of their cargoes.

3. Hall,

VOlases~

Once within the port itself, the

I, 226-27.

L.

~., 226.

5.

~., 229, 232.

6. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to

~dams.

ships were subject to municipal duties.

Cochrane t s noating customhouse

excited Hardy who left for Peru to see what could be done to resolve such an
unpleasant situation.

Did Cochrane proceed to levy his own custom dutie8 in-

dependent of San Martin?

Robinson claimed that neithar Cochrane nor San

Martin felt bound to obey instruction8 from the Chilean government.
characterization of San Martin 1I'a8 anything but complimentary.

His

Robinson be-

lieved San Martin to be motivated by ambition and unprincipled militarism
and furthermore, the Peruvian8 suspected San :uartin of wishing to exchange one
despoti8ll for another.

Robinson did not state whaer San J4artin gave his

b1essing8 to Cochrane's measures, but as was mentioned earlier.. the rift between the two leaders was public knowledge.

Robinson did comment that the

po1ic,. pursued by the Chilean government at this time favored the Royalists
and tended to protract the total liberation of Peru.

The Chilean government

permi tted the exportation of provisions and Chilean produce demanding a bond
that these goods would not go to the Royalists.

However, since "the demartd

is great and the prices exeessive1y high at the ports in their posseslion
these commodities will go where they are waated, and prove the incompetency
of this Chilean government to carry its partial restrictive SY8tem into
effect.,,7 Robinson added that on August 2, a British ship had gone to sea
without having posted the bond and its captain had

expresse~

confidence that

Hardy would protect his ship though it violated municipal regulations.
O'Higgins expre8sed concern over Cochrane's activitie8 which were placing

7.

Ibid., Robinson to Adam8, Aug. 2, 1821.

236
him in a most hum1liating position with the Brltish.8 From the letter it is
apparent that O'Higgins rebuked Cochrane severely I cautioning him to use
moderation

aDd

tact. In addition, O'Higgins informed San Martin that he was

sending him supplies and arms, naming Estanislao
Hall'. account

detinite~

~h

as the purveyor.

placed British merchant ships in tbe harbor ot

ABcon which 1q about twenty Jliles aortb ot L1ma. 9 !he C0!!!!l, with Hall
aboard, lett Call8.0 Roads "to be near the merchant ships,. since he had "no

business of ar:J1' consequence to transact in Lima....• While tbe Spaniards had
abandoned Lima. to San Kart!n, th.,. still controlled Callao thou.gh blockaded.
by land and sea.

Hot able to land in Callao, the Bri.tilh merchant ships

proceeded to Ancon to dispose ot tM1r cargoes. Hall bleed the present sad

state of the Roya.Ust oanse upen an unrealistic attitude toward tree trade.
Two years earlier ttclearsightedlt individuals had proposed an open trade to

till the treulll7 and enable the Viceroy to meet war costs.

Some ot tbese

belonged to the group whioh bad _st to gain from th. monopolistic policy"

Reluotant to act withou.t specific permission trom Spain. tbe local mtborlties
confined tb. . .lves to mer. discussion. While the Royalists discussed,

Cocbraae acted. 10
Once \he patriot toroes controlled Lima. Chileans who ta.vored the ex-

pedition with loans clamored tor remnneration. TheBe loans were given tlin

8.

DASM, V, 498-99.

9.

Ball,

-

,&,,8.,

lO. Ibid., 1l.6.17.

I, 2S1, Ju1113, 1.821.
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expectation of and on promises on conditions of engaging exclusive prirl1eges
and monopolies" and

~

thwarting of such indemnification might well have led

to a revolt in Ohile. 11

The Consulado or Board of Trade, assured Jos' Hipolito

Unanue, Secretario del De$pacho de Hacienda, that the people of Lima G1ected

to the Tribunal possessed knowledge and integrity and were

cap~ble

of dealing

with economic problems to the greatest benefit of the merchants. 12 Bow well
tho Chileans fared under the earliest stages of the Protectorate is not too
clear.

Robinson wrote Adams on August 13, 1821. that the Peruvian porta would

be open to neutral commerce but that merchants would be heavily taxed to gain
revenue.

Moreover, the regulations operated in favor of the people of the

country and discouraged foreign competition. l )
Hogan and Robinson added to the discussion of Ohilean commercial relations
with the Protectorate.

Hogan, U.S. Commercial Agent at Valparaiso, wrote to

Adams August 18, 1821, that an export duty of 15 percent was placed by Ohile
upon all articles shipped from Valparaiso to Lima.
to leave Valparaiso once permission to do
Adams on Auguet

80

lIany ships were prepared

was granted. 14 Robinson wrote

24, 1821, alluding to the new duties of 15 percent upon pro-

duce exported from Chile.

This 15 percent added to existing duties raised

the tariff to 26 or 27 percent.

Robinson believed these duties would continue

11.

Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Monroe, Aug. 11, 1821.

12.

Mini8terio de

13.

S~ia1
S~ial

14.

American State Papers, Foreign Relationa, IV, 827.

Hacienda, O.L. 26-2, Oonsulado to Unanue, Aug. 11, 1821.

Agents Reb6nson, Robinson to Adama, Aug.

SI,

1821.

r
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as there was great need for funds.
letter.

Then came the signifieant part of this

RcbinMn claimed that Chilean vessels were detained in Valparaiso

"to rive to those persons who had loaned money to the Government to aseist in
fitting out the expedi.tion to Peru, on condition or' enjoying certain commercial
privileges, a fair opportunity of profiting in thp highest possible degree by
their contraets •••• • 15 Other points in this letter are also worth considering.
Robinson stated that no merchandise either in neutral or other vessels was
landed in patriot ports near Callao with the exception of provisions and that

no import duties had as yet been established.

San MartIn's conduct was des-

cribed as "marked with clemency. moderation and good pOI1cy •••• ·16 A further
hteh1ip,ht of the letter 1s Robinson' s statement that 'those who gave toward the
Peruvian expedition now looked for a free trade with Lima and other types of
recompense .17
In addUion to the Chilean problem, San Mart!n received notice frO'll
Cochrane. August 29, 1821, regarding the sad plight of the merchant ships,
attributing their condition to present prohibitions and high duties.
hoped this situation would change .18 Some of Cochrane

t.

Coehraba

ambitions were ful-

filled when Callao capitulated on September 19, 1821.19

15.

Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adau, Aug. 24, 1821.

-

16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. DASIl, VIII, 343, Cochrane to San Martin, Aug. 29, 1821.

19. Odr1ozo1a, Documentos.. IV, 362; DAS, VII, 337-38; Galvan Ioreno, Bando.
219-20, contains terms of this capitulation.

Z Proclamaa,
l

~-----------,
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Kany economic problems were clarified by the Protector's promulgation of
Comercia on September 28, 1821. 20 It, introthe Reglamento Provisional de Comeraia
duction announced that this is only a provisional law, the final draft would
require tour to six months work.

Until that time, however, to provide for

the functioni.ng of commerce upon tl1e most liberal principles the following
measures were enacted.

Article 1 conceded free entrance into the ?orts of

Callao and Ruanohaco to all friendly or neutral ships coming from Europe, Asia,
Africa and America.

Article 2 required that all such ships within ten hours

of arrival to present a copy of all the carf!o carried signed by the captain
or supercargo which was then sent to the customhouse for the assigning of
duties. Wit.hin

48 hours, Article states, the captain or supereargo
supercargo wa.

obliged to name a trustee, who ought necessarily be a Peruvian citizen.
cording- to Article

4, foreign ships
sb1ps were to pay 4 real••

2 reales for anchorage and other services.

.Ac-

and national ship'

Article 5
5 required that the

trustee responsible for the ship to see to the fulfilment of all cu,tomhouee
regulations and duties.

Article 6 stipulated the L'BOunt of duties to be paid.

All goods brouo-ht i.nto Callao and Huanchaco in foreign ships were to pay an
import duty or 20 percent based upon current market price.

15

percent was to go to the State and

de consulado."

5 percent

Of this amount

was assigned for the "dereohos

Since an adjustment of prices was necessary. Article 7 provided

for the Tribunal del COll8ulado to submit to tr.e Supreme Government a list of
twenty-four merchants of integrity and ability, who would not only compile a

20. linisterio de Hacienda, O.L. 108-14a, signed by San Martin and UnanueJ
Stevenson, Historical Narrative, III, 423-25. gives this date as
a8 Oct. 8, 1821.
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list of new prices but oversee the affairs of the customhouse as to the
collection of the correct duties.

Goods imported from the newly independent

statea of Chile, Rio de la Blata and Colombia were, according to Article 8,
to pay only 18 percent import duty of which
funds and three to the Consulado.
Peruvian

l~

percent was to go to

st~te

Article 9 stated that ships flying the

nag were to pay only 16 percent import duty, 1.3 percent to the state

and three to the Consulado.

From the above data :it is rather obvious that

favoritism was shown to national ships.
As for the protective tariff, Article 10 provided that Jl1anui'acture:s which
directly injured the Peruvian industry were to pay t'ftice the duties stipulated
in articles 6, 8 and 9.

In this category fell. dry goods, tanned bides, sole

leather, shoes, boots, sofa chairs, tables, bureaus, carriages, saddle chairs,
grain shovels, and gunpowder.

Exempt from all import duty, according to

Article 11.. were all farming and mining instruments, articles of war, with the
exception of gunpowder, all books, scientific
of any classification.

in8t~nts..

maps.. and machines

Gold and silver needed careful regulation.

Article 12 abolished all the interior customhouses, and inhabitants were
permitted to carry merchandise and metals by land from one point to another
without customhouse permits, at least those goods not prohibited in following
artieles.

Article 13 placed a 2 1/2 percent duty upon sealed or finished

silver to be exported in ships of any land.

Of this 2 1/2 percent, 1 1/2

percent went to state funds and 1 percent to the oonsu1ado.

Coined gold

exported in any ships "ifas to pay only 2 1/2 percent export duty per Article 14
of which only 1 pArcent went to the consulado.

Article

15 prohibited the

exportaticn of bulk raw silver, [dlver and gold plates and €Told manufacture ••
Articl€) 16 placed a

4

percent export duty on all other Peruvian products

carried by foreign ships, ttd s duty tc be levied aooording to current market
price of the goods involved.

Goods exported in ships carrying the flar of

Chile, Rio de la Plata and Colombia were to pay only 3 3/'4 percent duties
levied at current rr;.arket prJces, according to article 17.

However, Peruvian

ships were taxed onlY' 3 percent according to Article 18.
The conduct of e,;porters and importers came in for legisla.tion.

Article

19 stipulated that the individual exporting the goods ha.d t.o pay the duties

assigned, while Article 20 del:dCflAted the method in which these duties were
to be paid.
articles

Captains and supercargoes, having petid the duties stipu.lated by

6 and 7, plus an additional 1 percent, transit duty, were permitted

by articles 21 to reimbark imported goods for ports outside Peru.
discrepancy were to occur between invoice and

c~rgo.

It any

artjcle 22 permitted the

confiscation of the cargo. provided the discrepancy was excessive.

If the

arr.i.ount was of 11ttle consideration. double duty was to be placed upon the
excess cargo net l i sted in the invoice.

Tho consignees were not to be allowed

to carryon retail operations (Article 23) as this mi~ht prejudice the cause
of shopkeepers and merchants.

Peruvian ships in Article

24.

The

ooastin~

trade was limited solely to

However, if thl s was not possible. licenses

were to be issued to foreign shj.ps provided one-half the crew were Peruvians,
and in the ease of Chllean, Rio de 1a Plata. or Colombian ships, only one-third

the crew would have to be Perurlan.

Article

25

further provided for the

transport of territorial fruits from one point in Per.]. to another, e.g. Faita,

-----------,
r----------,
r
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Huachc· and Pisco.

Article 26 forbade contraband activities.

favoritism was shown to

Peruvia~s

In all instances

and newly independent states.

Having established a basic code of

13'N8

for commerce, as might be ex-

pee ted, the San 1iartln government soon ha.c! to clarify its position with another
set of regulations regarding Peru"vian trade with west coast ports and inland
cities or provinces.

Dated October

5, 1821. this document was signed

El Conde del Villar de Fuente, Manuel de Santiago and

~~uel

by

de Barreda, and

proved that in each instance foreign ships paid higher duties than the

Peruvians.

21

For exampler the .import duty from Montevideo and Buenos Aires

per quintal upon tallow in fort:3ign ships was 20 reales am Peruvianships 20
realasJ upon other products frO!ll these two areas in foreign ships 13 percent
and national ships 10 percent; from Guayaquil, Realejo and Sonsonate, Cacao
in fore4;n ships paid 20 reales lfh:Ue the national ships only 16 reales j duties
on liquors brought in by foreign ships amounted to 20 perC'3n't Ylhj.le those in
national bottoms only 13 percent; foreign liquors broUfht from Nasca, Pisco,
Chincl'.a and Canete were charged -c,he huge amount of 80 percent.; from Chaooay,
Cha.neay,

Fiuacho, Hu.a.rmey Santa, Huanchaco, Pacasmayo a11d Payta, flours and wheat ifere

charged 24 realee per quintal in foreign ships and 0:n1y 16 reales per quintal
in na.t.icr.al
na.t.ior.al ships.

A similar discrepancy in charges existed alse
also in regard

to the products exported from Peru.

For example, Peruvian goods en route to

liontevideo and Buenos Aires in foreign Ships paid 10 percent while those
belollfing tc Peru only I) percent.

'1',,0

weeks later, October 18, further

21. Ministerio de Hacienda, O.L. 26-4, enclosure 1.

L

r----------.
243

amendments and modifications appeared in a supplement to the Reglamento
Provisional de Comercio. 22 Goods from Europe or Asia carried in foreign ships
destined for Montevideo and Buenos Aires were to pay a total of 6 percent dut,y
while those in national ships only 4 percent.

The same figures held true, 6

percent for foreign and 4 percent for national, also for goods traveling to
Chilo', Valdivia, Concepcion, Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Huasco, Guayaquil,
Sonsonate, Realejo, Nasca, Pisco, Chincha, Canete, Chancay, Huacho, Huarmey,
Santa, Huanchaco, Pacosmayo, Payta and the Intermediate ports.
The supplement contained further information on the coastal trade and
the interior customhouses.

Since the customhouses in the interior had been

abolished, the goods from Europe and Asia were to pay a

4 percent excise upon

the appraisals of the price in Lima instead of the 7 percent previously
assigned.

The apparent reason for this decrease was the shortage of mules in

the overland trade and resulting high prices charged. 23 There must have been
some complaints about the quality of fiour being brought into the country, for
another section of this same document stated that if rotten or spoiled flour
was introduced it would be confiscated and both the seller and wholesale
buyer were to suffer the penalty of contraband. 24
Also dated October 18, 1821, but listing a different set of figures from
the Suplemento just discussed, this addition to the Reglamento Provisional for
E.'uropean and Asian goods "que habiendase comprado en ssta"
esta" also shows a

-

22. Ibid., O.L. 42b-143.
23. ~.
24. Ibid.

-

L
l

r
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leaning toward national ShiPs.25 These goods carried in foreign ships destined
for Montevideo and Buenos Aires paid 8 percent while those belonging to Peru
5 percent.

Foreign ships headed for Chilo., Valdivia, Concepcion. Valparaiso.

Coquimbo were charged 6 percent and Peruvian ships 4 percent.

For Ouqaquil,
OuqaquU,

Sonsonate and ltealejo it was 8 percent for foreign and 5 percent for national
shipa.

For the remainder of the ports listed in the previous sup1emento the

figures were the amet 6 percent for foreign and 4 percent national.. There
is one more difference between the two documents.

The document citing the

8 and :) percent charges gave a greater portion of these charges to the Consulado.

In both cases the Estado and Consulado received their share of the

duties.

The specific qualifying factor differentiating explaining the

difference in the charges cannot be determined easily.
To confuse the iasue even more, there ia a third copy of the Suplemento
al Reflamento Provisional de Comercio dated October 18, 1821, which does not
contain either "que habiendose comprado en esta."

This third document ia

signed, unlike the others, by El Conde de Villar de Fuente and lIanuel de
Santiago and carries notes with the date of November 21, 1821. 26
will be discussed later.

The note.

Apparently, even the Peruvians and foreigner. were

confused aa the intent of the two supplements of October 18, 1821, for on
Rovember 23, 1821, a document sigtaed by Fuente and Santiago de iotalde and

25.

26.

l

-Ibid., O.L. 42b-143a.

.!2!2.,
~.,

O.L. 26-6, Item 4.

~------------------------~
24)

sent to San Martin referred to this confusion. 27

One of the supplements ap-

plied to goods bought in Lima (afectos compradoa en esta capital) and then
exported to other tree ports of Peru.

The other concerned European goods

wMch without changing ownership or authority (qua sin tranaferir domino se
embareasen por el Interesado que la. introdujo con direcc\1 a los puertos libre
del Estado.) were to be exported to other ports.

There obviously was a tie-up

between this supplement and Artiole 21 of the Reglamento Provisional de
Comeroio 6£ September 28.

A copy of the October 5 reglamento contained

S8Teral notes and addi tiona made probably in 1822.

Regarding imports from

Montevideo and Buenos Aires. 28 a March 30, 1822, decree permitted postponing
for one month the u
aa ..sament and payment of duties when the value of the goods
was high.

J. Jlay 28, 1822, deeree proVided that wheat, nours, rice, meat and

tallows introduced into Oallao either in foreign ships or ships under the
flags of other newly-independent states no longer were to pay the 13 percent
duty .demanded on goods com1Df, from Montevideo and Buenos Aires. but instead
were charged the same as national ships, 10 percent.29

On November 9. 1821.

sugar coming from Guayaquil, Realejo, Bonaonate in foreign ships was no longer
to be in the 10 percent categ0!7 assigned by the October 5 reglamento but was
to be raised to 80 percent to protect natiTe produetion. 30 Provisions for

27. ~., Item 5. Question raised regarding duties by Catalina,

6. Written to Administrator General de Esta
Lima, Iov. 3, 1821.

2B.

~.,

29.

-

30.

Ibid.

-Ibid.

O.L. 26-11.

1l!!!.••

Item

Aduana frqm Eugenio de .A.iBCO~.

r-~--------------------~
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liquor import were also modified.

On March 15, 1822, it was ordered that

foreign wines were to be charged only

48 percent instead of the 80 percent

previously demanded.)l
This same copy of the original reglamento dated October 18, 1821, contained five additional articles cited as Reglamento del Comercio Estrangero. 32
Article 1 provided that the abolition of interior customhouses, referred to
in article 12 of the September 28. 1821, reglamento bemporarily did not per-

tain to Iaa, Juaja, Paaeo, Huara and other villages.

Haciendas and worksh1pI

were to be appraised for purposes of taxation to compenaate, with a moderate
imposition, the los..s which the state might othani.. incur.

According to

A.rticle 2, goods imported by lIhip and then carried into the interior had to
give evidence of having paid the proper duties.

Similar proof was not de-

manded for goods brought in by any other meana or simply routed from one part
of the country to another.

Failure to comply meant confiscation.

ceptions were made with respect to accompanying invoices.

So. ex-

For example,

Article ) stated that liquor, wines and goods enumerated in the last article
of the "comereio terrestret! had to be accompanied by lists when carried from
one province to another.

Article 4 explained that the prohibition imposed by

article 1) of the September 28 reglamento upon the export of silver and
manufactured gold did not include that which was designed for personal use.
The quantity and quality seemed to be one criterion for determining whether
the gold and silver would be used commercially wrought gold and silver

)1.

)2.

-

Ibid.

-Ibid.

l

2b7
desi;'1l::.ted for personal use held to be enumerated and listed with the aduana,

or inland customs.

Article 5 opened the additional ports of Nasca, Canete

and Pacasmayo to commerce.
A most interesting decree bears the date October 17, 1821, with the
signatures of San Martin and Bernardo Monteagudo. 33 Apparently, this document
was intended to clarity Article 3 of the Reglamento Provisional de Comercio
de Ultramar.

These are the clarifications. Foreign merchants were permitted

to assign their shipments to Peruvian citizens and were assessed 20 percent
duty upon the

~~oods.

If, however, the foreign merchants

,~T'ose

business for themselves the import duties were 25 percent.

to RO into

The foreign

merchants were to make out their own invoices according to the current prices,
and submit them for inspection.

If a notable difference existed between the

appraisal made by the foreign merchants and the current local market prices
the government would levy an additional 10 percent duty upon the value of the
goods.
irlhat follows is also highly illuminating, dealing as it does with
questions that "might" arise between the warship commanders of neutral nations
and the Peruvians upon all the rights which foreign residents enjoyed and the
obligations imposed on them during their residence.

Foreign residents had the

same rights as Peruvian citizens to the protection of the government.

The

foreigners were reciprocally subject to and obligated by the laws of Peru and

33.

Ibid., O.L. 26-11a, Item 3; see also Odriozola, Documentos, IV, 392, for
que Quedan en Libertad las Comerciantes Extrangeros para
Consignar sus Espediciones a los Cuidadanos del Peru ••••
Decre~larando
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had no right to seek the jnterventicn of the naval commanders. or consuls representing their respective
law of nations.

~ountries

unless the law was contrad1ctor,y to the

Furthermore. foreign residents

weI~

obligated to take arms

to ma.i.ntain the domestic order but not against the "espafloles" as thlswould
be contrary to their character as neutrals.

Lastly. foreigners as inhabitants

of the Peruvian Itate were obligated to pay the charges

and

contributions im-

posed upon them in proportion to their fortunes and to the benefits which thaT
racei ved from free enterprise.

The very real clash taking place betw.en

foreign residents and naval commanders on the one hand

and

the policies of the

new Peruvian eovernment on the other is clear throughout this work.

this Cochrane's interpretation of the laws
above

decree does not seem out of place.

and
The

his personal whiJu

Add to

and the

last item in the decree 'WOuld

naturally be considered onerous especiallT by the merchants who historicallT
oppose any form of taxation or contribution.
of alienatlne many,

San

Notwithstanding possibilities

Vart!n needed money to maintain his government and all

available resources had to

be

tapped.

The deeree was designed to put a legal

weapon in his hands.
The Prov1.sional Statute for the government-of the Free Departments of the

State of Peru issued on October 8, 1821, by San Martin broadly indicated his
views regarding trade and commerce. J4 The preamble advanced reasons for the
Peruvi.an expedition

and

his assumption of power as Protector.

The entire

statute consisted of ten sections plus additional articles but only those
pertaining directly to trade

34.

and

commerce 'Will be cited here.

British State Papers, 1821-1822, 161.

Several articles

c:f hction II c9'l1 specifically rdth r'_'venue.
'~art{n, as

st~ted

that San

Protector, would impose contributions" establish dutie3, contract

loans and meet public
~ticle V

II.rticle III

gave San

acting on the advice of the Council of State.

a~penses,

~art!n

tbe power to regulate domestic and foreign commerce

"conformably to tbe liberal principles upon which the prosperity of the COlln
essentially depend."

San Martin cOllld also estabUsh the provisional coinage,

1fithout altering tbe weight and quality (Article VII).

Article VIII allowed

:3an Mart!n to apooint enveys and consuls to foreir:;n states and to conclude
diplomatic or commercial treaties.

In bis addresses to the Peruvians, tbe Protector extolled the virtues ot
U_berty and exph.ined the necessary reforms he was carrying out by means of
the °rovisional Reglamento de Comercio and the blockade. 3S Certain ports of
Peru were still off limits to commerce according to his October 15" 1821"
decree

~i'hich

was "to take every measure which mI1Y conduce to fulfil the

universal desire of all who have groaned under oppression. n36

This pro-

nouncement desL;nated all ports and creeks between 150 and 22 0 30' south from
the port of Caballos to Cobija under riGorous blockade.

Friendly and ne\ltral

ships could not engae;e in commerce with the proh1bited ports and those caught
in the blocka.ded ports,

ca.rryln~

contraband of wart or without necessary

papers would be sent to Callao.
Protestations by San Mart!n to the contrary, \merican observers doubted
tbe liberality of his reforms.

35.

Michael Hogan, stationed at Valparaiso called

Hall, Voya.ges, I" 212-14.

36. British State Paeers, 1821-1822, 804-805.

2,0
the transition ffOm Royalist to Protectorate government merely a change from
"national steady onpression to that of individual Despotism •••• • 37

Prevost

wrote Adams on October 16, 1821, that San Mart{n was so greatly irritated by

the conduct of two American naval commanders, Downes and Ridgely, "that it was

in agitation to restrict our intercourse by the imposition of additional dutie
the idea however has been abandoned and we remain on the same footing with
others. p38 Forbes, reportinv to Adams, October 26, 1821, stressed the fact
that statesmen in Buenos Aires doubted whether the Protectorate would "accelerate the great objects of self Oovernment ••••• 39
Hogan also disapproved of Cochrane's plundering and interruptions of
commercial actirlties. 40 Cochrane condemned monopoly in an address to the
inhabi tante of Guayaquil, probably on lovember 27, 1821, at the same time
lauding the benefits of foreign trade. 41 this is a
policy.

8Um1II&l"y

of his mercantile

The exclusion of foreign trade was not to their best interests.

Selling nat! ve goods for the highest prices and foreign goods at the lowest

37.

lianni!lF.. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 1058, Bogan to Adams, Oct. 9, 1821

38. Cruise of Franklin. Downes because of his conduct regarding the Louiaa
and Ridgely for giving Pez-uela asylum aboard the Constellaticn so that he
could escape.

39.

u.s.

40.

lIanning, DiElomatic Correspondence, II, 10,7, Hogan to Ad..s, Oct. 9, 1821

Consuls B.A., July 3, l82l-August 6, 1826, f. 12.

41. DABII, II, ,13-16. Date was found in the Dolphin Book OODlp&JV' Ltd.,
Cataloe no. 41, 1962, Latin Americar and PhilippineS, Rare Books and Manuscripts, 17, no. lOS.
-
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was the best means of acquiring riches and political power.

Furthermore,

Cochrane insisted that foreign merchants should be allowed to settle

free~

with their capital as competition was good for the economy. Regarding duties,
Cochrane urged moderation to discourage smuggling and to promote greater
consumption of domestic and foreign goods.
treasur,y.

The increased trade would fill the

Then a most interesting remark followed.

Cochrane called

Gu~aquil

the "central republic" and tiel centro de la energia agricultora, oomercio y
riqueza en esta porcion del globo." Strange that

Gu~aquil

should also be

the soene of the "kiss of death" to San MartinI s plans for northward expansion.
Confusion was the order of the day when it came to interpreting the
various commercial regulations and their supplements. Constant explanations
were mandatory and the November 21, 1821, document referred to earlier was one
example. Two of the four Itnotas" included in this document are of special
importance.

One of these notes insisted that sinoe the interior oustomhouses

were abolished, duties upon goods had to be paid at the point of origin with
attending proof so that other oharges would not be incurred.

Note number

three commented that the shortage of mules caused the prices of goods carried
by land to rise.

4 percent

Therefore, the duties should be lowered from 7 percent to

to compensate for the oompetition from sea tratfic. 42

There were further noteworthy developments taking place this same day.
In his Narrative, Stevenson wrote that all merchants were ordered to sign
their names at the Consulado "that they might all be equally taxed with such
contributions as the government might judge necessary to exa.ct."l.d '!'be

42. Ministerio de Hacienda, O.L. 26-6, Item 4.

43. stevenson, Historical Narrative III 429.
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October 17, 1821, decree with San MartIn' s signature mentioned earlier also
imposed obligation. upon the foreigners living in Peru.
The Protectorate faced

ma~

economic problems including

a

persistent

contraband trade. 44 Another problem was financial, and Abcorbe sought the
advice of Gordillo, Administrador General de la Aduana.. to see whether grains
carried by land and consu.med by the people would not be taxed.
most

iBlportant grains in question was rice.

One of the

i'he fact that the most 'Widely

used grains were free of duty meant 1088 of money for the government.

This

letter had a notation in the margin dated November 27. 1821. signed by Unanue,
which made the distinction that grains delivered by sea paid a duty while
thoN carried by land did not. 45 Gordillo vote to San KartIn on November 20,
1821, concerning the duties upon rice. 46 Still another problem concerned the
"buquea balleneros" which anchored away trom the port, sent in smaller boats
to shore and refused to pay anchorage chanrge.

The foreign ships were a....sed

4 reales per ton while the national ships only 2 rea1es ?er ton.

Although

ships engaged in the export-import traffic paid duties, questions were raised
as to the obligations of empty ships seeking provisions.

This document is

dated December 12, 1821, and signed by El Conde del Villar de Fuente and
Manuel de Santiago.47 On February 21, 1822, it was decreed that balleneros
Ministerio de Hacienda~ O.L. 26-8, Item 2, from Jose Ma • Aguirre to Uaanue
Hov. 17, 1821.

44.
45.

~., 26-7, Item 1.

46. ~., Item ), conta1.ns note by Unanue, l~ov. 22, 1821, in the margin.
Fuente de Santiago also wrote to San Martin on this matter, Nov. 29, 1821.
Fuente said the grains free if by land to encourage mule carrying trade; now
there were enol1gh~ mule ••
47. Ibid., P.L. 2-10. American "Ballenero" apparently precipitated this
di.cussion.
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coming into port for water and supplies had to pay the anchorage duties. 48
Viewed through tte eyes of the Norteamericanos, the Protectorate was
plagued by two very serious problems--Cochrane's high-handed measures and

San

Martin's policy. Hogan classified Cochrane's actions as bordering upon piracy,
"belonging to no nation", and he believed that possibly Cochrane was being
countenanced only until the fleet could be taken out of his hands. 49 Hogan
made his protests in Chile and raised the question about how responsible
Cochrane was to the Protectorate government. For that matter, how responsible
was San Martin to the Chilean government? Forbes wrote Adams, November 8,
1821, that San Mart!n tried to make himself "at his own choice. King, Dictator,
or Director,U 50 and again on December 12, 1821, that San Mart!n, "long seen
a.s

the Conqueror under the name of Deliverer of Peru,"probably intended to

take possession of the entire naval force and place it under the Peruvian flag
In such a case, "he (San Mart!nJ would have dictated the Law to Chili or
declared himself independent of his authorit.y.u51
Jer~

Robinson's observations dated November 29, 1821, are highly in-

formative about San Martin personally and his economic poliCies, as is reveale
by his evaluations of the Protectorate. 52 Robinson states flatly that San
Martin had taken much power for himself without consulting with the Cabildo
48. ~., O.L. 26-12, Item 1, point 5 of Notes to Reglamento.
49. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, Hogan to Adams, Nov. 4, 1821.
50. U.3. Consuls B.A., July 3, 1821-August 6, 1826, no. 23.
51.

~.,

no. 26.

52. Cruise of Ij'rankUn, pages numbered 1 to 6 by author but incorrectly
arranged in bound volume.

or other Juntaa) t.hat. all the important otfio1ala auch u Monteagudo, JUniataI'

of War and Marine, Oarcta, Secret.&r7 ot State, Uun., Minister of Hacienda
and Boa Uiaira all reoeive their ortiers trOll hill d1rect17.

ecollOldo polloi.a. Robin80n had this t.o sa,..

lTaluat~

t.be

the regulations governing 11Iport

,II'
I'!I

dutie., tu:e. and co.erce were clusitied .. "ftc1latirJg. teapor&r'1 m1

1':1

i

vexatious. It At tirat, llob1n&on aa1d, the duti.a nre lIIOderate but the,- haw
einea becoae alllOat prohibltifton JIUUl7 oomodi

ti...

Thue dutl•• _ " levied

at ..,.:luat1ona either eqwU. or above the market price and amounted to troa
......nt:r to eicht,. percent.

Robinaon adldt. that Peruriana had the lonat

duti.a, pq1ng two percent. l.aa than Chileana, wbile tore1rnera paid tour
percent IIOre than the Perunane, who h8d Itt" emlueive right to enter good.
at the Ouatoa Hou•• 1t The reault ot auch pol1c,. 1& that toreigner. had onq
a lia1'Md control

OftI'

ca.ercial tranaactioma.

To c01lPlioate ut.ter., the

ooamerce waa "l.ancU1d1t with ver:r little deJUnd for toreian gooda would in-

crease, the 1IIlport. would not. find an extensive urket, tor alreldT the
IlArket...... noode4 wi tb European gooda.

would suppl;r Peru wit.h prod.ions

Be ..... to think t.hat Chile

unle.. foreign

countrie. _re 1ntereated.

!he regulationa, then, 1I'OUIS detera1ne the extent. to which foreigner. could
or 1IOuld beeoae involved in t.he

proviaio~.

A. to San MartIn, Robinaon citecl his pre_nt. difficulti•• which be might
be able to work out with ChUe.

hie anr.y

.&

San

KaMin

wu becoa1ng leu popular wit.h

time ...nt on. partl,. becauee of t)'ramUcal and delPOtic ....awe••

With a little e1.lY7, Bobinaon noted that the Brit.i&h bad much better rapport
with the Ohileana than did the United. Statea cit.isena.

Specifically aingled

1
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out were the American consular agents and naval commanders who presumably
had shown favoritism toward the Royalists and used their flag to defend the
clandestine activities of American citizens for pecuniary reasons.

Also

under fire were the unadmired activities of consular agent. themselves.
Robinson believed that the attitude of the British Dval commander. had
to do with creating better relations with the new governments.

~

Robinson said

the Bri ti.h co_anders were more aware of the rights of the new governments
to protect themselves against contrabandist. and did not listen to the selfish

dictate. ot some of its citizens.

This was not a realistic interpretation ot

the situation.
On Janua17 20, 1822, Robinson wrote AdaD18 a letter which discussed the

regulations imposed upon foreign trade. 53 He especially referred to the
article, discussed above, which forbade foreign residents in Peru to claim
the protection of naval cOJlllWlders or consuls unless there was definite evidence of direct and positive violation of the law of nations.

Then Robin.on

showed that discrimination was practiced favoring the Peruvians who paid four
or five percent less, and goods from Chile and Buenos Aires also enjoying a
four percent advantage.

Then he added' "it was not yet clearly ascertained,

whether the vessels of those places, and the foreign good. which they carry
will not be obliged to

p~

imported by foreigners ••

53. .!2,!!.,

54.

f.

the same duty as other foreign vessels, and goods

54 Robinson also indicated that a tonnage duty of one

4.

-Ibid., Jan. 20, 1822.

l
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balf dollar per ton was laid on foreigh vessels but he was not oertain if a
tonnage duty would be demanded from Chile, Buenos Aires or other patriot
veasels.

Then in a rather unexpected commentary, after noting that the import

duty in Peru amounted to 20 percent, Robinson says that this duty was regulated by oircUlIlBtances and in many cases as reasonably as could be expected.
However. the government retained control over the tobacco monopoly and some
articles were still very highly taxed. 55
To obtain 80me financial security, San Mart!n proposed the creation ot a
bank and paper money and imposed new restrictions and regulations upon commer
activities. 56 A March 15, 1822, decree clarified further the eontrover.,y
which revobred around the October 18 supplements, 57 stipulating that only
those goods whioh were deposited in the warehouses of the aduana and then removed for reimbarkation would pay the 1 percent duty-

Those goods which had

been transferred to the aduana or went to particular warehouses remained in
the same category as those which changed ownership and therefore paid the
dutie. established in the supplement U> the reglamento.

Goods were permitted

to remain in warehouses for a period of four month. from the day of deposit;
i f their removal was delqed, each item deposited would be charged two reales

55.
56.

-Ibid.

)U.nisterio de Hacienda, O.L. 11-45, trom Fuente and Santiago to Unanue,
Dec. 20, 1821; DASJl, XI, 517-19, "Idea de un Banco Auxiliar de Papel lloneda
Para Lilla" written by San Mart!nJ Ibid., 520, 521, 524, 525, Reply ot Commis
regarding paper money signed by And-rii Salazar, Pedro Abad!a. MatIas Vaeatro,
Diego Aliaga., Antonio Alvarez de Villar; Ibid., >28-33, Observaciones Bobre 1a
necesidad de estab1ecer e1 papel lIOneda eii"trma.. no date.

57. ~•• O.L. 29-30, signed by Unanue, March 15, 1822.

ps
pi
I.

beginninr with the fifth month, four reales
subsequent month would be charged according

2$7
demerage on the sixth and each
to the progressive scale indicated.

it. decree of' AprU 30,
)0, 1822, treed from duties ships belongLne to Peruvians

even

tho~ part

of the crew was foreign, this exemption referring to seal ski:ru
ski:r.u

whale oU and fishing equipment.
On

~,1ay 9,

58

1822 further decrees
deorees stressed adherence to earlier
earl1er tariffs. 59

Furthermore, transfer of goods to avoid payment or transfer without proper
papers and payment of duties was illegal.

One area in which such tranasactions
tranasactiona

took place was the trade between spec1:f'1ca.lly
spea1:f'1ca.lly designated ports.

F'oreign sh1ps
Ib1ps

had to pay duties on current ll'8rket pdees at point or origin.

'lbe barrage of

decrees, however, faUed to provide al\V cleareut solution to the problems
problen\l!ll which
60
found himself engagea in pt'eparing new oonmerc1al.
oonmeroial laws.
arose and San Mart!n .found
How aaretuJ.:lJr
oaretuJ.:lJr these decrees and Helamentos lVere enforced,
enforoed, the extent of
national favoritism, and nDst 1mportan't:J.y' the effect of the laaw upon British

land

United States trade is the subject .tter of the next chapter. However,

a few aonments at this point 1t'OU.lu not be out of sequence.

If you take

iobinson as the guide, there were instances of
or British favoritism. His May 25,
1822,
conmeree was very corrupt although.
~822, letter to Ada.m'3 claimed that Britisb COI!Jlleree
.lritiah warships apparently did not protect ships without genuine British
.lritish

papers. However, Robinson suspected that several vessels and cargoes desip:nated
I
II"
"

,8. -

~8.

Ibid.., O.L. 29-hl, sigJled
sit?Jled by Unanue, April 30, 1822.

Iii
,I.

I
!

so.
50.

-

Ibid., O.L. 26-1, Unanue to Tribunal del Consul.ado, Aug. 9, 1821.
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as Bri Ush were "doubtless Spanish property.- Some of these were captured
but set free to "avoid collision with 'the British Government.

This embicility

has displeased Lord Cochrane and astonished the British Merchants and underwriters,--especially in the cases, where nearly all the cargoes were contraband of war._ 61 Robinson's letter of August 5, 1822, is even more critical
of the San Mart!n regime.

Perhaps the follOwing excerpt offers some inkling

as to how "free" was free trade under the Protectorate. Robinson wrote that
"General San Mart!n has sold the right of ).ntrodueing certain goods into
certain ports of Peru and has thereby established a p,artial monopoly in the
hands of individuals.,,62 Just

who

these individuals were Robinson did not

specify.
Sutcliffe's observations also merit consideration and part of his
diagnoses attributed San Martin's difficulties to stagnant mines, agriculture
and commerce.

Faced with a critioal situation, San

loan in England.

¥~!n

appealed for a

"The terms which these held out were not deemed too unsat-

isfactory by some of the more speculative of British capitalists, so that but
a

short while served to fill up the list of aubacribers.· 63 Still another

souree of discontent cited by Sutcliffe was thE! regulations for trade and
commeree which "had fallen very far short of the end proposed, for, by their
differing only in a few instances from the late colonial sYstem of commercial
61.

Cruise of Franklin, Robinson to Adams.

62.

.!£!9..,

postscript to letter of this date.

63. Sutcliffe. Sixteen Years. 53.
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policy, they had increased rather than

reli~ved

the embarrassment of the

country.,,64 In referring to the coasting trade, SutcUffe charged that only
national ships were permitted to engage in this trade since the duties laid
upon foreign ships virtually eliminated them from this traffic. 65

In several

instances SutcUffe, despite his tirade against a despotic Protectorate, made
excuses for San Martin, choosing at times to blame his ministers, e.g.
Monteagudo. 66 An unanticipated solution to San Martin's problems l~ in his
meeting with Bolivar in Guqaquil.

The reasons for BoUvar's success are not

within the province of this dissertation. Reasons for San Martin's failure
lay in his fiscal and trade problems, his inability to draft and enforce
commercial laws and the inen table demands for favon t1sm.

San Martin left

Peru in September of 1822 claiming to the end the purity of his intent to
make the Peruvians free.
will now be studied.

64. ~., 54.
65.
66.

Ibid.
-Ibid.,
57-58.

-

The real extent of this freedom, economic freedom,

CHAPTER IX
Trade and Commerce under the Protectorate
It now remains to be seen whether San Martin's actions mirrored his words.
Very simply stated, this chapter will cover the names of merchants carrying on
trade with the Protectorate, the ships involved, the cargoes carried, duties
paid and their compatibility with official pronouncements. Emphasis will be
on British and American trade.

Protective restrictions, frauds, penalties,

provisioning of army and navy, and monopolies have their major share within
this framework.
The Protectorate opened for business when a considerable number of tradi
Ucenses l were issued to interested individuals willing to pay for them. Juan
Gordillo was named Administrador de 14 Aduana de Lima2 and Juan Gutierrez
Quintanilla, Administrador de la Tesoreria General de Estado. 3 In keeping wit
Article 1 of the Reglamento Provisional, a list of twent,r-four merchants to

1. Ministerio de HaCienda, 0.1. 5-4, Nov. 1, 1821, cites twent,r five copies
of "licencias maritimas lt • O.L. 5-5, Nov. 9, 1821, cites fifty copies; 0.1..
5·16, Nov. 17, 1821, seventy-four "pasaports maritimas"; 0.1. 5-33, Nov. 28,
1821, forty-nine tllicencias de buques." All of the above were signed by
Monteagudo and written to the Ministerio de Hacienda. In addition see 0.1.
38-31, Fob. 1, 1822, one hundred copies of licenses; a.L. 38-224, 3ept. 12,
1822, thirty licenses "para que se sino. pasarlos a 10. Tesoreria General para
su venta. 1t The last two documents were signed by Guido and directed to the
Ministerio de Hacienda.
2.

lli2,., O.L. 1-9, signed by Unanue and dated Oct. 20, 1821.

3.

~.,

0.1. 1-5, signed by Unanue, Oct. 1, 1821.
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over.ee commercial affairs was presented by the Tribunal del Consulado for
San Martin'. approval. 4 A comparison between this list and import-export

record. indicates that many of these men were personally and deeply involTed
in the trade they were superrls1ng, for example the name of Franc isco Xarler
de Izcue.

Izcue, Comparet and Mendizabal had already been inTOlved in the

formulation of the reglamento. 5
Commercial interests found the Protectorate restrictions inhibiting and
a barrage of complaints ensued.

Cochrane alluded to such complaints in ad-

dressing the Merchants of England and other nations trading in the Pacific,
January

4, 1822.6 First of all Cochrane expres.ed hi. ftheartfelt satisfaction"

that port. once C10Nd by the Royalist monopoly were now open to all trade.
Any re.traints imposed during the struggle for independence which curbed commercial actirlties .... re merely those Itaanctioned by the practice of all
civilised state •• •

Although the "re.traint.· were not enumerated, more likely

than not it was the enforced blockade and Cochrane's own policie. rather than
San Jlartin"

decree. that "aggrieyed" the merchants.

To show his good in-

tention., Cochrane asked that the complaint. to be made known "through public

4. II1nisterio de Hacienda, O.L. 11-27, Oct. 9, 1821, to San MartIn from
Conde del Villar de Fuente, Manuel de Santiago. Para Ifectos de EDa:ial
Francisco Xavier de Izcue, Martin de Aramburu, OerOri'!'mO E.pinoSa, ama.o
Aria., Lorenzo Juan ~nacio Mendizabal, Juan Pedro Zelayeta, Lorenzo Santo
Domingo, MartIn RodrIguez, Lino de la Barrera y Hern8ndez, Juan Macho, Fernand
Ex-Helm y Oalecio, Felix Balega, Manuel Ex-Helm. Para Efectos de Chile I del
Pais: Domingo Urquijo, Felipe Santiago Reborado, Antonio Sacro.-

-

5.

~., O.L. 11-12, signed by Fuente and Barreda, Sept. ,3, 1821; O.L. 11and Barreda, Sept. ,3, 1821. Both were addressed to Unanue

14, signed by Fuente

Secretario del Despacho de Hacienda.

6.

Robinson Papers, vol.

5,

Jan.

4,

1822.

jii>
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presa" that he might answer or refute them.
Some of the official decrees no doubt hampered the activities of zealot
traders who found the coastal trade remunerative.

One such directive demanded

the posting of a 20,000 pesos bond guaranteeing that ships sailing from open
ports, e.g. Callao, would not enter a.rrr blockaded intermediate area. Writing
to the )(inieterio de Hacienda, March

4, 1822, To"a Ouido explained the pro-

cedures for controlling the above trade. 7 Two days later, a bond of 5,000
pesos was suggested for those ships which traffic only with Piaco. 8 In some
instances, the British or Norteam.ericanos the. .elves were to blame for an unfavorable turn of events.

The conduct of the American captains DowDes and

Ridgely in the Louisa and General Brown affair. and, their part in aiding the
Viceroy's escape, foreed San Martin to con.ider placiDg "heavier deaer1minating
duties on the ves.ela and produce of the U.S. than on the vessels and produce
of othtm· nations as a retaliatory measure of descr1m1nation ••• and also to
exclude the vessela of war from the ports of Peru particularly Callao •••• a9
Captain Stewart of the Franklin considered San Martin and Cochrane rogue ••
His lettftr to Smith Thompson, May 5, 1822, contained this bit of damning
commentary.

"Cochrane by means of licen.es to his agents and partn.r. in

commerc••••• was thus enriching h1maelf, while he was defeating the obj.ct of

7.

Ilnisterio de Hacienda, O.L.

38-47.

8.
Ibid., O.L. 38-49, Mar. 6, 1822. Bonds were to be posted with the
Administrador de 1& Aduana and those paying were to receive a voucher for the
amount.

9. Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Kar. 7, 1822.
General Paroissien informed Robinson of this possib1lity.

Apparently
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San Uart!n •••••10 The last referred to the length of time it took finally to
control Lima and Callao.

The Protector had collected money through plundering

"and the sale of passports" and "this money he prudently put on board a vessel
for safety, in ease he should be under the necessity of retreating suddenly."
It was this money that Cochrane seized to pay his soldiers and brought about
open war between the two men. ll Steart did not specify just what kind of
passports San Martin was selling.

Neither did he identity Cochrane'. commerci

partner. and agents,'
Prior to a detailed study of the import-export data. contemporar,r views
describing trade under the Protectorate will prove worthwhile.

tiera bluntly

criticized the San Kart!n regime for persecuting the merchants Abad!a and
Arismendi, who though men of conaiderable
considerable wealth and iniluence under the
Royalists, "had been mainly instrumental in forwarding the cause of independence. n12 tiers contended that the Protector soon found a pretext for
seizing the merchants' property_
property.

A

further charge levied against San

Marta

concerned the umrorked mines in Pasco, an Abad1a-Ari8llendi-Uv1l1e invostment
which meant a

600,000 losa. Kiere attributed this loss to the political

disturbances in the country and Monteagudo'. avarice .13
Ball's
included recounting a visit to Buecho
Ball fS observations 1nc1uded
Huacho on August 2,

10.

Captains' Letters, vol. 1, 1622, document no. 117.

11.

-

12.

13.

Ibid.

_
-Ibid.. 442-43.

liers,
liera, Travels in ................
Chile, II, 76.

-,I
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1a21, and the comment that one ship reflected recent political changes.

tlA

roll of English broad-cloth was resting on a French wine case marked MEDOC •••
the knives and forks were marked Sheffield, and the skreen which divided the
apartment was made of a piece of Glasgow printed cotton.,,14 After discussing
Spanish monopolistic policy, Hall said that "The operation of unrestricted
trade is certainly the most conspicuous and strikir..g result that has followed
upon the new order of things."lS Hall's mission aboard the COn¥3Y entailed
visiting the Chile-Peru intermediate ports inquiring about British interests,
assisting and protecting British citizens, and evaluating the commercial
possibilities of this coastline. 16 The visit to Lima proved fruitful, for
Hall found the shops filled with British goods and foreign merchants doing a
thriving business. Nonetheless, instability was very pronounced. 11 If one
chooses to look through Hall's eyes, one can see the harbor of Callao "open
and free to all the world ••• crowded with ships unloading rich cargoes) while

1.8
the bay •••was covered with others waiting for room to land their merchandise."
Hall credited

San

Martin with a vigorous policy, permitting no appeals, and

19
opening the port (Callao) to all foreigners "without reserve or restriction."
Attending

apl~

in Lima on December

14. Hall, V9Yages, I, 267-68.
15. Ibid., 313.

-Ibid., 66.
-Ibid., 64-65.
-Ibid., 71.
-

16. Ibid., II, 1, Nov.
17.
13.
19.

14,

1821.

14,

1821, Hall found the seats occupied
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by British, American and French merchants. 20
Mathison's Narrative both agreed and disagreed with Hall.

Once the

patriots controlled Lima, Mathison reported a large number of British merchants
from London and Liverpool coming into the city.

He indicated that at this

time trade was still in the hands of "foreigners and large capitallsts.,,21
As to San MartIn, unlike Hall, Mathison noted the Protector's absence at a
bullfight on

M~

4, 1822, but "since he professes to take no share in the
22
government of the countr.y, he never shows himself in public."
~n

undated and unsigned "Expos1cion" citing various Gacetas from 1821

and 1822, favorg,bly discussed the Protectorate's economic pollcy.2) The
reglamentos of September 28, 1821, October 18, 1821 and January 1822, expedite
the affairs of the Aduana and did away with much of the economic confusion.
Another ftExposicion", 24 this one signed by Monteagudo, brought out the virtues
of the Protectorate policy.

Monteagudo cited the fishing privileges extended

to coastal inhabitants and ships staffed by Peruvians as an example of economic

20.

Ibid., 82.
-Gilbert
Farquhar. Mathison, Narrative of a Visit to Brazil, Chile, Peru

21.
and the Sandwich Isl~.ads, During tEe Years tB'2T and

m,

April

22.

~.,

17,

18~~.

-

-

-

1822 {ronJan, 1825),""'"89,

-

300.

2). Jose Manuel Valega, La Gesta Emancipadora del Peru (Lima, 1940.1942), III,
48-52 iassim, footnote no:-l cites this as MemorIa'de1racienda, 1821-1822;
DASM, 1,597, probably written in 1822 by Unanue whowas Secretario de
JraCrenda.
24. Odriozola, Documentos, V, 57-58, "Exposicion de las tareas administrativas
del gobierno, deade au instalacion hasta e1 15 de Jullo de 1822." Ministerio
de Hacienda, 0.1. 38-125; Guido to the Min1sterio de Hacienda, May 18, 1822,
refers to the decree which exempted fish from taxation.

r
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beneficence.

Duties imposed upon

forei~;n

goods '\tiera discl1.ssad cit:i.ng

favorable discounts to native ships and those belonging to newly independent
states.

stress was placed upon the decided beneficial changes from a mono-

polistic to an independent state.
Compliments notwithstanding, the Protectorate found itself criticized on
many fronts.

Cochrane's aotivities managed to remain a major theme discussed

between tho Protectorate and the Chilean government. Aocused of selling
"passports" as a fund raising project, Cochrane defended the practice based
on precedent and financial need. He further excused himself with the argument
that he sold the passports at a moderate price while others exacted ten times
as much for similar licenses. 25
Another source of aggravation revolved around the poor bookkeeping
proceedures during the early years of the Protectorate. Importers and
merohants olaimed they were overcharged or charged twioe tor goods brought
into Peru. One such complaint was lodged by Ambrosio Aldunate on June 7,
1822, but apparently satisfactorily settled according to a notation dated
July 5, 1822, which admitted that Aldunate was overcharged. 26 Adding to the
unrest was the resistance that merchants showed tor rapidly depreCiating paper
money,27 and the problem of establishing rules governing ships emtering

25. Riva AgUero, Mamorias I Documentos, II,
reply to oharges of l"w-. 11, lB~2.

74,

Nov. 18, 1822, Cochrane's

26. fi-1inisterio de Hacienda, O.L. 2-40.

-

27. Ibid., O.L. 52-29, Riva Aguero to Hinisterio de Hacienda, Aug. 1, 1822.

rr
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Peruvian port. for reasons other than commerce.

28

Similar difficulties were

faced when procledu:res for f:overning public auctions were debated.

San

Uartin

finally permitted Juan Thwaites to hold public auctions and appended to the
permission were rules concerning such transactions.

Among the reasons cited.

for granting the permis.ion was the existence of public auctions in virtually
every country and the sateguarding of business freedoll.

The Reglamento de

Martillo signed by San MartIn on Januar,; 18, 1822, imposed numerous restrict
upon Thwaites and others who would hold public auctions. 29 Large quantities
of one item could not be sold to a single aource j varied goods were not to
identified. by ldndJ lots were to be numbered,
be sold as a lot but divided and identified,
goods were to be exhibited before sold so that the government would know the
ldnd and qualitYJ the action place must be large enough and centrall,. locatedJ
and accurate sales recorda had to be kept.

The government was to receive a

duty of one percent levied against the total sales.
COJllBlercia! privUeges were extended to toher indiYiduals.

On August 15.

1822, Robinson notii'ied
notii·ied .Adams that San Martin had granted a coapan,y of English
and North American merchants a special license to trade in return for "an

iaenae sum of money.·

Furthermore, San Marth was to aid these merchant.

?!with some of his vea..l . of war. lf30 The lieense granted to the merchants

Juan Begg, Guillermo Hodgson, OuAllermo Cochrane, Juan Parish RObertson.

28.

~.,

-

O.L. 2-10, signed by Unanue, Feb. 13. 1822.

29. Ibid., O.L. 29-7.
,30.

SlJecial Agents, Robinson.
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Jose RigIos, Manuel Oastillo
Oaatillo and Estanislao Lynch the exclusive privilege to
import overseas goods amounting to 800,000 pesos and 3.000
),000 quintalea of caea
In return for this coneession, the above lI1fJrchants were to put at the dispos-

ition of the Peruvian governmAnt the amount of 120,000 pesos.

Ot
Of this total,

70,000 pesos in cash
caah had to be paid i_ediatley
i_ediatle,.. with the remainder in installment ranging over a period of several months.

ot war were excluded by this contract.
of

Prohibited goods and articles

The imports covered by the 800,000

duty free for a ten percent duty
waa placed upon the total
figure were not dutY'
dutY' was
value listed in tre invoices.

Goods not sold were exempt from the duty.

The

contract stipulated the importation and sale of foods into the Intermediate
Ports under the protection of the Peruvian goyermnent but if thi.s was not
feasible,
teasible. the import and sale could take place in any other port ttnder the
dom.ination of Peru.

ot
A time limit was imposed by the contract, a period of

four months from the day on which goods were disembarked in the stipulated
ports.

However, if

th~

pooCis were sold beton the designated fClur month

period, the conceesion ended.

The Peruvian govermnent agreed to inform. port

and sea authorities of the above exclusive
exclu8ive contract.

Juan Begg apparently

32
had some difficu1ty in meetillf.
loan.)2
meetinp. his share or
of the loan.
The list of foreign merchants carrying on business in Peru is rather
extensive and will be more tully di.8CU.Sed
di.sc'U8Sed in another section of this chapter.
For t.ht'! m.oment, it is
i8 sufficient to ir.dicate that the merch8..1"lts
mereh8..1"lts cited in the

31. Ministerio
Minist.erio de Hacienda, O.L. 37-1. contract used. was
waa dated J'Ul'le
JUl'le 16,
16. 1822
although there was 8l1Other
&.l1Other copy dated June 20, 1622 in O.L. 50-2.
)2.
32.

Ibid •• O.L. 40-15, document addressed
addreaaed to the Jlinisterio
JI1n1aterio de Haciellda and

dated~. 12,
12. 1822.

r
r
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contract just discus..d were not the only ones who sought privileges.

"oll~

the fall of Callao, British merchants representing firms in Chile and el..where quickly arrived in Peru to take advantage of commercial opportunities.
In his larrati_, Mathison noted on Mareh 30, 1822, that he was "struck by the
i

mlJIber ot 8Dl8.rt ships, abounding in 'reuch silks and j .....ll.r,y, and British
goods of eTery sort and description ... 33 llathison descri~d Lima as a commercial metropolis.

British fino which carried on business in Chile or Peru

included John Begg, J.P. Robertson, Thous Kinder, Robert Ponsoby Staples,
the Iullett Brothers, and a man called J. D. Barbard.

tinder supposedly lent

DlOMy to Peru through his bankers Everett, Walker, ~tb7 and Ellis. 14 Tbe
British firm of Anthony- Gibbs and Sons also transacted business in Lima during
the San Marth occupation. 3S

The names of Henry Hill, Istanisiao LJI;1ch,

John C. Z1-.erm&ll, and Patricio L7JlCh appear very frequently in coaercial
documents and diploll&t1c correspondence concerning Peruvian trade.
San Marth's entruce into Peru did not tendnate the need for 110M,..

Docl1ll'1ents attest to the tact that loans were solicited.l6 both voluntaril,. and
under duress.

On October 8, 1821,37 Robinson referred to the exhauated

iA'
a.no
a.no".'

33. ,Mathison, Jarrative, 228.

34.

Humphre,rs, Liberation South America, 121-22.

3S. Encina, Hiatoria Chile, X, lSS.
lSS•

.36.
36. Jlin1sterio de Hacienda, O.L. 7-9, official notice to Secretario de
Hacienda sending list of individuals who made voluntarily contributions for the
liberating IU"IIJ", Aug. 31, 18211 O.L. 32-44, Monteagudo to lIinisterio de
Haci.nda, Mar. 21, 1822, regarding a loan of 150,000 pesos exacted fran Lima
merchants.
37. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Oct. 8, -1821.

r
r
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state of the San Mart!n government in Lima but believed San JIart!n would not
dare resort to forced loan. and "other oppressive exactions ft aa had been done
elsewhere.

He added that the people of Lima had enough of free government and

·protection,-

On BoYUlber

4, 1821, Robinson again referred to the need tor

IIOnay and characterised San Martin'. _uures aa judicious

am marked with

greater degree ot moderation than could have been expected,38 However,
Robinson admitted that much preasure had been placed upon the Peruvians to
raise DlOney to repay Chile.

already
This prea8UlJe waa bound to excite emotions alread1

taxed during the long Ja)ntha ot the Peruvian campaign.

"double target.· as far aa loan. were concerned.

The Engliah were

First of all Jam.es Paroissien

and Juan Garcia del Rio Dre sent to Europe for the expres. purpose of soli~

loans,

Designated as envo,.s extraordinary and minister )ienipotent1ary, the,.

Dre eaponrecl to enter into treaties of amity
would need no ratification in Peru.
million dollara,

am co. .rce, treaties which

The quota set tor the.. two men was aix

One bait for .uch a loan waa conceasion of special privileges

to Ilin1Dg companies desiring to operate in Peru. 39 Ingliah merchants living
in Protectorate Peru were asked repeatedly to contribute in the form of loana.
When the Royalists threatened Peru in April of 1822, the English merchants,
wrote llathiaon, volunteered to rai88 the neceasary funda. 40 Along with the

38. ~., Robinson to AdUl••

39. Humphrey., Liberation South .America, 101.

40. Ilath1aon, larrative, 2.54, April 16, 1822.
acription-of some thou.and dollars ••

The amount cited waa a sub-
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gathering of loans came the need to establish a bank to handle paper money

~ich apparently was operating by November of 1821. 41
In addition to securing loan., it was necessary for San MartIn to continue
finding supplie. for an

a~

still militarily engaging the royalist forces.

Among the ships whiehcarried supplie. were the Laura,42 Oaptain R. L. Lan,

the lfontazuma,43 the Hercules,44 and the llaeedonian. 4S Ind.irlduals who
actively aided the San Martin torces by supplying foodstuffs. equipment or
Illmitions included the names of Estan1slao Lynch,46 aeorge Waddington, 47
Waddington and Green. D• .,. Games,48 Juan .10.. Barratea,49 Severino and

41. JI1n1aterio de Hacienda. O.L. 9-29, signed by Ignacio Cabero, Oct. 11, 182
O.L. 11-39, Fuente 7 Santiago to M1n1sterio de Hacienda, Iov. 21, 1821.

42. DASII, VIII, 43S-36, July 21. 1821. regarding eupplies received b7 Cochrane
ineludIDi meat. frijoles. and flour.

4). timsterio de Hacienda, O.L. 20-22. JOM Antonio Rodriguez to San Martin,
Aug. 20, 1821.
44. Ibid., O.L. 13-6, Luis de La Cruz to Ministerio de Hacienda, Dec. 10.
1821.~ English Hercules, Capt. Juan Heron. carried beef.

4S. Ibid •• O.L. )8-85. Guido to Kinisterio de Hacienda, April lS, 1822.
cargo'"TiiC'luded beef. cacao and bread.

The

46.

Ibid., O.L. )8-40, Guido to Ministerio de Hacienda, Feb. 23, 1822J O.L.
38-5s;cruido to lI1n1sterio de Hacienda, Mar. 16, 1822; O.L. )8-6S, Guido to
K1nisterio de Hacienda, ~~ 1822.
47. Ibid., O.L. 38-96, Guido to Kinisterio de Hacienda, April 22, 1822; O.L.
38-119,1'l'uido to tinisterio de Hacienda, Ma7 15, 1822.
Special Ag6nts, Robinson, letter from one Englishman to aoother in San
no names given, rlMicat1ng that Game. was involved in bringing supplies to
Kendosa, Aug. 1), 1821.
48.

49. lI1msterio de Hacienda, P.L. 2-59.
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lareiso Mentero,'O
larciso
Mentero,50 Juan Jose Usandivaras.'l
Uaandivaras. 51 Lists of
ot names suPplying other
necessities, but too long to mention here, are also available in the records
U the Jlinisterio de Hacienda.'2
Hacienda. 52

The continued interest of Chile in the

Perurlan campaign i.
Peruvian
is evidenced by the contract between the Ch:1lean
Ch:11ean Supre_
Government with BaIlon
Bamon Bara. who ..... ColllDil8ioned
colllDissioned to supply the Peruvian anq.

The date of
ot thil
thia contract il
is July 29, 1822.'3
1822. 53
The t t . hal
ships
has co_
COM to investigate the documents which show how' ~ ship.
entered and lett
left Peruvian
Pe1"UYian ports, the
tlMt names
name. of the ships involved and their
_rchants and con81gnees
con81gne.s ..hich most frequentlY' a1'place of origin, naMa of Mrchanta
peared
records. persons not paying duties, cargoes carri
. on invoices and port records,
.

1,,11

and total duties paid for
tor imports and exports during the San Martin Protectom
Proteatom

Once this is accorapUshed.
accomplished. a compari80n
comparilJOn of
ot names will be JUde between thol.
those

I

III,II
III1'1
i

found in the above records and those involved in provisioning
prorlsioning the San Martin

;Ii

torees for the Peruvian campaign.
forees

How
or1&inal contributors to
Ho
.. I!&D.7
I!&D¥ of the original

III

,I,

the liberating expedition beDefited
benefited from the Protectorate! Were foreigners
permitted to trade without cumbersome restrictionl?
restrictions?

How free
tree was the free

"

I'

I

'I
I~

I'l

,0.

1.

50. Ibid., O.L. 38-210, Guido to Kinisterio de Hacienda.
Hacienda, Sept. 1. 1822.
Goodl""b'rOught
Goods""b'rOught in by the Jionteros
Jionterol were free of
ot duty,
duty. but these
tlMtae goods
gooda were not
identified. '

51. Ibid •• O.L. ,38-222,
38-222, Contract signed by San Martin

and Usandivaru,'
U.and1v&ru,· Sept. 7
1822.--:iCcording
Usandivaras wal
was to supplY' San Martin with
1822.--:iC'cording to this contract Usand.ivaras
three hundred horses
horse. within sixty daYII. The Peruvian government
govemll8nt guaranteed
payment for said horse
horae ••

52.

17. 1821.
Ibid., O.L. 4-6, Aug. 17,
suppl.I'88for
auppl.I'88for the San Martin troops.

53.

~., O.L. 5~)a.

This was a list of persons who contrib

'11:,i,
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trade'
The study of
ot imports from ~u1y 1821 to July of 1822. import. arriving

from Europe and Asi& and going through the official ports of Jmcon and Callao,
is baaed on records in the Ilinisterio de Hacienda. 54 Only names of merchants
which appeared with any degree of regularity or individuals involved in several
transactions were used tor the study.

c. . . .
SiJJce the nature and value of the c..-.

cannot e&8i11 be determinad it is difficult to tell whether or not the duties
charged by the Peruvian government complied. with the provisions of the commercial Reglamento reterred to in the previous chapter.
J.
A discussion of the

European and. Asian imports follows.

Of the ships

entering the designated ports, eighteen ....re British. fifteen from the Un! ted
States, tive fro. other countries and the

nag

of eight could not be deteradDed

Among the Britillh .hip. were. the Uly...., Laborite,

Branch,

~

~

Francis, Calcutta, Hercules, and the Laura.

!!!i.&,

Tobias, Olive

Listed as coming

trom the United States were the Diek, Mirror, Charley, America, Gallen, Panther
Theis. lLacedonla. Semnt and the Savage.
France, Sweden and Holland.

A total of

Other countries represented ....re

290.347.) 1/2 pesos dut7 was paid by

all the ships engaged in this 1Japort trade.

Among the BlOst frequently mentDBi

JlaJles of consignees were. Juan JOM Suratea, Francisco Xavier Isscue, Pedro
Abadla, Juan Begg and. Istam.lao
Abad!a,
Estantslao L1Mh.

Persons not paying duties for 80me
80me of

the cargoes were Juan Begg, Es~alao Lynch and. Juan JOM Sarratea.

the next category to

54. Ibid.,
July IB'H.

O.L.

34-4&,

be discussed concerns the imports entering Oallao

May 1822
July 1821 to April 1822) O.L. )4a-1&, »a,.

io

from other Latin ltmerican ports from July 1821 to Jul7 1822.5,
ships

new

Thirt7-five

the British nag, one the fl~ of the United States, four were

French, two 5vredish. while the nSf of one hundred and seventy-f1.ve could not

be determined although point of departure was listed.

Among the British were

the Maria, Louisa, lsa.bel Betty, Hercules. Neptune, Waleingham, Arriel,

!!!Z,
!!!z,

Rebecca, lameralda, Roberto, Catalina, Enterprise, Porcupine, Laura, Caledonia,
Will, Bet!l, Pacific, Hermosa, Elena, Leopold, Corona•

.!!m!

and V:!p!r.

Ar-

I

,1,1'

riving from Ialparaiao ore the Perpetua, teodoa10, Carmen, Perla, Guerrero,
Hermosa, Chilena, !aquena,

Tomas, and the ilinerva.

B2! Amiso.,

Rapid, Aurora. Estrangero, Rosario,

COIling from the Latin American ports Huaoho, Guayaquil

!neon, Paca8lUlJO, Piseo, Coqu1mbo, Arica, Pdta, Huanchaeo, Buenos Aires,
Panama,
Panam.a, Concepci6n and Talcabuano ....re numerous ship..

Total duties paid by

ships from other Latin American porta amounted to )86,361.2 1/2 pesos.

Moat

frequent consignees appearing on the invoices submitted to port authorities
aret Juan de Dios Zufliga, Juan 1'hwaites, Juan Jose Sarratea, William Cochrane,

O$orge Waddington, Waddington and Green, Estanislao L;rnc h, Diego Portalea,

Jose Riglos, Juan Begg, Francisco Sales Vidal, Joe' Cabenecia, Maximo Samudio,
and Samuel Prioe.

Cargoes most otten carried included graina, liquors, to-

bacco, meat, military and naval supplies and European goods.

Thera was no

indication as to 'Which of the above merchants failed to pay duty upon the
goods imported although military items ftre often eUl'Ipt from. taxation.

IIa.D7

consigMe. were from England or the United States enm though the ship. were

55. Ibid., O.L. 34-4c, JulY' 1821 to April 1822) O.L. 34a-lc.
July!!!2.

JIq 1822 to

I"

,I'll

ijl

r
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not registered to those two countries.

Many names which appeared as importers!'

of European goods were elso involved as importers of goods from other Latin
American ports.
Exports to Europe and Asia from Call&o56 from July of 1821 to July of
1822 ineltlded a list of ten British ships. eight fram the United States, with
twenty-one ships having no flag designation although destinations were some-

times indicated.

Total duty paid by above ships amounted to 106,169 pesos.

lIany of these ships carried gold and silver belonging to private individuals

as well as per80nal effects which were either tax exempt or paid very little
duty.

Other goods carried included dye., cacao, caacarilla, wine, liquor,

vicuna, and quicksilver.

On board the same ahips were quantities of gold

valued at 32,314 pesos, silver worth 3,654,591.0 3/4 pesos, and goods valued
at 256,211.0 1/2 pesos.

How much of this was taxable could not be ascertail3ed

from the official records.

!l.

Carrying e. British flag 'Were the following shipst

Patrick, Panther, Arlester, A1aerit,. and Calcutta.

of the United States included. the General
the America.

~.

Ships with the flag

MercurI, .America, Mainet and

Ports of destination were listed a8 llio-Glbralter, London, Cal-

cutta, Bordeaux, Cadis, and the United States.

trade .ere the following individuals whose names
as carrying on an import business as well

al

Participating in this export
~

have already been listed

the export trade t ltatania1ao

Lynch, Juan Begg, Juan Jos~ Sarratea., Juan Riglo8, Juan de Di08 Zui1iga,
Francisco Sales Vidal, Francisco Iscue. Diego Aliaga, Juan Moans, George

56. Ibid., O.L. 34-4b, Jul,. 1821 to April 1822; O.L. )4a-lb, April 30, 1622
to .JuI7i822.

r
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Waddington, Juan Begr. Francisco Izcue, Pedro Abad!a, Juan Jose Sarratea and
Estanislao Lynch.
Involved in the export trade to other Lati.n American ports,
Peru, for the period from July 1821 to July

S~

within

1822,7 were twenty British ships,

seven Ameriean and seventy-five _ieh could not be easily traced as far as
cnmership and nag were eoncerned.

The ships carryi!W on this kind of export

40,627.4 pesos. The value of silver

trade paid a total duty amounting to
carried was noted as

682,171

~S08, the ~o1d

personal efreets and other goods at

wat valued at 24,69),4 pesos and

1,4)0,21).7 pesos. Again how much of

_ ----

this ..... taxable could not be proven.

British ships included the John Gordon,

.......

Aurora, Oolonel Yog, J.!ereules, Karl. Per"verenee,
Porc52ine, Laura, Tristan, Sir Ft:,ancis, Hermosa

~~eea, ~

E1e~

ancl the LeoEa.rd.

United States oril!'in were the Amanda, Ma,.C',:net and the Dick.
q

'I

Begg,

...-.-....

or

Unilentifiable

ships travelled to the ports of Guayaquil, Valparaiso, San BIas, Huacho, P.aeaslU.J"O, Piaeo, Huaneheeo, Paita, Pisco, Concepei6n, Valdivia. Taleahuano,

Sansonate, Buenos Aires, and Rio de Janeiro as did tho" with Dri tish and
Ameriean flegs.

In this unidentifiable categol"J" could be found the

Catalir..a, Peruana, Mereedes, Olmedo,

!!!!,

~xicana,

Golon<irina, Rosario, Resolucion,

Terrible, Pilar, Roberto, Perl,a, ~ta Rtt!, Conatanoia, Emilia,ll Dolore8,
Carmen, Bofia, San ~u8ti~, Do. Amigcs and the Gad! tana.

The people carrying

on this trade included names ment.ioned in the other three categories: Pedro
Jo" Galarsa, Juan de Di08 Zuf1iga, Jo.e Rlg108, Diego Portales, William

,7.
Jul,.

Ibid., O.L.

iB22.

J4-lad,

JulY' 1821 to Ka,. 1822; O.L. 34a-ld, lIq 1822 to
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r'"

Cochrane~ Manuel Helmes, Francisco Izcue.. Jose Cabenecia, Estanlslao LJlDCh~
Jua.l1 Jose Sarratea.. Bernardo Font, Pedro Cr:3.Ccn. Juan Begg, Fabia.."1 a6mez~

'i

Jose Aria'''Asndi. Francisco Sales Vidal, Pedro AbadU., Felipe Reborado, George
Waddington, and Waddington and Ort'en.

Exempt from certain duties were Jose

Cabenooia, Fra.neit!lOo Izcue. Estanislao Lynch, Jose R1.glos, Juan :BeLf, Waddington and Green, Bernardo Font.. Juan de Dios Zuaiga and Fabian

a6m('..

Goods

oarried by this last grouping of ships included cacao, wines, clothinc. gin,
liquoT's. paper, tobacco,

rjce~

indigo, cotton, sombreros, coffae.. sutr,ar, flour

and European goods.

From the preceding pages it 1. s obvious that certain individuals and
companjes in fact, m<'nopoliozed Peruvian trade whether or not they were given

legal nermissjon to do so.

The same name:s appear and reappea.r with constant

regularity although others cUd participate in the import-export trade.

Among

thp. individuals conrmercia1ly engaged durinr the Protector£i.te were several who
originally contributed toward t.he Peruvt&n cam.;.)aign, individuals who contl~acted

to supply 8&"1 MartIn's troops.

The list :1ne1ttdes the names of Juan Jose

Sarratea. Paulino Campbell, John Beg!:, James Barnard.. Wil1iQUn Hodgson,
E8tan:l.sla.o Lynch~ Henry Hi11~
Hill~ Lynch and Zimmerman.. Edward Ellice, George Green,

Thomas K::inder, Robert Ponaoby Staples and J(")se Riglos.
Before
on the

discuS8i~

i~ort-export

frauds, smuggling and confiscations a few observations

trade are neeessary.

records are, they seem incomplete.

As voluminous as the available port

The natlen.s-1ity
natien.s-1ity of ships cannot be deter-

mined, cargoes are not listed, and there is no way of determining whether or
not the duM.es leTied corresponded to the pereentages stipulated bY' the

:1
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Reglamento de Comercie.

TrUI?

identification of the nationality is almost

impossible, since ships stopped at various ports but onlY the last port was
entered.

Duties were most often paid in installments and a

debts owed to the Peruvian government.

30~e

~ecord

kept of

goods entered duty free but no

reason for such concession was noted in the port records. 11any

consi,~nees

were English or North American although they used Latin American ships for
transport.

Various records show the presence of maqy foreign merchants in

Peru but there is little evidence indicating where their merchandise came from
It was also true that Chilean and Peruvian merchants used British ships to
carry on their commercial enterprise. A case in point was Juan Jose Sarratea~
A high level of

smugglin~

of the 3a.n Mart!n regime.

proved annoying and prejudicial to the welfare

Some of this smuggling was carried on by United

States citizens and reported in the Robinson-Adams correspondence. On
October 8, 1821, Robinson accused the Beaver, Canton, Maaedonian, Ellen Maria,

!!!!!!, !!:2 Catherines, ,General Brown, Sav!ie, ZephYl;-, Emerald, Galen,
1!! Plant, Amanda, !!!!, and the Stranser, of transporting belligerent proFlying

perty and carrying on an illegal coastal trade. 59 Worse than the smuggling
itself, was the involvement of United States naval personnel. Robinson
charged that naval officials on furlough bought ships, secured certificates
from the vice-consul Henry Hill, and proceeded to trade with the Royalists.
One ship, the brig vJarrior, commanded by a Un! ted States naval officer on

-

_

58. Ibid., 34-4d, one ship used by Sarratea was the John ...................
Gordon.

59. SpeCial Agents, Robinson, Robinson

to Adams, October

8, 1821.
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furlough, brought a cargo of arms, part of which was sold to the patriot.s and
part to the Royalists.
highest bidder.

Then this ship carried freit;ht and smugt-;led to the

The stranger, mentioned above, was owned by Santiago merchant

under the name of tvlO United States oi tizens and flew the fla&;
3tates with a certilicat3 issued by the vice-consul.

the Un! ted

This ship ap?arentl.;r had

Not only naval perconnel but consular agents

just be,m sold by a Hr. iiogan.
were iuvolved notoriousl;,y.

0:

The house of Lynch

himself acted as a&ents for the

~triot

the Rooinu,)U report of October 3.

an~

Hill of Valparaiso and Hill

squadron and privateers, according to

The company of Lynch, Zimmerman and Company

as well as Zimmerman acting as vice consul in i3uenos Aires,

o",~ed

pri vawers.

The names of Iquch, Hill and Zimmerman were identifiod with Peruvian trade
prior to and during the San ~'1art!n Protectorate.
Illegal traffic and violation of
cation.

co~~rcial

regulations led to confis-

The confiscat.i.ons evoked many heated arguments between the 3an 'fi:art:!n

government and the Itvictims."

The Louisa,60 Nancy,61 and the Macedonian62

found themselves in just such a predicament.

The circumstances surrounding

the seizure of the Macedonian and subsequent attempts to secure restitution
are worth investigating.

The Hacedonian, owned by John S. Ellery, was seized

60.

DASH, VIII, 374, sept. 15, 1821; Ministerio cia Hacienda, 0.1. 20-30,
Sept.-';-1821; Ru1nes, Espedicion Libertadora, II, 346-47, Sept. 15, 1821.

61. Ninil:lterio de HaCienda, 0.1. 20-50, Nov. 16, lB21; O.L • .5-19, !iov. 19,
1821.
Doc~~nt no. 58, 35th Cong., 1st Jession, 3-1 ,ass1m, Memorial
of Thomas H. Perkins to the honorable Secretary of State 0 the United States,
Nov. 31, 1840.

62. 3enate
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the firat t..S.IIe

OIl OJ'

abollt. A¢l. S, 1819, Dr the C1d.le&rl UTal. squadron.

Captain Sld.th C&l'I"iedproceecSa fl'oa .alae al.ona the Cbilean ud PC"UV"1an cou\

aDd..u
he

011

b.1e

It.,. tit aa-" wbeD iDtenepW.

oani.... ,.,

Sld.th a1caed &1IItf' the $80,000

ot tbe . .. , boa \he aaloa ... can1ed aboarcl aIlOtBer abl"

tAle .i'lreDcb bril o.e\le, which abo totmcllte 'fItq into OGobr.... s banda. !Id.a
~ 1:Jel0Q81na to

. . tbe _aftCl

..uve ot

oaptan of tM

auel.lI brotI&bt Oochr'aae 160,000.

U•

\he

!!I!!!!se' a ~..

ftMt

leaoUat1oft8 between \be

....c StatM uct 0ll11eaa g..,......... broa&h\ JUtr1iut..1.OIl of S1OL,ooo plus

~"'.

Tbo \bird ee11U.'H of

Ioll.ald.ac 1IbfI1819

~, ..

.:1urH. the

proper. took

!!!!!.te!ae .~

at. yarlou pGI'tra _ \be SOUth Aaae10a cout•••••
0apta1n 3ad.th ba4~' t1n1ahed OCI'IIti81'01al

..... aDd OU'ri.ed

o.t. .'0,000.

'lbe ....... 1at--.tJ1oa Wall

tNIO\INd

'!be ~

pl.aee

on Mq 9, 1.821.

\0 wade

tor ...

WlwD oapto.Nd -

w..

MIl' 9,

tr. . .~ in Ar:I.oa and...."
1IU

aODf'1,..W ad ree.pt ttl....

ttw a ............'1 dped ........ H. P8l1d.1ut,

who wl\h Joha S. 11la7 waa· ........... of the ~ . . . . . . leis. ia 1811
and bad .. 1nt«ut

s.r. _. 1821 P"Oi1te.

tbe . . . . . .tv.a\ton becoM. . . .

. . . e.,u.oaW ",*,QapWa SIll"'"'. 1....1......' wi'" ........'" Abadl&
aact Ari--.ti ....

to'U.lJa'- loooN!ul to

de. . . ._, Ad• • •

'*- ,....

..... of . . ~6) Ari . . . . . . ~ ... 1.&_ ..."..,: 't7 Srld.tIb

who oW'" ttsa\ Arl.,ad1· . . . 11... ., .. . , .....da __ betIrec ttl_ 8Ild
the ..1.e ..,.. , ...

,1fIOe.

The NUOIl tor ttd.e d8a1al ... araotb.. _ .....f

Jlacedonian this tiM by the San

Marta governMnt -.bloh considered the

ahip

tfro;yal1st ll propert,.. While San Mart!n ,was buy occUP1iDl Lim&" Sa;ith reai....

in Upper Pera .tUl controlled b7 t-belo,-ali.te •. Att..rSan

llartin cOBvollecl

L1u.. $rdth dec14edto avan himself ot the Lima. lI&l'UU NId coui&D8d. a oa'l"l.
to 4bact!a and lriaendl, hi8 uual co._ion m.erohu:t.a.

It turned out tbat

the bou.. ot Abad!a and Ar.1aaeadl bad. bun dl.101ved by the San Uartfa &0V9.1'Il-

ment

du6

to 1t. conneetion with the 107a11st reg1lle. 'I'hB carao

signed to tbt! 1n61i$h house of Juan

Wall

Thtra.1tel. the )(acedolliM: RS then

over by the Lima lOVeJ'llMnt to befitted. ,outa. a Yes..l-of....ar.

3'Odpd to. be the propert,- of tbe Spanish
to the use of the Itat•• ·& Sllith.

Ulen cont.aUta

It wu

"1'1&- Ari_J1dl and 1100114........

"a. "err di..,..,haDted with San »arth and

in a letter to 101m S. Illery, Sept.lIbel' 11, 1822, JUde the stat.eaent that
1'roteoterat. Peru was in a terrible oond1tton.

The Ban lIarth

l'8gt." be

olaimed., had no resources "except that ot laJing contr1butioJ18tt and he di4

not believe -that. San Karta wUl be able to hold cut. two months. u be baa

alr.~

'beco_

verr \UlPOPular

alIlODg

the LiMllU. ,1.6

Mathison aal'Md. w1th II1th with

Ban

Jartln

"~t

to ttle cbaD1.ic 'Co»4lt-ion of i.ba

1'8,ia. .. bell.wei t.ha.t the c0Dt1• •.,1on of Brlt,uh u.cl Aaarlcu

vessels tor blookade runnine de.mand.d t.he protection of naular11 ••tab11aW
ccm.ula charged with protecting toreienproP4'n,...66 Coohra.' • .,o\1&U. .

64. Ibid •• 1S4-86iM81m. l.epq to Don l'uuel C&n'Illo. inv07 Ixttr&OJ'Cl1Dar;r

.,o!dIi:
6S. .!!!J.!•• ,,,.

66. .this. . luratt.,.. t6)-A.

..:rUe.. chapter.

Tbere .a 1IlCuh controYertr1' .•• towhether or not tbe San lla.rt!.n Protector'ate J)I"Ombcmeticial to a 11berate4"_. lo11ew:1ng an interview 'rlth San
his rfJti~nt. as ~tGr, ~vost wr«>te

Marth. in Va,lparai ..,Rbjllquent to

a _Jtinteftstblg letter to 8eer4ttU7ot State. Adams.
,",,"It ~....

ftJ'prift

,tt.t

San

M.u-tbt stiU

Elated I QTe1Iber2, 1821

nttained oommand

ot the a%'lt"

ad ........,.t17 at1eipating lome exhibition or pTlbU.o teeltng in tima, ,...

fll\1riag hi.

NtVl)

al.. belie_ tbat

to pre.ide at the h.adot that 10000:rnment••61 Prevost

s..Jlart.b

lIOuld be ver:r d.1sappo1nted it he expected a

pabUoebow1Jl1 ..... be cttdnot appear suf.f'1cientl;y aware of his lossot

populuit7.
Much of

t]:,a

di.satistaction with the Proteetorate was due to the aotlv11S111

ota latym1niater, BernardoUenteagudo. Vier8 claimed that as long as Bonta.gudo 1fU inottiae prl.....t. property was not 8ldo, cO!ln!lel"ee l-.gged. mQney bee.... lItUlree .8l'ld pa;p.? aQ!187. virtually worthless. 68
de.~

and

the)" whodat"ed to retu.ae payment in

with. brpr1~t and contl.ation.

Publio confidence was
paper money were threatened

Oortf'ronted on all sides by d1f.flcult1.a

he could not control San Martin abdicated as ProteetorSeptember

an,

16!2.

Follo"bl.g San Martin'. abdication, 'orbes reported to Adams on the eir-cuaatane••

~.

aueh a

1lOTe."

One ,....on wu the attitude ot the

67.. Special ",eats P,,'8voat. B1d41e,.DoJT, Pnftn to Adaa, h.,. 2. 18ft.
66. Jfiers. Tra'Mla

.!! eWe. u, 78-7'.

69. U.. $. ConrNla B.A., JulJ'" 1821-.&....... 6, 1826. forbea to Ad.a,
Oct. 1, 18ft.

Ch11e~ gO'ftrl'lllfSnt1l'M.ah luppOrte4 Ceeht'ul ag~at San Jfart!n.
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that.j,t.4&e 'beentbe 1Q.~ otJu4Q laeariot."· Forbes

·hoPflC1tb$t.1Jol1v~ lVQuld trl~ht,fIr. civil war;tp Pt;'\l wa.V8r:/ PM81ble
wU.~i Jol1.~ ~_ 4"-:tator.

~\MrtAe .11b..rato, would be able to calm .

tbac.o...re1al.cl. . . . and ntain

1(U

ano~T

t~

con£i.r..ceo! interested lox-.i&l'lpoqn

-.tter. tthe meet.i• •t. 0.,,44\111 ptovedmo.nto\\i f,nd_e4.Ua

k1...... 'iveJ;, it "AI ..

ld...

of deat,h tor the pC)ll t.ical and eomm.ercial

..wltioruJ of hoMctor 30" 4•. s.n kart!a.

CONCLU5101
San Martin promised an end to the Spanish colonial closed port .,.stera.

Prior to the Chile an capaign, during the Chilean campaign and during the
PeruTian campaign, San Martin personally or through various officials and
friends favored the extension of commercial advantages to both Great Britain
and the United States.

Considerable favoritisa toward the British existed,

a favoriti_ JlUCh envied by commercial interests in the United States.

Promi ••

made by San Marta in the Chilean campaign were kept, for with the completion
of Chilean independence in 1818 free trade existed.

Individuals or companies

representing business interests in Great Britain, United States, Argentina,
and Chile, who either outfitted or financially aided the Peruvian expedition

were granted concessions.
A.lthough supporting the rebel forces, unofficially of course, British
and North American mercantile interests indulged in contraband trade.

illegal trade was backed up by naval forces

1'1'011

This

their respective countr1es.

These same interests urged the establishment of conaular agents and special

agents empowered to protect their pro;ert,..
had

British and .American merchants

two big headaches' the Spanish naTT but most of all Cochrane. The Spanish

navy was a poor match for British and American gunboats.

The Peruvian Vice-

roys found they could not convince Ferdinand VII to revamp his monopolistic
syste. nor were they able to auppress the illegal trade.
another matter.

Cochrane was quite

Theoretically responding to Chilean control and instruoted

to complement San MartIn' s land forces, Cochrane proceeded to act independent17
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28,
much to the chagrin of the Chilean government. San Martin. and British and
American businessmen.

Oochrane too believed in tree trade but his confis-

cations and "noating customhouse*' widened the breach already' existing between
himself and San Ilart!n.

Both favored tree trade but differed as to how to

achieve it.
Peace negotiations wi tJl Viceroys Pesuela and La Serna failed and San
Martin proclaimed Peruvian independence in Lima.

Ilonarchiacall,. inclined but

pledged to guarantee the liberal principle of tree trade. San Martin issued
various laws to guarantee such a trade.

The Reglamento Provisional ~

Camercio, Supleaento.!l Reg1amento Provisional

2

Oomereio, !51amento

S!!.

Camercio Istransero, the Provisional Statute, and numerous other law. evideneed his convictions regarding free trade.

Documenta.r)r proof attests to

the fact that San Martin .fulfilled JU.n7 proJlised cOJllmercial concessions.
Success did not bring reconciliation with Cochrane.
clamored for more privileges.

Chilean support vaccilated.

Mercantile interests
Duties once termed

moderate were considered increasingl,. prohibitive and designed to favor
Peruvians and Chileans.

These .ere two excellent reasona for British and

American disenchantment.
aggravation.

Protest brought little satisfaction and much

Contemporaries depicted the sad Qommercia1 and financial state

of Protectorate Peru.

The need for loans increased and regulations fell far

short of the propo.ed end.
Political difference. between San Martin and Bolivar were not 80le1,.
responsible for San Martin's abdication as Protector of Peru.
preached and delivered .free trade.

San Martin

His difficulties stemmed frOll fiscal and
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tracte problema, inability to draft and enforce commercial lawa and the inevitable demand. for favored treatment nth which he could not cope.
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